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ABSTRACT
INTERNSHIP EQUIVALENCY AT 
THE OFFICE OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER 
XM1 TANK SYSTEMS 
Paul Michael Root, B. S., United States Military Academy 
Master of Science, Stanford University
Chairman of Advisory Committee: Dr. Don E. Bray
This report discusses the author's engineering 
experiences while a member of the Office of the Program 
Manager, XM1 Tank Systems, from December 1976 until June 
1980. A report on this experience plus twelve additional 
hours of coursework were substituted for an internship in 
accordance with requirements established by the College 
of Engineering.
The experience gained by the author in his 
assignment can be directly related to the two general 
objectives of an internship:
1. To demonstrate and enhance his ability to apply 
both knowledge and technical training by 
demonstrating an identifiable contribution to the 
organization in which the intern served.
2. To enable the intern to function in a non-academic
environment in which he will become aware of his 
employer's approach to the solution of problems, 
especially those of a non-technical nature.
The author served in the Automotive Branch of the 
Systems Engineering Division and was the Program 
Manager's principal representative on all matters 
concerning the AGT 1500 turbine engine and related 
systems for the XM1 Tank. Additionally, he was assigned 
responsibilities in many areas not directly related to 
the engine. This report discusses some of his major 
areas of responsibility and his contributions in those 
areas. Several general observations concerning his 
experiences are also discussed.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This report documents the prior professional work 
experience of PAUL M. ROOT which is being submitted, 
along with twelve additional hours of coursework, in lieu 
of the internship requirement for the Doctor of 
Engineering degree.
Waiver Of Internship
There are two primary objectives of the internship:
1. To enable the student to demonstrate 
and enhance his or her abilities to apply both 
knowledge and technical training by making an 
identifiable contribution in an area of 
practical concern to the organization or 
industry in which the internship is served.
2. To enable the student to function in a 
non-academic environment in a position in which 
he or she will become aware of the employer's 
approach to problems, in addition to those 
approaches of traditional engineering design or 
analysis.(1)
1. "Doctor of Engineering Program Manual", College of 
Engineering, Texas A&M University, undated, p.5.
At the time of the author's entry into the Doctor of 
Engineering program, it was possible for the internship 
to be waived if the candidate had extensive experience of 
a suitable nature prior to entering the program.
In addition to other assignments of an engineering 
nature during his Army career, the author had spent three 
and one half years in the Automotive Branch of the 
Systems Engineering Division, Office of the Program 
Manager, XM1 Tank Systems (now Ml Tank Systems). During 
that period he was responsible for managing and 
monitoring the development of the AGT 1500 turbine engine 
for the XM1 tank. This experience has been allowed to be 
used in lieu of a separate internship.
Qualifications
When he served in the Program Manager's office, the 
author was a Major in the United States Army. He is now a 
Lieutenant Colonel and has over seventeen years of active 
military service. During this time he has attended 
various schools and held a wide variety of assignments.
His academic achievements include:
Master of Science, Mechanical Engineering, Stanford 
University, 1969
Graduate, Royal Armour Corps Long Armour Infantry 
Course, England, 1972
Graduate, US Army Command and General Staff College, 
1976
Graduate, Defense Systems Management College, 1976 
Significant assignments include:
Research and Development Coordinator, US Army Test 
and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Md., 1970-71
Instructor, Course Director, and Assistant 
Professor, Department of Engineering, United States 
Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1973-1976
Research and Development Coordinator, Office of the 
Program Manager, XM1 Tank Systems, Warren, Mi., 
1976-1980
Tank Modernization Officer, Joint United States 
Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, Ankara, Turkey, 
1980-1982
The author has been a Registered Professional
Engineer in the State of Virginia since 1976.
Organization Of Report
The remainder of this report is organized into 
several chapters and appendices. Chapter 2 describes the 
Office of the Program Manager, XM1 Tank Systems, its 
purpose, organization, and the author's position.
Chapters 3 through 10 detail some of the major projects 
with which the author was involved, and the final chapter 
summarizes some observations made by the author during 
his assignment.
Chapter 2
OFFICE OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER, XM1 TANK SYSTEMS
General
The Secretary of the Army has the authority to 
appoint a Program Manager for Research, Development and 
Acquisition programs which will have a major impact on 
the Army. The Program Manager is delegated the full line 
authority of the Commanding General, US Army Materiel 
Development and Readiness Command for the centralized 
management of his assigned program. He is totally 
responsible for the success or failure of his program, 
and is the single point of contact for all decisions 
regarding his program. A Program Manager is an Army 
officer in the rank of Colonel, Brigadier General, or 
Major General, depending on the size, importance, cost, 
and visibility of the program. He is a commissioned 
officer, rather than a Civil Servant, so that he can be 
expeditiously replaced if the occasion should arise, a 
procedure not possible with members of the Civil Service.
The Program Manager usually has extensive field 
experience and a background in logistics, research and 
development, or program management. His most important 
attribute is that of a good manager, followed closely by 
his ability as a spokesman and salesman for his program 
to a wide variety of audiences, most notably Congress, 
which must annually authorize funding for the program.
To assist him in his task, he commands a Program 
Manager's Office, formed especially for his program and 
staffed with military and civilian personnel who have, 
expertise in the areas required for effective management 
of the program. Depending on the program, his staff 
might include specialists in contracting, budgeting, 
logistics, systems engineering, production, procurement, 
product assurance, cost management, and other fields as 
required. Field Offices and Liaison Offices may be 
established at various military installations and test 
sites as required.
The organization of a Program Manager's Office is 
not static, but changes during the life of the program as 
it progresses through various phases. For instance, a 
logistics division may be minimally staffed during the 
early development stages of a program, but may become the 
prime reason for the continuation of a Program Manager's 
Office once the equipment is produced and fielded.
Program Manager's Office, XM1 Tank Systems
A Program Manager was appointed for the XM1 Tank 
Systems in 1973 after the termination of the joint United 
States-Federal Republic of Germany MBT 70 tank program.
In authorizing the Army to begin development of a new 
tank, Congress, which was concerned with the failure of 
the previous program and the long development period for 
new military hardware, mandated that the first production 
should begin in 1980, thus allowing only seven years for 
design, development and testing of the new tank. While 
this may seem like a sufficient time, it was three years 
shorter than prudent estimates of the required 
development time, and would result in many problems.
The Program Manager's Office is located in Warren, 
Michigan, near the US Army Tank Automotive Command, from 
which most of its civilian personnel were drawn. It was 
initially staffed with approximately twenty officers and 
forty civilians and had grown by 1980 to approximately 45 
military personnel and one hundred civilians. In 1980 
liaison offices existed in Washington, DC, and Bonn, 
Germany, and field offices existed at Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Md., Fort Knox, Ky., and Fort Hood, Tx. A
subordinate Program Manager for Tank Main Armament 
Systems was located at Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ.
Program History
The XM1 tank program was divided into three phases: 
Engineering Design, Full Scale Engineering Development 
(FSED), and Production. The Engineering Design phase was 
competitive and lasted three years. General Motors and 
Chrysler Defense Division both received contracts to 
develop one prototype tank and one automotive test 
vehicle. These were tested against the requirements 
specified in the Materiel Need document, an Army document 
which stated the performance requirements which the tank 
must meet. Many of these requirements were stated as 
minimum threshholds which the contractor had to meet, but 
could exceed, and by so doing receive additional credit 
in that area of performance evaluation. This allowed the 
contractor to make tradeoffs and optimize his vehicle 
design within the broadly stated performance parameters. 
It was hoped that this competitive procedure would result 
in the best possible tank.
The prototype tanks and automotive test vehicles 
were tested at Aberdeen Proving Ground by the US Army
Test and Evaluation Command in 1975 and early 1976. The 
results were used in the selection of the contractor for 
the next phase of the development program.
The selection of the contractor for the Full Scale 
Engineering Development phase of the program was of great 
importance, since that contractor would also receive the 
production contract for the tank, the ultimate payoff of 
the program. For this reason, absolute fairness and 
impartiality was required in the Source Selection 
Process. A three-tiered procedure was used. In addition 
to the performance of the prototypes, each contractor's 
proposal for the next phase would be evaluated in the 
areas of cost, performance and schedule. Each factor to 
be evaluated was enumerated, and a numerical scale was 
established for each factor to compare the performance of 
the two contractor's vehicles.
A Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) was 
established to evaluate each factor considered in the 
decision. Its deliberations took a considerable period 
of time, and its findings were strictly limited to the 
scoring of each factor. It did not make a recommendation 
as to which contractor should be awarded the contract.
The Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC), 
consisting of senior personnel in Washington, DC,
received the report of the SSEB, and applied relative 
weights, which it independently determined, to each 
factor under consideration. The product of the score for 
each decision factor and its relative weight was then 
summed for each contractor. The SSAC then recommended 
that the contractor with the higher overall score receive 
the contract.
The SSAC made its recommendation to the Source 
Selection Authority (SSA), the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering. The SSA is not 
bound by the recommendations of the SSAC, but usually 
follows them.
The actual reports of the SSEB and SSAC are not 
available since they are highly sensitive, but the 
ultimate result was that Chrysler Defense Division 
received the contract for Full Scale Engineering 
Development in November 1976. The contract was a "Cost 
Plus Incentive Fee and Award Fee" type and the value was 
approximately $243 million. The incentives were based on 
actual costs being less than budgeted costs and were 
enumerated in the contract, but the award fee was solely 
at the discretion of the Program Manager, up to a maximum 
amount. He could withhold or award any or all of it 
based upon his evaluation of the contractor's 
performance, or he could defer a part of it to a later
period, and the contractor had no recourse. The award 
fee was'the Program Manager's leverage with the 
contractor to insure the technical quality of the tank as 
opposed to the cost, which was covered by the incentive 
fee. The major motivation to the contractor, however, 
was the fact that if the development program was not 
successful, the tank would not go to production, and the 
production contract was the prize. The recent failure of 
the MBT 70 tank program underscored that possibility.
The objectives of FSED were to prove the 
contractor's design, determine the tank's suitability for 
use by the Army, and insure readiness for production . 
These objectives were to be met by production of eleven 
prototype tanks and an extensive vehicle and component 
test program. A photo of the XM1 is at Figure 1.
The vehicle testing included contractor's testing, 
Development (engineering) testing at various government 
test sites, and Operational testing, involving a platoon 
of five tanks tested under field conditions by soldiers 
at Ft. Bliss, TX. The performance in the Development and 
Operational testing was evaluated against requirements as 
stated in the Materiel Need Document, and all failures 
and problems were scored using an elaborate system which
/
XM1 Tank (3/4 Left Front View)
XM1 Tank (3/4 Right Front View)
Figure 1. XMl Tank
assessed Mission Reliability and Combat Mission 
reliability, and compared those reliabilities, stated as 
Mean Miles Between Failures (MMBF), against the stated 
requirements. Normally, contractor testing would precede 
Development and Operational testing so that the 
contractor could correct design problems discovered prior 
to government testing. The compressed development 
schedule did not allow for this, however, and Development 
and Operational testing were well underway prior to the 
start of any contractor testing. Many problems which 
should have been discovered and corrected during 
contractor testing were not uncovered until Development 
and Operational testing, and these problems caused the 
tank to receive much bad publicity.
Component testing, on the other hand, was generally 
conducted to insure a component's design maturity prior 
to testing in the tank. A notable exception was the 
engine, which had separate durability requirements which 
had to be met in component testing.
The FSED phase lasted until early 1980 when the 
first production tank was accepted by the Army. When the 
tank entered production, the "X" was dropped from its . 
designation, and it became the Ml Abrams Tank, named 
after General Creighton Abrams, an Armor officer and 
former Chief of Staff of the Army. Production initially
began at a low rate at the Lima Army Tank Plant, Lima, 
Ohio, and has grown to sixty per month with the addition 
of the Detroit Army Tank Plant. As of 1980, production 
was scheduled to continue through 1989 with a total 
production of over 7,000 tanks.
AVCO Lycoming AGT 1500 Turbine Engine
As long as the tank met the performance requirements 
of the Materiel Need document, each contractor was free 
to choose those components he desired, including the type 
of engine. General Motors had chosen a 1500 HP variable 
compression ratio diesel engine for its tank, and 
Chrysler had chosen the AVCO Lycoming 1500 HP recuperated 
gas turbine engine for its version.
The turbine engine had been under development by the 
Tank Automotive Command since 1965, and Chrysler chose it 
for its tank due to its light weight, size, and 
performance. The engine was not fully developed prior to 
being included in Chrysler's tank, and the result was 
that the tank and the engine were being developed 
concurrently, which resulted in many problems. A drawing 
of the engine is at Figure 2.
The engine had been developed specifically for
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ground vehicle usage, and weight was not as important as 
in aircraft applications. The engine housings were 
constructed of inexpensive steels and cast irons rather 
than lightweight alloys, and this contributed to the 
engine's ruggedness and weight of 2500 lb., compared to 
400 lb. for an aircraft turbine of similar power. 
Another factor contributing to the engine's weight was 
the recuperator, or heat exchanger, which preheated the 
incoming compressed air to the combustor and greatly 
reduced the fuel consumption at part power.
To be compatible with the Army's logistics system, 
the engine was multifuel: its normal fuel was diesel 
grade DF2, but it could burn any vehicular grade of 
diesel fuel, jet fuel, or gasoline with no adjustments 
and no damage to the engine. The fuel flow rate to the 
combustor was controlled by the turbine inlet 
temperature, and no matter what fuel was being used, the 
fuel control would prevent the maximum allowable turbine 
inlet temperature from being exceeded.
The engine was built in three major modules: the 
forward, rear, and accessory, gearbox modules (Figure 3). 
These could be replaced by maintenance personnel in the 
field with few special tools and no critical alignments; 
the modules just bolted together. Most engine
Figure 3. AGT 1500 Modular Construction
accessories including the starter, fuel nozzle and oil 
filter could be replaced without removing the engine from 
the tank, thus greatly facilitating maintenance.
The turbine required no external cooling system, 
either air or water, as a diesel engine would, but the 
airflow through the engine was.much greater than would 
have been the case for a comparable diesel engine, and 
this was potentially a source of problems. At maximum 
power the engine required 10,000 CFM of filtered air, and 
consequently the air filters had to be large. There had 
been no problem with them during the competitive phase of 
development, but poor air filtration was to cause many 
problems during FSED.
The Author1s Assignment
The author was assigned to the Automotive Branch of 
the Systems Engineering Division in December, 1976, and 
remained there until July, 1980, when he was reassigned 
to Ankara, Turkey. His assignment coincided with the FSED 
phase of the development of the tank.
The Systems Engineering Division of the Program 
Manager's Office was responsible for management of the 
technical development of the XM1 tank. It contained a
Firepower Branch, responsible for the armament and fire 
control systems, an Armor Branch, responsible for the 
development of the secret "Special Armor" which gave the 
tank protection far superior to that of any other tank in 
the world, a Product Assurance and Test Branch, 
responsible for quality control and monitoring the 
conduct of the Development and Operational tests, a 
Systems Integration Branch, responsible for insuring the 
effectiveness of the total system, and the Automotive 
Branch, which was responsible for the automotive systems 
in the tank, including the engine, transmission, 
electrical, fuel, track, suspension and auxiliary 
automotive systems.
The Automotive Branch was staffed by three Civil 
Service engineers, a secretary, and the author. The 
Branch Chief was initially Mr. Irv Smith. During the 
author's assignment Mr. Smith took a position with 
civilian industry, and the author became acting Branch 
Chief for several months. Mr. Lou Gerback was assigned 
as Branch Chief and remains in that position. Mr. Will 
Harju was responsible for the hull electrical and 
auxiliary automotive systems, including the track and 
suspension, and Mr. Bill Appleyard was responsible for 
the transmission. The author was responsible for the 
engine and related systems. For most of his assignment,
the author was the only officer in the Program Manager's 
Office serving in a technical engineering position.
During the author's assignment the engine progressed 
from advanced engineering development to a mature design, 
ready for production, due to extensive engineering effort 
on the part of AVCO Lycoming and an extensive test 
program consisting of both laboratory engine tests and 
vehicle tests for performance, reliability, and 
durability. The value of the contracts for engine 
development during FSED was approximately $50 million.
The author's responsibilities included:
1. Managing the $50 million engine development program 
for the XMl tank.
2. Acting as military advisor to the Chief, Automotive 
Branch, with respect to vehicle mobility, agility, 
and vulnerability.
3. Developing, designing, managing, and evaluating 
laboratory and vehicle test programs for the engine 
and related automotive systems.
4. Evaluating engine and powerpack performance, 
reliability and durability.
5. Preparing and presenting technical briefings on the
engine, including acting as principal briefer to 
other US government agencies and foreign 
governments.
6. Representing the Program Manager with other 
agencies on related engine and automotive 
programs.
The relationship between the author, as the 
representative of the Program Manager, and AVCO Lycoming, 
the contractor for the engine, was unique. Chrysler 
Defense Division was the prime contractor for the tank, 
and AVCO Lycoming was the subcontractor for the engine. 
Chrysler had "total system responsibility" for the tank, 
which gave it nearly total engineering freedom, so long 
as the tank met the stated requirements. Any directions 
given to the contractor had to be formalized with 
contract modifications and usually involved additional 
costs. Only the designated contracting officer in the 
Program Manager's Office could legally direct the 
contractor to change the scope of work of the contract, 
so the author could not directly order either Chrysler or 
AVCO to do anything. His success depended on his 
credibility, rapport, and ability to convince the 
contractor that what needed to be done would benefit the 
program. Fortunately, most of the people encountered 
were dedicated to the program's success and to fielding
the best engine possible in the tank, and cooperation was 
the order of the day. When problems arose, people 
attempted to solve them in a manner which would result in 
the best possible tank.
Although the author's formal assignment was 
responsibility for the engine and related systems, his 
actual job encompassed much more than the technical 
aspects of those systems. The Program Manager's Office 
was created to develop and field the tank, and most 
personnel were "mission oriented", that is, they did 
whatever jobs were necessary or assigned to accomplish 
the job at hand, without regard to job title. One of the 
factors which made the author's assignment to the Program 
Manager's Office so enjoyable was the wide variety of 
projects in which he became involved. The following 
chapters describe some of the major areas in which the 
author became involved and his responsibilities in those 
areas.
Chapter 3 
THE AGT 1500 TURBINE ENGINE
The author's principal responsibility was to become 
the Program Manager's representative for the engine, not 
only for the technical aspects, but the operational 
aspects as well. One of his early tasks was to write a 
"Fact Sheet" about the engine, its technical operation 
and functioning, and the status and cost of the engine 
development program. This was used by the Program 
Manager as a refresher before he testified at 
Congressional Budget Hearings on the tank (Appendix A-l), 
and by others to familiarize themselves with the engine.
During this testimony, it was commonplace that many 
technical questions were not answered during the Hearings 
themselves, but that the answers would be provided for 
the Congressional Record. An example of these questions, 
and the answers written by the author, is given in 
Appendix A-2.
A significant amount of time was spent at the 
contractor's plant observing engine assembly,
disassembly, testing, and participating in engine 
teardowns and failure analysis. The author investigated 
engine failures which resulted from laboratory .and 
vehicle testing and wrote the reports on those failures, 
including analysis of the contractor's proposed 
corrective actions. These were used to inform the 
Program Manager of the nature of the failures and the 
adequacy of the contractor's proposed actions. Examples 
of these reports are at Appendices A-3 and A-4. The 
author's report on an incorrect bearing assembly in the 
engine, which led to several engine failures and a 
redesign of the component is at Appendix A-5.
One of the more interesting failures occurred when 
the first stage Low Pressure turbine failed during 
operation. The Low Pressure turbine was an integrally 
cast wheel and disc. It was initially cast from a high 
nickel alloy material, C101, but it was changed to C103, 
a slightly different material which had somewhat better 
stress rupture properties. It appeared to be a minor 
change. This material had been extensively used for 
turbine blades in the past but had not been used in 
integrally cast disc and blade assemblies. Investigation 
of the failure showed that a fatigue fracture had started 
at the trailing edge of one of the blades. The 
manufacturer's report concluded that the wheel had failed
from a combination of low and high cycle fatigue.
Miner's Rule was being used'by the manufacturer to 
predict fatigue life under the combined high and low 
cycle fatigue loading which was encountered during normal 
operation. This criteria states that fatigue failure 
will occur when the sum of the life fractions of fatigue 
at each stress level add up to one. The manufacturer 
stated that the failure occurred at a life of .33 as 
predicted by Miner's Rule, and that there were 
"synergistic effects of transients not previously 
observed in industry," which were responsible for the 
failure. This conclusion was accepted by the prime 
contractor, the author, and several outside experts in 
turbine engine design, who had been brought in as 
consultants for solution of the problem.
The problem was eventually solved by redesign of the 
wheel. The final design used a forged disc and 
individually inserted cast blades, and the problem did 
not recur. However, while at Texas A&M, the author had 
the opportunity to investigate the problem further. He 
discovered that the engine manufacturer's conclusion that 
the failure was due to previously unobserved effects was 
incorrect. His investigation showed that Miner's Rule 
was, at best, a poor approximation for life under 
combined fatigue loading, and that experimental results
gave failures at Miner's Rule values of .3 to 1.5. 
Additionally, agreement to a factor of 2 is considered 
good for pure low cycle fatigue experiments, so a wide 
scatter band should have been expected, and, in fact, the 
failure occurred at what should have been considered the 
low end of the band. This "turbine fatigue" problem has 
since been observed in other turbine engines run to 
continuously varying duty cycles. The engine for the 
F-16 fighter aircraft encountered this problem.
Twenty new engines had been built for the FSED phase 
of the program, and by the end of the phase there had 
been forty engine failures which occurred in vehicles 
undergoing test, and sixteen engines had been removed for 
major repair prior to failure. The choice of the turbine 
engine had been somewhat controversial and news of the 
failures traveled quickly. One of the author's 
continuing tasks was to compile and periodically update a 
"FACT SHEET" categorizing all the failures and listing 
the corrective action taken to prevent similar failures 
in the future. These reports were important because the 
engine had a durability requirement of a "50% probability 
of going 4,000 miles without a durability failure", and 
it was obvious merely from the number of failures that 
the engine would not meet that requirement. Therefore 
accurate knowledge of the number of failures, their
cause, and corrective action was of great interest to 
many people, both inside and outside the Program Office. 
Appendix A-6 is the updated Fact Sheet written by the 
author near the end of the FSED phase.
The author also spent considerable time at the field 
test sites observing the operation of the engine and the 
tank during both Operational and Development tests and 
troubleshooting and reporting on problems (Appendices A-7 
and A-8). These observations and discussions with 
soldiers who operated the tank provided valuable 
information concerning actual problems, practical 
solutions to those problems, and suggestions for 
realistic improvements to operating procedures.
As the Program Manager's representative for the 
engine, the author prepared and gave numerous briefings. 
Since this was the first turbine engine ever used in a 
military ground vehicle, few people were familiar with 
the operation of a turbine engine. Those who were had 
been exposed to helicopter engines, and the AGT 1500 bore 
little resemblance to an aviation turbine. The author 
briefed visitors to the Program Office, senior Army 
officers and civilians, Congressional Staff members, and 
members of foreign governments which had expressed an 
interest in the new tank. As testing progressed these 
briefings grew to include engine failure analysis and
comparison with other engines, including diesels and 
helicopter turbines which outsiders felt might be 
suitable substitute engines for the tank in case the 
current engine development was not successful. Copies of 
the Vu-graphs from a representative briefing written and 
presented by the author are at Appendix A-9.
Chapter 4 
RELATED SYSTEMS
The author's responsibilities extended to those 
systems related directly to the engine and included the 
air induction and filtration system, the electronic fuel 
control, the fuel pumps and filters, and the lubrication 
system. Of these, the air filtration system caused the 
most problems and received the greatest amount of 
publicity.
Air Cleaner
The air cleaner system consisted of a large 
rectangular box into which three "V"-shaped filters were 
inserted. Air entered a centrifugal precleaner at the 
top of the box, and then passed through the outside of 
the "V"-pacs and the filtered air left through the top of 
the "V". The "V"-pacs were held against openings at the 
end of the box by a lever and cam system, and there were 
rubber seals on the top of the filters to insure no
unfiltered air bypassed the filters. The filtered air 
•then passed through a plenum where it was directed into 
the engine inlet. A large flexible rubber seal connected 
the air plenum to the engine inlet. Appendix B-l is a 
schematic of the system.
There had been no problem with the air filtration 
system during the engineering design phase, but as soon 
as the FSED tanks began testing at Ft. Bliss, TX, engine 
failures due to dust ingestion began, and they plagued 
the tank throughout its testing. Nine engine failures 
and two removals prior to failure were attributed to the 
air filtration system. Appendix B-2 is the author's 
report on one of the engines which failed due to dust 
ingestion.
The problem was traced to the production of the 
filter system. Chrysler had decided to manufacture the 
box itself, welding it from aluminum plate. They did not 
hold the tolerances close enough, and the end of the box 
with the openings for the filtered air was not 
perpendicular to the floor of the box. Consequently, the 
seals of the "V"-pacs did not contact the box all the way 
around the end of the filter, and unfiltered air entered 
the engine. Additionally, the seals themselves, which 
were cemented to the end of the "V"-pacs, were subject to 
damage and could be stripped from the filter on
installation, also allowing unfiltered air to bypass the 
filters.
This problem was compounded by two other factors. 
First, the sand at Ft. Bliss is silica-based and 
extremely abrasive, and sand ingestion is a problem there 
for all types of engines, not just the turbine. When 
sand entered the turbine engine, it would abrade the 
compressor blades, changing their airfoil shape and 
eventually causing compressor surge. As it passed 
through the combustor, it would melt, and then resolidify 
on the turbine blades as it cooled.
Second, the first stage of the high pressure 
compressor had a very short surge life and would fail 
catastrophically, damaging subsequent compressor stages. 
This occurred with little or no prior warning.
The turbine engine received very bad publicity from 
these failures, although the major problem was with the 
air filters, and the engine manufacturer, AVCO Lycoming 
had no responsibility for them. A great deal of the 
author's time was spent with Chrysler and AVCO Lycoming 
evaluating these failures, determining corrective 
actions, and planning for their implementation and 
phasing into the ongoing test program. Appendix B-3 
details one of the early meetings in which the author
participated. Further time was spent in authoring Fact 
Sheets and giving briefings on these failures and the 
design changes which would eliminate the problem. An 
Information Paper on the subject, written by the author, 
is at Appendix B-4.
The problem was solved by several design changes. 
Production standards on the air cleaner boxes were 
tightened so the ends were square. The seals were 
recessed in grooves in the air cleaner box to protect 
them from damage, and the top of the "V"-pacs were 
modified to have a raised lip which engaged the recessed 
seals (see Appendix B-5). The lever and camming 
mechanism, which held the "V"-pacs in place was modified 
so that the air precleaner could not be installed unless 
the nV n-pacs were properly installed. Additionally, AVCO 
redesigned the first stage of the high pressure 
compressor so that it had a much greater surge life and 
thereby could tolerate more erosion prior to failure.
It took some time to implement all the design 
changes, and positive confirmation was required of their 
effectiveness. In late summer and early fall of 1979 a 
1,300 mile test was designed and run in the dust bowl 
area of White Sands Missile Range, adjacent to Ft. Bliss. 
The tank used had all the air cleaner modifications on 
it. The author assisted in setting up the test courses
(see Appendix B-6), and evaluated the conduct of the test 
(Appendix B-7). The engine was calibrated before and 
after the test, and no engine degradation was found. The 
modifications subsequently entered production. The major 
difficulty was convincing decision makers, who were 
generally non-engineers, that the problem was being 
solved, that the design changes appeared adequate, that 
there would be sufficient testing to confirm the changes, 
and that the engine could operate in a dusty, sandy, 
desert environment.
One problem left unsolved was the difficulty of 
cleaning the "V'-pacs. When clogged they contained 20-25 
pounds of dust, and they were cleaned with compressed 
air, a job that could take over an hour per "V"-pac. In 
addition to being an extremely dirty job, it would take a 
tank company of seventeen tanks (51 "V"-pacs) many hours 
to clean all their filters completely since there are 
very few adequate sources of compressed air in a tank 
company. A method of partially cleaning the "V"-pacs in 
the field by gently dropping them on a flat surface was 
developed to allow expeditious cleaning and this proved 
satisfactory. When the author departed the program 
proposals for other methods of cleaning the filters were 
being evaluated, and the author is unaware of the current 
status of this problem.
New air filter concepts and designs were also being 
studied, and the author evaluated them. Most novel among 
these was one which cleaned itself periodically by 
automatically vacuuming its surface. It was an 
interesting concept, but the author felt its major 
drawbacks were its extreme mechanical complexity and 
small dust capacity should the self-cleaning feature 
break down.
Fuel Control
The engine had an analog electronic fuel control, 
unlike most turbine fuel controls which were 
hydromechanical, and it was a new design for FSED. It was 
designed to sense several parameters during engine start 
and operation and either shut down the engine or reduce 
its power if the parameters were not within the 
prescribed operating windows. The control monitored 
engine speed, turbine inlet temperature, battery voltage, 
oil pressure, and several other parameters. The author 
wrote several memoranda and Fact Sheets explaining the 
fuel control's operation to other members of the Program 
Office (Appendices B-8 and B-9). Additionally, it was 
found that the draft Operator's Manuals for the tank did 
not adequately explain the starting procedure, so the
author addressed it in a Memorandum which was intended to 
be included in a revision to the manual (see Appendix 
B-10) .
The fuel control had several design problems which 
were discovered during testing and had. to be rapidly 
corrected. Ideally they would have been discovered 
during contractor testing, but due to the accelerated 
program schedule, they were first encountered in 
Operational or Development testing where they were 
treated as failures for scoring purposes. It was found 
that the operating windows for some of the control 
parameters were too restrictive and in some cases the 
engine would not be allowed to start. In other cases it 
was found that engine power would be reduced when it was 
not necessary because the control had sensed a problem 
which did not really exist. The author participated, as 
the representative of the Program Manager, in the 
decisions for the reprogramming of the fuel control. 
Fortunately, the fuel control manufacturer was able to 
correct these problems rapidly since they involved 
changing components on a printed circuit board and not 
the remachining of complex cams and levers as would have 
been the case if it had been a hydromechanical fuel 
control.
One of the persistent complaints about the engine
was unexplained "vehicle loss of power". A driver would 
somehow sense that the tank had less power than it 
previously had, and would enter the report in the 
logbook. During vehicle testing, this would be scored as 
a failure, and in some instances the engine and fuel 
control were operating as they had been designed to. It 
became necessary for the author to write a memorandum 
explaining the function of the fuel control, its 
protective modes which resulted in "loss of power", and 
the procedures for resetting the fuel control for full 
power operation (Appendix B-ll). This was sent to the 
test sites and, hopefully was included in later versions 
of the Operator's Manual.
Fuel Filters
The fuel filtration system also caused problems at 
first. The filters were initially sized too small for 
long life between servicing, and they were designed 
without an adequate bypass system when they became 
clogged. Consequently, the engine would become starved 
for fuel. The-author participated in the redesign of the 
system and implementation of modified maintenance 
procedures to further reduce the effects of the problem.
The performance of the XM1 was continually compared 
with that of the present tank, the M60, and whenever the 
XM1 did not outperform the M60, it was cause for 
concern. The user did not want to get. something worse 
than he already had. The fuel filters clogged more often 
than those of the M60, so the author had to attempt to 
explain the difference. Appendix B-12 is a Fact Sheet 
which defines the problem, but offers no solution.
Maintenance Monitor
The driver's station includes a maintenance monitor 
panel which contains warning and caution lights for 
various engine and other systems. These include filter 
clogged lights, oil pressure and temperature warning 
lights, and engine overtemperature and overspeed lights. 
When certain lights came on, the fuel control 
automatically took protective action, but in all cases 
the driver had corrective action he was required to take, 
either immediately or at the next break in operation.
One of the author's tasks was to correct the Operators' 
Manual so that the instructions were proper.
The author rewrote the instructions for the 
Operator's Manual to conform with what was actually
necessary. His input (Appendix B-13) included 
identification of each warning and caution light, what 
the light indicated, and the required crew action to 
correct the malfunction. For instance, the oil 
filtration system was designed so that the filter clogged 
light would come on when a certain pressure drop existed 
across the filter. The system was designed for 
"on-condition" maintenance, that is the filter should be 
changed at a reasonable time after the filter clogged 
light came on. Initially, the manual instructed the 
driver to stop immediately and change the filter, an 
impractical and unnecessary procedure. As a result of 
the author's efforts, the manual was subsequently changed 
to reflect the fact that the current mission could be 
completed prior to servicing the filters, as was the 
original intention.
Chapter 5 
FUEL ECONOMY
Fuel consumption was of interest for several 
reasons, and the author spent a great deal of time 
calculating, evaluating, and justifying various fuel 
consumption figures to many outside parties and 
agencies.
The supplying of fuel to units in the field under 
combat conditions is one of the most difficult 
requirements placed on the logistics system. Military 
history holds many examples of operations which had to be 
halted or delayed because of lack of fuel at the front 
lines. The turbine engine for the XM1 was rated at 1500 
HP, compared to the diesel in the current M60 tank, which 
was rated at 750 HP. An increase in fuel consumption was 
to be expected for the new tank, and determination of its 
magnitude was important because additional fuel trucks 
would have to be added to supply units to accommodate the 
needs of the new tanks.
There was a great deal of interest in how far the
tank could run without refueling on secondary roads so 
that a cruising range for road marches could be 
determined. Current doctrine calls for tanks to be 
refueled daily in battle, and an estimate of the fuel 
consumption for a typical operational "battlefield day" 
was also required. Consequently, the Materiel Need 
document specified two different fuel consumption 
requirements for the tank. The first was that the tank 
should have a cruising range with onboard fuel of 275-325 
miles on secondary roads (dry, hard dirt roads) at 25 
mph, and the second was that the tank be able to complete 
a hypothetical "battlefield day" mission profile with 
onboard fuel. This mission profile was based on a worst 
case (greatest mileage) situation and consisted of 
specified distances on secondary roads and cross country 
at given speeds and a number of hours of engine idle.
The fuel consumption for each of these requirements was 
calculated from data available from the Development 
tests, and, to further confuse matters, various outside 
agencies used different mission profiles for their 
analyses.
Several different fuel consumption tests were run, 
both under controlled and relatively uncontrolled 
conditions. All of these data were widely available and 
were often used by these outside groups without
verification of its accuracy. Data from the discrete 
fuel consumption tests were reasonably repeatable.
However, different vehicles at different times gave 
different results, and the non-engineer decision makers 
were uncomfortable with a range of values for the fuel 
consumption. They wanted a single, repeatable number for 
secondary road fuel consumption that they could use in 
computing the cruising range and a single value for 
battlefield day fuel consumption. In addition to the 
variation between vehicles, the problem was complicated 
by the fact that there is no "standard" secondary road.
A secondary road is a dirt, clay, or gravel road, and the 
rolling resistance varies between the different types of 
surfaces, as well as for the same surface for various 
climatic conditions. These conditions made complete 
repeatability nearly impossible.
Fuel consumption data were taken from the operations 
at Ft. Bliss and used without the knowledge of the 
Program Manager. These data were very unfavorable to the 
XM1, and it was not until the author investigated that it 
was found that they were gross data, taken over an 
interval of about a month, during a period when the tanks 
were not operating to any typical mission profile. It 
was also found that some of the fuel tankers used did not 
have functioning fuel metering devices, and what was
supposedly data was, in fact, just someone's estimate.
The topic became so confusing that it was necessary for 
the author to write an Information Paper concerning fuel 
consumption in an attempt to explain the different 
figures and rationalize the differences between them (see 
Appendix C-l).
The Commander of the Armor Center at Ft. Knox, KY, 
received some of the uncontrolled fuel consumption data 
and remarked about how bad it appeared. The author was 
then tasked to write a "White Paper" (Appendix C-2) on 
fuel consumption and the various figures that existed.
At the same time, it had become necessary to increase the 
track tension on the tank, and this increased its rolling 
resistance and thus its fuel consumption by about 10%, 
which further complicated the fuel consumption data.
As a further complexity, the manufacturer of the 
diesel engine which had not been chosen for the XM1 
continually claimed that his engine had superior fuel 
economy when compared to the turbine. At the same time, 
there were people who favored the diesel engine, and it 
became necessary for the author to write an Information 
Paper comparing the fuel consumption of the turbine with 
that of the diesel. Since the diesel had not been 
chosen, the only data available for its fuel consumption 
came from the previous phase of the program. Any
comparisons, therefore, were hypothetical since no new 
diesels had been produced, no side-by-side testing 
occurred, and the tank had increased in weight since the 
previous phase. Appendix C-3 is the author's attempt to 
compare these two engines.
Each Spring the funding for the tank program was 
subject to review during the Congressional Budget 
Hearings, and one of the author's tasks was to prepare 
answers to possible questions which the Program Manager 
or the Chief of Staff of the Army might be asked during 
those hearings. Appendix C-4 is an example of the 
questions and answers prepared by the author on the 
subject of fuel consumption.
In early 1980, the difficulty in achieving 
repeatability in the secondary road fuel consumption 
tests became important to the contractor, since a portion 
of his fee depended on meeting the cruising range 
requirement. By letter, he proposed that a 300 mile 
range on paved road be used instead of a 275 mile range 
on secondary road. The use of paved road would help 
repeatability. The author evaluated this proposal 
(Appendix C-5) and determined that, based on fuel 
consumption rates, the two were not equivalent. Instead, 
after considering the best available, he proposed a 340 
mile range as being equivalent. He departed the program
for his next assignment before the question was finally 
resolved.
It had become evident to the author and to many 
people that a wide range of numbers did exist for fuel 
consumption, and that each of those numbers was valid for 
the particular circumstances under which the data was 
taken. It was also evident that many people were 
uncomfortable with a range of values for fuel 
consumption-it was difficult to make a decision based on 
a range of values. Before the author departed the 
program, he summarized the entire problem on one sheet of 
paper (Appendix C-6), and he hoped that this would 
finally resolve the question.
Chapter 6 
ENGINE AND VEHICLE TESTING
It was imperative that the engine be successful, or 
the entire tank program could be put in jeopardy. Since 
the engine was still under development at the beginning 
of FSED, extensive laboratory testing was scheduled for 
this phase of the program. The engine development 
program was funded at over fifty million dollars, and 
over 7900 hours of laboratory testing were scheduled for 
the engine, as well as nearly 100,000 miles of vehicle 
testing during which the engine would be evaluated. 
Further testing was added during the FSED phase to 
provide verification of fixes to problems discovered 
during the testing, and the author assisted in the design 
of some of the test cycles and in establishing their 
equivalence to field usage.
Development of a realistic mission profile for 
engine usage which could be reproduced in the laboratory 
on a dynamometer test stand was challenging, since there 
is no "typical" mission profile for usage of a tank
engine as there is for an aircraft engine. The 400 Hour 
Durability Test Cycle (Appendix D-l) was based on a NATO 
standard test cycle, and was used as a baseline for 
comparison of durability with other production engines. 
The Low Cycle Fatigue (LCF) test cycle (Appendix D-2) was 
excellent to stress hot-end turbine components, but was 
not representative of any operating conditions. The 
Mission Profile test (Appendix D—3) was derived from a 
powerpack mission profile test which was in turn 
developed from an instrumented vehicle test. In this 
test, the throttle position was set and the load on the 
engine was varied to obtain the required power turbine 
(PT) speeds. This test had a large number of transients 
which had been found to be a critical parameter since 
thermal and low cycle fatigue damage could occur during 
them and many failures occurred during the transients.
There were more than enough engine failures, but one 
was caused by the test cell configuration, and the author 
was required to attempt to convince interested parties 
that the failure could not possibly have happened except 
with that particular test cell equipment. A high-speed 
fuel shutoff valve inadvertently shut the engine down 
from high power, and the test cell engineer apparently 
attempted to reset the valve before the engine stopped. 
Fuel was blown through the still-rotating engine without
igniting until it contacted the hot recuperator where it 
ignited, burning the recuperator. Since it was 
impossible to duplicate this failure mode in the vehicle, 
the author classified it as a test cell incident so the 
failure would not be charged against the engine (Appendix 
D-4). This, failure was particularly annoying since the 
non-engineer decision-makers had difficulty understanding 
what actually happened and why the failure should not be 
charged against the engine.
One of the requirements for Army equipment is the 
ability to start and operate at temperatures down to -65 
degrees F. One of the turbine engine's stated advantages 
was its easy cold starting capability compared to a 
diesel engine, and engine and vehicle cold starting tests 
were part of the FSED phase. This type of testing is 
very time-consuming since the engine must cool to the 
ambient temperature between starts. Usually, only one 
start per day can be made.
Engine cold start tests were conducted by the 
manufacturer with varying degrees of success. Vehicle 
tests were more difficult. The Army's cold start test 
cell is quite old and not large enough to provide the 
volume of cold air needed by the turbine engine. 
Additionally, the cell is too small to test the 
functioning of the turret traverse and stabilization
system. The Air Force has an extremely large cold room 
at Eglin AFB, Fla., where they test aircraft, and 
arrangements were made to test the tank there.
Many problems were encountered with the originally 
scheduled test in late July 1979 including the lack of a 
production-type fuel nozzle for the engine, the 
unavailability of suitable arctic fuel in time for the 
test, and the lack of a good test plan. The author wrote 
a small Staff Study (Appendix D-5) stating the problems, 
outlining the facts, exploring the alternative courses of 
action, and finally recommending a four-month delay. The 
recommendation was accepted and the test was delayed.
One of the author's challenges was to keep the 
engine testing realistic. Various outside consultants 
and review groups had their own ideas of what tests the 
engine should pass before it should be allowed to go into 
production, and many of these were very severe overtests 
of the engine. While the tests would provide interesting 
data, the author felt they were not essential at that 
point in the development program, and if failures 
occurred, they would be viewed as further proof that the 
engine was not ready for production instead of as 
indications where product improvements could be made.
A turbine engine expert from the Navy, who had
accompanied an Admiral on a visit to the engine 
manufacturer and had sometimes been a consultant to the 
program, proposed "penalty runs" on any components which 
failed a 1000 hour test of the engine. This test 
consisted of a 400 hour NATO durability test followed by 
a 600 hour mission profile test and was an overtest of 
the engine, representing 17,000 to 20,000 miles of 
operation. The "penalty run" would consist of taking the 
replacement parts for any components which failed, and, 
after the completion of the basic 1000 hour test, running 
them in another engine to the specified test cycle until 
they reached 1000 hours of operation.
In addition to the lack of engine assets, time, and 
funds to conduct such tests, the author's investigation 
(Appendix D-6) revealed that this requirement was not 
placed on any other engine, even aviation engines, as a 
condition for production acceptance of that engine. The 
only similar requirement which could be found was that if 
an Army aviation engine component failed during its 150 
hour qualification test, that component would be 
subjected to a specialized abbreviated test designed to 
stress that particular component. The Navy consultant's 
idea of "penalty runs" was apparently his own and was not 
used by any service, yet the proposal was taken seriously 
until it was discovered that it was not the widely
accepted practice he would have had people believe.
As additional testing was added during the program, 
the contractor rightfully requested additional funding. 
The author often was required to provide independent 
estimates of the cost of additional testing or to 
validate costs submitted by the contractor. Usually 
these estimates were needed immediately, so detailed 
costing was impossible, but these "quick and dirty" 
estimates often were given great credibility and were 
difficult to revise. It was not unusual for the author 
to see one of his cost estimates appear as a line in next 
year's budget, and then it was impossible to change. 
Consequently, the tendency was to insure that the funding 
would be sufficient, and these estimates tended to be 
high.
Chapter 7 
LOGISTICS
One of the most important considerations in fielding 
a new weapons system is the provision of adequate 
logistics support for that system. Logistics includes 
training of crew members and mechanics, establishment and 
verification of maintenance procedures, provision of 
operating and maintenance manuals, and provision for and 
supply of spare and repair parts. If the logistics 
support required for a weapons system has not been 
adequately considered, the system soon becomes 
ineffective and useless. "For want of a nail..."
The Program Manager's Office had a Logistics 
Division and the author assisted members of this division 
in several specific areas related to the engine. His 
efforts in correcting portions of the Operator's Manuals 
have previously been described.
Test Sets
AVCO had provided two test sets for the engine for 
FSED, and part of the test program was to evaluate the 
test sets. The Organizational Test Set allowed the tank 
unit mechanics to diagnose minor problems with the engine 
and its accessories, and it worked fairly well. It was 
computer-based and conducted electronic tests of proper 
circuit functioning, cable continuity, and proper 
operation of certain accessories. It did occasionally 
fail, and one of the author's concerns was that the 
contractor develop simple and adequate backup methods for 
troubleshooting the engine. There were only one or two 
Organizational Test Sets per company of tanks, and if 
they were in use or inoperative, it was still necessary 
for the mechanics to be able to perform their jobs. The 
initial backup troubleshooting procedures were very 
cumbersome and the author attempted, without much 
success, to get them simplified so that they would be 
useful to a mechanic.
The other test set was to be used by Direct Support 
(DS) maintenance units. Engine modules were to be 
replaced at this level of maintenance, and the engine was
designed for easy substitution of modules. • The Direct 
Support Engine Test Set was designed to be used when the 
engine suffered a substantial loss of power but could 
still operate. Vibration and speed sensors were attached 
to the engine, and the engine was run. The data 
collected would supposedly enable the mechanic to 
determine which module needed to be replaced.
In theory it was a good system, but in practice, it 
was never used. Of all the engine failures which 
occurred during FSED, there was never a failure in which 
a substantial loss of power occurred and the engine could 
continue to be run. The author helped to convince the 
contractor that a different test set was required for. 
Direct Support Maintenance.
Ground Hop Console
The engine and transmission are removed as a unit 
from a tank, and they are often tested, after repair, by 
connecting to the tank's controls by extension power, 
fuel, and control cables. The power pack is then "ground 
hopped" while it is sitting on the ground, and 
adjustments are easy to make since there is good access 
to the power pack. Most maintenance units have
fabricated "ground hop consoles" for the powerpacks of 
their current tanks. These consist of batteries for 
starting, a fuel tank, necessary instrumentation, and 
connectors so that the extension cables can be hooked to 
the engine. The mechanics can then test power packs 
without the necessity for a tank being present.
Since engines are repaired at Direct Support 
maintenance units, the. author felt it was necessary that 
they be able to be tested prior to being reissued to the 
using units. The contractor initially stated that since 
the engine was modular, there was no need to test it once 
it was reassembled. The maintenance unit has no tanks of 
its own, and the author felt that it was necessary that a 
"ground hop console" be developed for the turbine power 
pack which would enable the engine and transmission to be 
tested after they had been repaired. He also felt that 
this console would be very useful to the Organizational 
mechanics in the tank units in the performance of their 
maintenance. The need for an electronic fuel control, 
which was not mounted on the engine, and would have to be 
a part of the console, made it impossible for the units 
to build their own.
The author had seen a console which had been 
manufactured by Chrysler for its own use, and requested 
that Chrysler provide a cost estimate on a production
version which could be used by troops. Instead of merely 
a ruggedized version of what had already been developed, 
the contractor produced a plan for an extremely 
expensive, highly sophisticated console which actually 
did little more than the prototype. This was not what 
was needed, but the author departed the program before 
this subject was resolved.
Depot Spare Parts
June 1980 to June 1981 was scheduled to be Low Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP) for the tank. During this 
period, the initial production models of the tanks would 
undergo Development Testing to insure that the production 
models met the requirements for the tank and that changes 
identified in FSED had been successfully incorporated.
In addition, Operational testing of a full Tank Battalion 
of 54 tanks was scheduled at Fort Hood, TX, to determine 
the tactical operational effectiveness of the tank when 
in simulated combat and to insure that soldiers could 
easily operate and maintain the tank. Additional engine 
testing was also planned. This phase was covered by a 
one year contract with Chrysler, and after that full 
scale production would begin. Detailed planning for this 
phase began in 1979.
Based on FSED experience, it was obvious that there 
would be engine failures and that AVCO would be required 
to rebuild and overhaul those engines, since there were 
very few spare engines in the LRIP contract. The author 
obtained a copy of the Depot Spare Parts List for which 
Chrysler had contracted. The parts list had been 
generated by the logistics section at Chrysler and 
approved by the Logistics Division of the PMO without 
review by Chrysler engineers or by the Automotive Branch 
of the PMO.
The author reviewed the list and found that there 
were many critical parts missing from it, such as turbine 
and compressor blades and discs, bearings and bearing 
housings, and combustor liners. All of these had been 
needed for engine rebuilds in FSED, and it was obvious 
that they would be needed again. Without these parts on 
order for rebuilds, it would be necessary to steal parts 
from new production engines, which would delay the 
delivery of new engines and hence the delivery of new 
tanks.
Upon investigation, the author was told that some of 
the parts had been deleted because their leadtime was 
longer than one year and they were expensive. Leadtimes 
can be reduced with effort, and the author was concerned
that, without those parts, there could be delays to the 
test program. His memorandum (Appendix E-l) addresses 
the problem and lists the critical parts he identified. 
Unfortunately, he left the program before the problem was 
resolved. It has been reported to him that the parts 
were not ordered and that delays in testing resulted.
Chapter 8 
ALTERNATE ENGINES
Throughout the FSED phase of the program, with its 
engine problems, there were calls for development of an 
alternate engine, so that the entire tank program would 
not be delayed if the turbine engine were not ready for 
production. Some of these were legitimate, but others 
were inspired by the manufacturer of the diesel engine 
associated with the General Motors proposal which did not 
receive the contract.
1500 HP Diesel Engine
This manufacturer had a lobbyist in Washington who 
was very successful in generating concern about the 
development problems of the turbine engine. Through his 
efforts Congress appropriated $14.2 million for continued 
development of the diesel engine, and the diesel 
manufacturer attempted to make people believe that it 
could produce a production-ready, durability proven
engine for that amount.
In fact, the funding would only complete development 
of the diesel engine, and provide for very limited engine 
durability testing. It was not adequate for any vehicle 
testing, nor for any of the vehicle redesign required to 
incorporate the diesel engine in the tank.
It was the author's position, supported by the 
Program Manager, that a true alternate engine program 
would be a massive and extensive undertaking requiring 
duplication of nearly all the testing which had occurred 
in FSED, since the engine was evaluated in all the 
testing. The vehicle would require a major redesign to 
accommodate the larger, heavier diesel engine and the 
different instrumentation. The transmission would 
require redesign for the lower input speeds from the 
diesel. Fire Control tests would have to be repeated to 
check vibration effects from the engine on the fire 
control system. Operational tests would have to be 
repeated to insure the troops could maintain and operate 
this new vehicle. Necessary production machinery would 
have to be procured in advance so the engine could be 
produced in quantity if it were eventually chosen.
The author estimated that the entire, realistic 
program (Appendices F-l and F-2) would cost $230 million
and take five years to complete, thus delaying production 
by about four years. Fortunately, such a program never 
occurred, and the tank went to production -on schedule.
Other engines were also proposed as backups 
including existing aircraft turbine engines and the 
diesel engine used in the German LEOPARD II tank, which 
was being developed concurrently. To the uninitiated, 
one 1500 HP engine seemed much like another, and there 
was the widespread incorrect belief that it was a simple 
matter to substitute a different engine. The author 
evaluated many of these possible alternatives, and one of 
the most interesting was the use of the General Electric 
T700 helicopter turbine in the tank.
The T700 Helicopter Turbine Engine
The T700 is a 1250 HP turbine engine developed for 
dual installation in the Army's Blackhawk helicopter.
Its development coincided with that of the AGT 1500 for 
the tank, and the question was raised concerning why the " 
Army should develop two different engines of similar 
ratings. The author was tasked by the Program Manager to 
answer the question.
His investigation (Appendix F-3) highlighted the
differences in the engines. The AGT 1500 had been 
designed from the beginning as a tank engine. It was 
configured to fit in the engine compartment of a tank and 
the power output was in the rear of the engine, so that 
it could mate with the transmission. It used inexpensive 
casing materials because weight was not as critical in 
the ground role. The T700 was designed as an aircraft 
engine. Its power output was at the front. It used 
exotic, lightweight, expensive casing materials. Its 
output speed was geared for an aircraft, not a ground 
vehicle. It had no recuperator to improve part-load fuel 
economy, and it was not designed to handle the accessory 
loads that were required for a tank. It used an 
air-start system powered by an auxiliary power unit 
instead of the electric start system used by the tank.
The extensive modifications necessary to the T700 in 
order for it to be usable in the tank would have 
destroyed any commonality with the aircraft version of 
the engine. In addition to its lower power rating, which 
would have reduced the tank's performance, cost estimates 
placed it at approximately 50% more expensive than the 
AGT 1500.
Still, it was a legitimate, if somewhat uninformed 
question, and the author wrote and presented a briefing 
to senior officers in the Pentagon on the engine
comparison (Appendix F-4). At the time (late 1977) the 
question was dropped, but about the time the author 
departed the program, General Electric proposed to the 
government a modification to the T700 that would be 
useable in the tank. To the author's knowledge, the 
proposal has not been acted upon.
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FOREIGN INTEREST
The development of a new tank, or any new weapons 
system, is extremely expensive. The development cost for 
the XMl tank was over $250 million prior to production. 
Consequently, other friendly countries are often 
interested when a new weapon is being developed, and the 
XMl was no exception. Germany, the United Kingdom,
Japan, and Iran (prior to the revolution) all showed 
different levels of interest in the tank, and the author 
participated in several briefings with representatives of 
these governments.
Both the United Kingdom and Germany were developing 
tanks of their own at this time, and there was 
considerable interest in each other's design. Under NATO 
interoperability standards, it was a desirable goal if 
the same equipment were used by more than one country, 
thus simplifying logistics and reducing development 
costs.
The main problem with the development of a single
tank for several different countries is that each country 
has its own slightly different tactical requirements for 
its tank, and the result has been that the differences 
between each country's design philosophies have been 
sufficiently great so that one country has not found the 
tank of another acceptable for its army. The US-German 
joint development of the MBT70 is an excellent example of 
a program, begun in the name of standardization, which 
failed because of differences in requirements and design 
philosophies.
Standardization of components is the next lower 
level, and both the United Kingdom and Germany showed 
interest in incorporating the turbine engine in their 
tanks. The author traveled to both countries and 
participated in technical feasibility discussions 
concerning adapting the turbine engine, and perhaps the 
transmission, to these other tanks.
British Interest
Two trips were made to London by the author to 
conduct briefings for the British Army on the possible 
use of the turbine powerpack in their new tank, the 
MBT80. On the first trip, in the fall of 1977, the author
presented technical briefings on the XMl and the turbine 
power pack and provided answers to questions (Appendix 
G-l) ..
By the second trip, in late 1978, the British had 
modified their position to one of desiring the best 
possible powerpack for their tank, and standardization 
had become secondary. They were considering the bare 
turbine engine and transmission and intended to provide 
their own accessories and oil coolers so that the 
powerpack. would fit in their vehicle. The other 
powerpack under consideration consisted of a British 
diesel engine and transmission.
During this second visit, the author coordinated the 
upcoming visit of the British to observe XMl testing in 
the US and discussed the provision of a powerpack for 
them to test. Logistics, the results of current testing, 
and British plans were also discussed. As a result of 
these discussions it became very obvious to the author 
that the British were probably not interested in a 
standardized powerpack, but in one modified to fit their 
vehicle and with little interchangeability with the US 
version. Based on this, he recommended that the PMO 
become less directly involved but assist the British in 
coordinating with the engine and transmission 
manufacturer for possible production of their own version
under license (Appendix G-2).
The British seriously studied the turbine powerpack, 
but their interest never progressed to the point where 
they requested one to test. Eventually they installed 
their own diesel engine and transmission in the MBT80.
German Interest
The United States had negotiated a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with Germany concerning 
interoperability of certain components of their new 
tanks. (The US had, in fact, tested the new German. 
LEOPARD II tank as a possible alternative to developing a 
new tank, but it had not met the US requirements.) Part 
of the MOU stated that Germany would incorporate the 
turbine powerpack into its tank production when it met 
several unique German requirements.
The Germans were master negotiators and the unique 
requirements had been written in such a way that the 
turbine powerpack could never meet all of them. The 
author evaluated these requirements in the summer of 1977 
and concluded that the Germans were not that serious 
about standardizing on the turbine (Appendix G-3). Their 
requirements were such that they wanted all the
performance and interface characteristics of their own 
diesel engine in the form of a turbine, a requirements 
they knew the AGT 1500 could not meet. Certain 
requirements could never be met by the turbine powerpack, 
and others could be met only with significant 
modifications to the existing configuration.
In spite of the doubts concerning the sincerity of 
the Germans, plans were made to loan them a powerpack for 
installation in a modified prototype LEOPARD II tank. 
Modifications required to the tank for installation of 
the powerpack were minimal (Appendix G - 4 ) . The author 
accompanied German representatives on their visits to the 
contractors in preparation for the test, and made several 
trips to Germany in conjunction with it. The first trip, 
at the same time as the trip to London in the fall of 
1977, was made to view the test facilities, provide 
answers to technical questions, discuss the German test 
plans, and view the modifications to the LEOPARD II 
(Appendix G - l ) . The Germans did a thoroughly professional 
job on the powerpack installation and vehicle 
modification, and it appeared to the author that it would 
be relatively simple to modify the production version of 
the LEOPARD II to accept the turbine powerpack.
The following year, the author observed the actual 
testing. The turbine powerpack performed well, and,
unofficially, German engineers were very pleased with its 
performance, although the government would make no formal 
commitment to adopt it.
Throughout this period, the author participated, as 
the Program Manager's representative for the engine, in 
periodic meetings with the Germans on the subject of 
standardization. These meetings addressed, among other 
things, the unique German requirements. Although the 
Minutes of one of those meetings were encouraging 
(Appendix G - 5 ) , it became obvious that the Germans did 
not intend to adopt the turbine power pack. The author 
felt that the Germans had been using this opportunity to 
gain, at no cost, a great deal of turbine technology to 
which they had not previously had access.
In January, 1980, Germany formally declined to 
incorporate the turbine into their tank. Failure to meet 
all the unique requirements was given as the reason, but 
the real reasons were political. The "not invented here" 
syndrome was operating, and the German government could 
not adopt a American turbine engine, even though it would 
have been built under license in Germany, in lieu of a 
German designed and built diesel. Standardization, even 
at the component level, remains an elusive goal.
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OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE
Because this was the first use of a turbine engine 
in a ground vehicle by the Army, there was not a great 
deal of in-house expertise concerning turbine engines. 
Consequently the PMO received a considerable amount of 
outside assistance, both welcome and unwelcome, from 
various agencies. As the number of engine failures 
mounted, the level of outside assistance became almost 
unbearable.
Army Aviation Research And Development Command
The United States Army Aviation Research and 
Development Command (AVRADCOM) is responsible for the 
development of Army helicopters. At the Program 
Manager's initiative, AVRADCOM's help was sought, and 
they provided the most valuable continuing assistance.
Mr. Ralph Tyson, an engineer for AVRADCOM, had many years 
of experience in the development and testing of small
aviation turbines used in helicopters, and he assisted in 
the evaluation of engine failures and proposed design 
changes. Of all the assistance received, his was the 
most practical and useful because he was familiar with 
military requirements and knew what was realistically 
obtainable instead of insisting, as some "experts" did, 
on some unreachable ideal of performance.
Air Force
Early in the FSED phase, the Program Manager 
requested a visit from a team of turbine engine designers 
from the Air Force development laboratories at 
Wright-Patterson A F B , Ohio. They conducted a design 
review of the engine and provided recommendations on 
accelerated test programs.
During their initial visit it soon became apparent 
that their perspective was different from that of the 
Army. The officer heading the team was extremely 
concerned that the tank had only a single engine. From 
his viewpoint, a twin engine installation was much more 
desirable since his aircraft could still fly if one 
engine failed. He never quite accepted the fact that a 
tank crew could get out and walk if necessary, and that
the complexities of a twin engine installation were not 
justified.
Secretary Of Defense1s Review Panel
Due to the high number of engine failures during 
FSED, there was considerable concern at the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) about the design maturity of 
the turbine engine. Consequently a panel was appointed 
by OSD in early 1979 to evaluate the engine design 
maturity and to make recommendations to increase 
confidence that it would be ready for production in 1980. 
The panel consisted of engineering and reliability 
sub-groups and was made up of senior executives from 
various industries, most with some experience in design 
of military equipment. Senior turbine engine designers 
from two major corporations were included in the panel, 
and a retired Army Lieutenant General was the operational 
evaluator for the panel. The author was the Program 
Manager's representative to the panel.
It quickly became obvious that, although the panel 
members were experts in their own fields, none of them, 
with the exception of the general, had any good idea of 
what a tank was, how it operated, what its missions were,
or the environment in which the engine had to operate.
The author's first task was to familiarize the panel 
members with these aspects. This objective was 
accomplished by a trip to Aberdeen Proving Ground to see 
the tank demonstrated and compared with the M60, the 
current tank (Appendix H - l ) . A demonstration of powerpack 
removal was also held, and this was the first opportunity 
that many of them had to see the tank and the engine.
The designers on the panel were familiar with aviation 
turbines and had no concept of the dust levels in which 
the engine was required to routinely operate. They had. 
no previous experience with air cleaners for turbines and 
were amazed at the dust, dirt, and grime which normally 
accompany tank operations.
The author accompanied the panel during its 
investigations, both at the engine manufacturer and at 
field sites, and participated in the technical 
discussions. He wrote and presented the briefings on the 
engine design, operation, and durability status, to 
include detailed test plans and explanation of engine 
failures (Appendix H-2). Once the panel members were 
familiar with the engine, they performed a good 
evaluation of the status of development and made several 
valuable recommendations which were subsequently 
implemented.
The author advised the panel concerning the 
feasibility of their proposed recommendations and 
attempted to insure that additional testing proposed by 
the panel would be not only realistic but also capable of 
being completed in the allotted time period and not in 
conflict with other program requirements. He helped 
design a "1,000 Hour" laboratory test for the engine 
which combined the NATO endurance test with a 600 hour 
mission profile test. He managed to convince the panel 
that while this was an excellent test of the engine, it 
was a severe overtest for the stated requirements, and 
successful completion of the test should not be a 
prerequisite for production. Instead, the results should 
be used to identify areas for future reliability 
improvements.
The panel concluded that the engine incidents were 
not unusual in a development program and that durability 
was about as should be expected for that stage of engine 
maturity. As well as additional testing, one of the 
panel's recommendations was that they reconvene in a year 
to assess progress made in the areas which they had 
identified. In the winter of 1980 the author again 
served as the Program Manager's representative to the 
panel. At this time the panel found that the engine and 
power train did meet the reliability and durability
requirements, although areas for further improvement were 
identified.
General Accounting Office
The most unwelcome outside assistance came from the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) of the US government. A 
member of Congress had requested that the GAO evaluate 
the turbine engine and its readiness for production. In 
a GAO investigation any information requested by the 
investigators must be provided. Once a draft GAO report 
is written, it is customarily provided to the agency 
under investigation for review and correction of mistakes 
prior to being released.
The GAO investigators assigned to do this study were 
not familiar with turbine engines, tanks, or the army and 
were accountants, not qualified engineers. The author 
briefed them on several occasions, and his first step 
necessarily was to attempt to explain the workings of the 
engine to them. Many documents which the author had 
written were explained, discussed, and provided at their 
request. Engine failures and subsequent corrective 
actions were discussed at length. At no time during 
their investigation did they independently inspect the
engines using qualified engineers, nor did they use the 
most recent laboratory test results in their report.
They evaluated the engine against design goals instead of 
government requirements for reliability and durability. 
The investigators were also in touch with the competing 
diesel engine manufacturer and were apparently accepting, 
without proof, his claims as to the reliability of the 
diesel engine.
When the draft report was received for comment, it 
was found to contain many errors. Several problems which 
were cited as being current were, in fact, old problems 
which the investigators had been informed had been 
corrected. Quotes from PMO-provided documents were taken 
out of context or were misquotes. The competing engine 
manufacturer was given full credibility for his claims, 
and the documented test results for the XMl and its 
engine were questioned. The report contained no 
recommendations for improvements to the engine or for 
additional testing, only for limitation of production and 
funding for alternate engines.
When the draft report was received for review, it 
was learned that it already had been released in 
Washington. The PMO was provided no opportunity to make 
corrections prior to the release of the document. 
Eventually, the corrections were made in the final
report, but the inaccuracies in the first report received 
all the publicity and the corrections received none.
The author wrote many of the comments on the GAO 
report (Appendix H-3), and in testimony before Congress, 
General Keith, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and 
Development for the Army, used these comments as 
rebuttals to the report.
The general feeling was that the GAO was out to do a 
"hatchet job" on the turbine engine, and the high number 
of inaccuracies and general haphazardness of the report 
reinforced that belief. The Congressman who had 
requested the report was from the district in which the 
diesel engine manufacturer's plant was located.
The author compared the OSD panel report and the GAO 
report and found a significant lack of professionalism on 
the part of the GAO (Appendix H - 4 ) . The generally low 
quality of the G A O 's work was a disappointment to the 
author, but not really a surprise as he knew of other 
agencies and programs which had had similar experiences.
It illustrated the difficulty of using non-engineers to 
evaluate what was primarily an engineering problem. A 
major concern to the author from this is that the general 
public believes the GAO reports, and the program had 
difficulty recovering from the inaccuracies presented in
the report. Even today the author encounters people 
whose beliefs about the tank and engine are based on that 
report.
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OBSERVATIONS
The author's assignment to the Program Manager's 
Office was professionally extremely rewarding. He 
developed, over the course of his assignment, a great 
deal of expertise on the engine and the tank. He had a 
wide variety of professional experiences and the 
satisfaction of knowing that his efforts had a positive 
influence on the success of the tank program. The fact 
that his assignment coincided with the FSED phase of 
development enabled him to see the program progress from 
a single prototype tank to the beginning of production. 
The problems that were encountered and he helped to 
overcome gave him a tremendous sense of accomplishment, 
and, of all his assignments, this was also the most 
personally rewarding.
The author learned a tremendous amount during this 
assignment about many areas of engineering and program 
management. He took many impressions with him when he 
departed, and they dealt with various aspects of his
experiences, both technical and nontechnical. A few of 
those impressions follow.
Interface Problems
One of the major problems with the engine was dust 
ingestion during testing at Ft. Bliss. Chrysler had 
responsibility for the air cleaner and the interface with 
the engine. AVCO Lycoming's responsibility was for the 
engine only. On the basis of the experiences, it would 
seem prudent that the responsibility for critical systems 
which must operate successfully together should be given 
to one or the other of the firms involved.
In that way, there will be no interface disputes to 
be resolved between a contractor and a subcontractor. In 
retrospect, design changes to the air filtration system 
would have occurred faster if AVCO Lycoming had had the 
responsibility for it as well as the engine. If AVCO had 
been given the responsibility for the air cleaner, they 
would have acted very quickly to solve any problems in 
order to protect their reputation. As it was, AVCO 
Lycoming received much of the bad publicity for a 
Chrysler problem.
Concurrent Development
In order to provide the most modern equipment for 
the army, major components were still being developed 
during FSED at the same time as the tank was being 
tested. This is not unusual for weapons system 
development, but it can complicate programs. The engine, 
transmission, and fire control system were still in the 
final stages of development during FSED, and as problems 
were discovered, design changes were made and 
incorporated as quickly as possible into the components 
so that they could be at least partially tested.
A more conservative design philosophy would have 
been to use proven, fully developed components for the 
new tank, but this would have resulted in an obsolescent 
system by the time it was produced. This philosophy 
results in nothing more than product improvements on 
existing systems, and there comes a time when improved 
technology is not adaptable to current equipment and a 
totally new design is required.
Such was the case with the XMl. It would have been 
impossible to incorporate the "special armor" into the 
existing M60 tanks, and it would have been nearly
impossible to modify the M60's suspension and to install 
a more powerful engine which would allow the tank to 
reach a top speed of 45 MPH.
Concurrent development increases the risks of a 
program, but the risks are necessary in order to insure 
the best, most modern equipment. Decision-makers should 
be aware that problems will occur and should make 
allowances for that when they are evaluating a new 
system. The impression that the author had was that 
senior officials did not like to hear of any problems.
Concurrent Testing
Because of the Congressionally imposed seven year 
development period, the FSED phase was compressed. It 
was impossible to reduce the time required for the 
competitive first phase, so the FSED phase was 
shortened. As previously stated, the contractor had no 
opportunity to "wring out" his new vehicles prior to 
turning them over to the government for Development and 
Operational testing. Consequently, many problems were 
initially discovered during the government testing, and 
it was necessary to halt the testing several times for 
vehicle modifications so that the latest design changes
could be incorporated.
Because of the compressed schedule and the necessity 
for government testing to precede contractor testing, the 
scoring methodology used allowed for the discounting of 
early failures if design modifications had been made, 
incorporated in the tank for a significant portion of the 
test, and the failure mode had not recurred. This 
discounting of failures was done at formal scoring 
conferences, and a majority of the voting representatives 
from the various agencies had to agree before a failure 
was discounted.
The major problem with this procedure was that there 
was no agreement as to how much testing was required to 
prove a design change. It seemed that everyone had his 
own opinion. The contractor generally felt that a change 
needed little or no testing, the test agency felt that it 
needed an entire new test, and the final decisions were 
usually subjective.
In spite of this difficulty, it seemed to the author 
that this was an excellent method for insuring that the 
latest version of the tank was being evaluated, but 
outside agencies, such as the GAO, apparently did not 
fully understand the method and severely criticized the 
procedure. They claimed that the PMO was not counting
many failures which had occurred, and therefore the 
durability and reliability figures for the tank were not 
correct. These criticisms reached the media, and more 
unnecessary bad publicity resulted.
It is easy to be a critic, especially if the 
criticism is not based on all the facts, and it is very 
difficult to defend against. The Program Manager was 
continually put in the position of having to defend the 
test results and the scoring procedure and explain the 
true situation. Not only does this take a great deal of 
time, but rebuttals always seem a little lame to the 
outsider, and there is a tendency for him to believe the 
first report.
Reasons for Testing
There are two reasons to test a weapons system prior 
to production, and the two are not compatible. At the 
end of the FSED phase a high level decision is made as to 
whether the systenr is ready for production. The results 
of the testing are a major factor influencing that 
decision, and production on some programs has been 
cancelled or delayed based on unfavorable test results.
The first reason to test is to discover the problems
with the system while it is still in the prototype stage 
so that they can be corrected prior to production. This 
reason would lead one to design a very rugged test of the 
system in which many failures and problems would be 
expected to occur. There might even be test delays while 
modifications are incorporated into the vehicles for the 
remainder of the test. Because there may be many 
failures the system may receive unfavorable publicity 
which could prejudice the public and decision makers. If 
the test is too rugged, the system may never be allowed 
to enter production. The end result, however, would be 
that when the system did enter production most of its 
problems would already have been solved and the user 
would have a superior system.
The second reason to test is so that the system can 
be given permission to enter production. This would lead 
one to design an easy test for the system. If there are 
few problems or failures during the test, the decision 
maker has an easy choice and the system will probably 
enter production. However, the result may be a vehicle 
which still has many problems remaining in the production 
version. This leads to expensive modification programs, 
and possibly reduced systems effectiveness.
This, then, is the dilemma. Where, between the 
extremes, should the test be designed? What is the right
balance to strike so that an excellent, fully tested 
vehicle will actually be produced? The XM1 took the 
rugged test extreme, somewhat by chance, and the 
production program was nearly delayed or cancelled 
several times. The testing paid off, however, and 
reports from the field state that it is an excellent 
tank, far better than anything the Soviets have and that 
there is no comparison between it and the M60. The 
soldiers who use it, and may Someday have to fight in it, 
like the tank and its capabilities, and that is the 
ultimate test.
Politics and Reality
Political considerations often override the reality 
of the situation. The lobbyist for the diesel engine 
manufacturer which did not receive the contract and the 
Congressman for that firm's district were able to induce 
Congress to appropriate $14.2 million for a "diesel 
backup program". This program has already been 
discussed, but the funding was unnecessary based on the 
ongoing test results, and it was inadequate■for its 
stated purpose of "finishing development of a production 
ready backup diesel engine".
It amounted to a political gift to assist this firm, 
which had lost the competition, from the government. To 
the author, it seemed a great waste that the funds were 
spent in this manner. If the success of the tank program 
were the real issue, the funds could have been spent much 
more profitably to improve the turbine engine or some 
other component of the tank. However, politics does not 
operate in that manner, and in the author's opinion, the 
money, which was taxpayer's money, was not wisely spent. 
The author does not know how, with our form of 
government, such occurrences can be avoided.
Experts and Consultants
The author had many dealings with consultants to the 
program and outsiders brought in for their expertise on 
turbine engines. They were supposed to use their 
knowledge to provide assistance to the program. However, 
the author discovered that, generally, they brought 
little knowledge of the particular problem with them and 
it was necessary to educate them before they were 
productive.
The value of spending time and effort educating them 
and then having them confirm what was already known seems
questionable. Its real value comes from building a body 
of opinion to reinforce what the PMO already knows. This 
assists the decision makers and gives them more 
confidence in their decision. As such, it is a necessary 
evil of the development process.
Decision Makers
As in any bureaucracy, there were many groups and 
agencies which had little directly to do with the success 
of the tank program, but which could meddle in it. There 
were obscure requirements and regulations which the 
program must comply with but which did not benefit the 
program, and these agencies felt that the tank program 
should not continue until their interests were 
considered.
The result was that there were many people and 
agencies which could delay or hinder the program, but 
there was no one single person or agency which could say, 
"Proceed at full speed. This system is needed as soon as 
possible." There are so many checkpoints and milestones 
in the development process and so many agencies are 
involved, that is is extremely easy to delay a program 
but nearly impossible to expedite it.
It routinely takes seven to ten years to field a 
major new weapons system, but World War II was fought and 
won in only three and a half years. Other countries can 
develop and field equipment in less time, and the 
development process must be streamlined and simplified in 
order to reduce development costs and to make the system 
more responsive.
Communications
Perhaps the most frustrating problem the author 
encountered was that of communicating engineering 
information to non-engineers. When a failure occurred, 
the news traveled quickly. The author found that many 
people, especially at high levels of government, were 
only interested the fact that a failure had occurred.
They were not interested in, and, in many cases did not 
attempt to understand, the technical reason for the 
failure. Consequently, they were not interested in and 
made no attempt to understand the corrective action which 
was being taken. The author felt that these people's 
opinion was, "It broke, therefore it's no good, and you 
are just trying to alibi the problems." It was obvious 
that they did not understand the reasons for testing and 
were not interested in learning.
In all the author's dealings, he seldom was able to 
truly communicate with these people, and it remains a 
serious problem, since some of these people are the ones 
who decide the fate of major programs and are the ones 
who should be capable of making informed decisions.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A-l
DRCPM-GCH Automotive Branch 
9 September 1977
ENGINE FACT SHEET
1. Background;
a. Nomenclature: * AVCO Lycoming Gas Turbine Engine: AGT 1500.
b. Requirement: *Vehide performance requirements were specified in 
the MN and were met or exceeded using the AGT 1500 engine In the XH1:
Characteristic 
Acceleration 0-20 MPH 
Max.'sustained'speed 
10Z slope speed. '
- 60Z jslope 'speed----
MN Requirement 
6-9 Sec. 
35-40 MPH 
20-25 11PH 
3-5 MPH
XM1 DT I Results
6.2 Sec.
44 MPH
• 24 MPH
5.2 MPH
• '^Englne.Schi
“ •r-/ -
2. Characteristics: \‘.'.V'-' '
ttie: -See Inclosure 1. 
br^TabulatedgCharacterifltics:
3)i*enaians~L
ffidth>- 
•Hajght
T>r?^® 4 ®Ht^ (excluding-starter and hydraulic pump)
jpeveoied -MsxiaDB d^ticput .Speed
Scrnal-.^ _ ____
Seqttlried'^cir' 45' MCT vehicle speed
Raquired-for3 .SPIiWehtele rate of pivot
-;&orverned -Mlnlam Output Speed
~ Low Idle
Required for vehicle creep speed of 2.5 *mph 
. Tactical Idle .
66.75 In. 
39.0 in. 
31.6 In*
2475 lb*.
1500 shp at 3000 Tpa/ 
1000 shp at 3100 zpn 
0 shp at 2620 rpm 
1100 shp at 2400 rpm
0 shp at 890 rpm 
85 shp at 870 rpm 
0 shp at 1350 rpm
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Oil Capacity Including 2 gal. cooler and line capacity 7 gals.
Oil Consumption (not to exceed rate after 100 hours of 
operation)
Fuel Types
Best Specific Fuel Consumption
Transient.Response (froa idle to 90 percent rated 
power)
Power Decay Sate (from 100 percent rated to 20 per­
cent -rated power)
Exhaust Smoke
Engine Noise Level (at 50 ft. and vehicle traveling 
.20 MPH)-
0.1 gala, per hr.
DF-2, DF-1, and 
DF-A Diesel Fuel 
JP-4, JP-5, Jet 
Fuel, gasoline 
(emergency)
0.475 lbs. per hp hr.
2.5 sec.
2 sec.
No visible smoke 
101 db
~ i f i Th* ACT-Tsnn tank turbine engine features a two-spool
Tgw 'producer^*,.free, power turbine output( and a recuperator for nunrtimna 
~e££id*acj throughout thi 'Operating range. All components have been con­
's ervatively-' dee jgned :for .-asxinum structural Integrity and slnplidty. The 
engine-counted .accessories are arranged for ease of removal and replacement 
-with ~the power package Installed In the vehicle. The engine control system 
lie deaigised;for-operational simplicity and features automatic engine protec-ifciodK
The;baalc^ACT->1500 engine configuration is represented schematically in 
Incl l.—ijThe {two»spool. yes producer Is Bade up of two independently ro*V 
^Tat 1 ng^ssaarTof^compreeaogs» .a low pressure set and a high pressure set» vith 
jeach set'iiriviKi'by cringle stage axial turbine. The engine air flows ax- 
iially..inro-.the JLow .pressure compressor where the pressure is Increased by 
-five axial, stages .to approximately 48 psla at full power. The flow con-
t - - t h a  high pr«jnmr-a compressor, which has four axial stages and 
a single-stage 1 centrifugal compressor with a radial diffuser, where the pres­
sure is further increased to its maximum pressure of 197 psia. The compressed 
air then passes through a recuperator (stationary air to air heat exchanger)' 
where the ’compressed air is partially heated by recovering waste heat from 
the exhaust gas, thus reducing the amount of fuel subsequently required to 
heat the air. The air then enters the combustion zone where fuel is
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Introduced by means of a single spray nozzle and can combustor, vhlch 
further Increases the air temperature to approximately 2,180°F at maxi­
m a  power* This heated gas expands through the high and lov pressure 
turbine stages, which drive the respective high and low pressure compres­
sors. , Because of the work done by the turbines, the temperature and v 
pressure at the exit of the low pressure turbine are reduced to 1,458°?: 
and.42 psia respectively at maximum power. The air is further expanded 
through a two-stage power \turblne that delivers power to drive the vehi­
cle as well as transmission-mounted accessories* The gas then flows 
through the recuperator and heats the compressor discharge air as in­
dicated previously. The exhaust temperature. &a_the gas exits the recupera-
tor^iai?44^F^maximim^ ' ' " ** ^
The two Independently rotating gas-producer compressors and free power 
shaft serv« to Improve operating efficiency of the engine at both the 
rated design point as well as part load. If the two-gas-producer com­
pressors were directly coupled to operate on a single shaft, the forward 
low pressure compressor stages would operate inefficiently at part power. 
Since the free power turbine also rotates Independently from the other 
main shafts, this allows the gas-producer compressors to operate at opti­
mum efficiency over the entire spectrum of torque and speed output.
To further improve power-turblne output efficiency and thereby mala tala 
jgood fuel economy -at part load, the engine features variable Islet nozzle 
’'vames <tojdlrect ;the hotgases -at the optimum angle on the blades of. the 
pOTr^<ttt^ine^kiheel.?~The^current AGT-1500 engine also incorporates yarirble; 
Inlet. g u l ^ :~vwe«ijtliat, araCprlmartly, used to direct the incoming alx flow 
”tp^thevfixsi'low^reasure'rCcmprMsor. rotor blading during starting sad 
-operation up to approximately 40 percent power. Above this power level 
-the Inlet guide vanes operate in one fished position'.
All -pf -trha accessories are located vertically on the acces­
sory.^®**^* with the mechanical drive through gearing to the high pressure 
spool.~~~The -engine required accessories mounted on the accessory geaxbox 
.are the starter, oil p m p  and filter assembly, and fuel control. A spur 
gear' traia connects each of these accessories to the single shaft con­
nected to the high pressure compressor shaft. The vehicle hydraulic pump 
Is* also -Donated «oa a  power takeoff pad on this same gearbox.
The -output speed from the power turbiae is reduced through an integral re­
duction gearbox before transmission Input.
The engine Is designed in three major module assemblies: the forward module, 
the rear module, and the accessory gearbox module. This concept permits 
repair of the engine by changing only the failed module.
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The engine system also Includes a remotely mounted electronic control unit, 
a part of the electronic fuel management system, for automatic starting, 
engine control and protection, and governing of minimum and maximum output 
speed.
3. Schedule:
a. Engine durability testing is at I n d  2 and 3.
b. Engine delivery is at I n d  3.
4. Present Status:
At End of Validation Scheduled for FSED 
Engines built 32 20
Total engine hours 11,500 18,600
Total engine miles 23,100 97,700
5. Cost:
a. FSED Contracts 20 new engines 8 $748,000 each plus seven rebuilt/. 
Validation engines".
• b. Production Unit Cost: Ten year average DTC engine price (AVCO 
selling price to Chrysler) is $110,479 (Dee 75$). This is based on 3312 
engines and vill change with the new quantity reconanended at ASARC.
6. Personnel?
a. Han loading!
Max
Min
Avg
FY77 (2 months) FY78 FY79 F780 (2 months)
321 379 • 190 94
* 267 191 99 77
. 294 272 138 86
b. Number of people at AVCO Lycoming: Approximately 3000.
7. Risk:
a. Technical: Technical risk is low. The engine has already met or 
exceeded performance and durability goals set for it.
b. Schedule: Schedule risk is low, but the schedule bears close 
watching. AVCO has a success-oriented engine lab test schedule and has 
already considered slipping some test milestones. Chrysler had scheduled
DRCPM-GCM '
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8000 miles on engine S/N 26 in the ATE. at Chelsea Proving Ground last 
. Spring. Vehicle problems allowed them to accumulate only 3327 miles be­
fore a scheduled engine rebuild. In May-Dee 78 two vehicles are scheduled 
to run 9000 engine durability miles each. This is adequate tloe provided 
there pre few problems, but the test must be monitored closely to insure 
Chrysler does not fall behind. -
c. Cost: Cost risk (ten year average DTC) is moderate. This Is 
based on the fact that the method used to arrive at the ten year average 
cost is questioned by the Cost Information and Analysis Branch, and the 
cost reductions claimed by AVCO due to productionalizlng the engine, 
product improvements, etc., have not been completely planned, identified 
and scheduled for introduction into the engine.
8. Previous Guidance/Interest: '
a. Higher echelon: DoD was greatly-Interested in the engine choice 
for XMl. During the source selection process, DA and DoD engine Review 
Committees were formed to evaluate 'the turbine and diesel engines. The 
ASA (RD&A) requires bimonthly engine status briefings. DCS (RD&A) -is ’ 
interested In. cost comparisons between the T700 engine (used in UTTAS) 
and the AGT-1500 and w^s briefed on this subject.
.; “b.-Tsers.Trxhe -user is basically unfamiliar with gas turbine engines. „• 
An-education-program may be necessary. Armor Branch aviators need to be 
Informed of ^ differences between the AGT-1500 and aircraft turbines.
Shaft Horsepower 
Mass Flow*Jb?sec 
Nhz-'RPM '
N L^ R P M
Output 5ha£t Speed^RPM
Low Compressor Efficiency 
Adiabatic^%
High Compressor Efficlency/^Adiab. %
High Turbine Efficiency ^ Adiab. %
Low Turbine Elficiency^-Adiab. %
Power Turbine Efficiency/^Adiab. %
Low Compressor Inlet Temperature 
/w>R
Low Compressor Inlet Pressure/*-PSIA 
Low Compressor Exit Temperature^w*R
A
Low Compressor Exit Pressure/wPSIA
High Compressor Exit I: Recuperator 
A ir Inlet Tem perature/^'R
High Compressor Exic &c Recuperator 
Air Inlet Pres sure/wPSIA
Recuperator Air Exit & Combustor Inlet 
T emperatur e s*? R
Recuperator Air Exit & Combustor Inlet 
Pres sure /'-'PS LA.
MliSr* Pressure Turbine Rotor Inlet 
Temperatures* *R
Max Power 
1500
12. 1
43900
31500
3000
85* 0
79.5 
83. 6
83.3
88.4 
519
14.7
764
48
1250
212
1443
209
2560
Idle
35
3.0
24400
11900
400
519
14.7
17
35
Max Powe r
High P ressu re  Turbine Rotor Inlet 203 0
P res sure^-PSIA
High P ressu reT u rb in e  Exit T e m p . 21 19
High P ressu re  Turbine Exit P ressu re  75
PSIA
Low P ressu re  Turbine Inlet Tem perature 2082
^ • R
Low P ressu re  Turbine Inlet P ressu re  75
/-wPSIA
Low P ressu re  Turbine Exit Tem perature 1873
,a>R
Low P ressu re  Turbine Exit P ressu re  44t q
/v^PSIA
Power Turbine Inlet T em perature/^R  1867
Power Turbine Inlet Pressure/'•'PSIA 4 4 .0
Power Turbine Exit it Recuperator Gas 1534
Inlet Temperature/u^R
Power Turbine Exit & Recuperator Gas 17 .7
Inlet Pressure/'-'PSIA
. y
Recuperator Gas Exit Tem perature V R  1361
Recuperator Gas Exit P res  sure ^ -PSIA 1 4 , 7
Reduction Gear Efficiency
Idle
1393
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REPLY TO QUESTIONS ASKED 
BY SENATOR'S EXON A!ID WARMER
Question No. 2: How much shaft horsepower has the XMl engine shown to date 
when connected to its air cleaners and exhaust ducts?
Response: Shaft horsepower is that power available at the output of the 
engine. The "bare" engine (without air cleaners or exhaust duct) is rated at 
1500 shaft horsepower. Approximately 1280 shaft horsepower is available as 
measured in the laboratory with XMl inlet and exhaust systems connected.
C'je:-;-. Since this is a 1500 shaft horse-- er engine does the Army cxpect
to"gee that type or performance?
Response: Yes. A loss of shaft horsepower with inlet and exhaust systems^ 
connected is typical of any engine whether it is gasoline, diesel, or turbine.
Engines are typically rated for shaft horsepower as "bare" engines, that is, 
without inlet cr exhaust attached. Most ground engine applications (automobile, 
truck, tank, etc.) require air inlet system for air filtration and an exhaust 
systen to duct exhaust cases to an appropriate location and silence the engine 
noise. Therefore, the inaxiiaum installed shaft horsepower attainable will always 
be less than the rated shaft horsepower. Racing cars and dragsters are an 
exception and have little or no inlet or exhaust systerrs in order to maximize 
available shaft horsepower, but they operate for only short periods of time in 
a very restricted environment.
Question No. 4 : I,'hat has the diesel engine been tested to in shaft horsepower?
Response: The Teledyne Continental AVCR 1360 diesel engine is rated at 1500 
Gross Horsepower. It is an air-cooled engine with integral cooling fans and 
the shaft horsepower available (power available at the output of the engine) 
is determined by subtracting the power required for the fans from the gross 
horsepower. At full power, the cooling fans require 160 horsepower, so the 
maximum shaft horsepower for the bare AVCR 1360 is 1340 SHP. to obtain the 
installed shaft horsepower, the power loss due to the air cleaners and exhaust 
for the diesel must be included. For the AVCR 1360 installed in a tank, this 
loss is approximately 200 IIP, so the maximum available installed shaft horse­
power for this engine is approximately 1140 SHP.
•S
i o
HE PLY TO QriL5TI0;;S ASKED 
BY SET!AT0R 1S F.XON A-:D i'ARUE
_  i'os the turbine enair.e i?et i \ r a  durability goals established
icF the production version of the XM1?
Response: Yes. The government durability requirement is established for the 
power train (engine, transmission and final drive) and is the same for full 
scale engineering development (FSED) and production: 50:- probability of 
completing 4000 miles without a durability failure. Based on the 16,000 
miles of Ft. Knox testing on three tanks, the power train achieved a 54% 
probability of 4000 miles without a durability failure.
Mo. .24: General Babers, in your personal opinion, is there a need to 
continue a backup-diesel-engine program for the XMl in FV1931?
Response: No. The AGT 1500 turbine engine today is a mature, well-proven, 
extensively tested engins which meets all of the Army's performance, reliability, 
and durability requirements. Based on its demonstrated performance, there is 
no nesd to pursue a backup diesel engine program.
The AVCR 1360 diesel engine is neither mature nor ready for production. The 
funds appropriated by Congress would be primarily used to complete the develop­
ment of the engine components, including variable area turbochargers (VAT), and 
variable speed cooling fans, and for reconfiguration of the engine to be compatible 
with the XMl tank, including reconfiguration of the oil pan, relocation of the
oil piimp, alternator, hydraulic power supply and starter motor, and redesign of 
the accessory drive train. This XMl-compatible diesel would be a new engine con­
figuration without any test experience or maturity. These major design changes 
to the engine induction system, lubrication system, cooling system and structural 
ingecrity require a complete development cycle to verify that vehicle performance 
and durability requirements can be met. USATARADCOM has stated that 3000 dyna­
mometer hours and 50,000 vehicle miles are required, and at the end of that 
testing, there is no assurance that the diesel engine's performance, reliability 
and durability will be as good as the turbine engine is now.
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MEMOBAMDOM FOR BBOfHB) 
SUBJECT: Trip Report
1 .  Ob 7  D m  7 7  t h e  a d t n l g i M d  v i s l t a d  AVOO Lgrceadng f o r  t t e  po r p o —  
o f  v i e w in g  t h e  e n g in e  d jM a g e  o n  e n g in e  8 /H 26  w h ic h  f a i l e d  a t  APC
o n  )  D ec  7 7  w h i l e  l a t a  H a d  l a  F V - 1 .
2 .  D m  b la d e a  o f  t h i  f i r s t  s t a g e  HP o o M p re s s o r  h a d  f a l l a d  ( Z a o l  1 ) .
A l l  b la d e a  o f  t h a t  s t a g e  h ad  b e e n  b r o k e n  a n d  had  d i s i n t e g r a t e d  w h i l e  
p a s s in g  t h r o u g h  t h a  r a a a t n ln g  s t a g e s  o f  t h a  HP e o a p r a s s o r .  T h e r e  w aa 
e x t e n s i v e  d a a a g e  t o  th a  r a a a in in g  s t a g e s  o f  th a  HP o a q p r a a a o r .  T h a ra  
« u  a i a o r  POD t o  t h a  L P  o o a p r e a a o r ,  b a t  t h i a  i a  b e l i e v e d  t o  b a  u n r e la t e d  
t o  th a  HP o a a p r a a e o r  f a i l u r e .
3 . P r e l i M i a a r y  e a a M ln a t io n  ahow ad e v id e n c e  o f  f a i i g a e  c r a c k s  o n  th a  
b la d a  s t u e p s  o f  a p p r o a l a a t a l r  7 0 % o f  t h a  b la d a a  o f  t h a  f a l l a d  s t a g e .  
D a t a i l a d  a a a l y a i a  o f  th a  ca n a a  o f  t h a  f a l l o r a  w i l l  r e q u i r e  a e a a  t i a a *
4 .  D a t a i l a  o f  t h a  ■ o d i f i o a t i o n a  t o  t h a  a n g in a  f o a l  a y s ta M  a a o a a a i t a t a d  
b y  t h a  r a o a a t  p r o b la a e  a r a  show n a t  Z a o l  2 .  t h a  M o d i f i c a t i o n  ra d u o a a  
t h a  p r a a a u ra  d r o p  a o e r o a a  th a  ' I '  f i t t i n g  and  a a a o o ia t a d  t u b in g  a t  f u l l  
f l o w  r a t a a  fro m  1 2  p a l  t o  1  p a i .  B i i s  a p p e a r s  t o  h a v t  s o l v a d  th a  
p r o b la a .
2  Z n o l PAUL M. 800V 
KftJ, OcdC
AG
T 
15
00
 
EN
GI
NE
 
SC
H
EM
A
TI
C
cc<LUtr
AC
CE
SS
OR
Y 
HIG
H 
HIG
H 
LO
W 
PO
W
ER
 
RE
DU
CT
IO
N 
GE
AR
BO
X 
PR
ES
SU
RE
 
PR
ES
SU
RE
 
PR
ES
SU
RE
 
TU
RB
IN
E 
GE
AR
 
CO
M
PR
ES
SO
R 
TU
RB
IN
E 
TU
RB
IN
E
Appendix A -4
DRCPM-GCM-SM FACT SHEET Automotive Branch
MAJ Root/31231 
6 December 1977
SUBJECT: Engine Failure on FV-1 
Project Manager, XMl Tank System
PURPOSE,. To inform the Project Manager of the facts surrounding the 
engine failure on FV-1.
FACTS.
1. On Saturday, 3 December 1977, FV-1 was running at APG when the engine, 
#26, "popped", shut down, and would not restart. First indications were 
that the problem was a dirty fuel nozzle. The engine had accumulated 718 
hours (roughly equivalent to 7180 miles) prior to the failure.
2. When the fuel nozzle was replaced, four of the mounting bolts sheared. 
A new nozzle and combustor dome were shipped from AVCO and installed.
3. The engine started but " s u r g e d "  at idle and was immediately shut down. 
The compressor bleed tube was removed and small pieces of metal were 
visible, indicating compressor damage, possibly due to Foreign Object 
Damage (FOD).
4. Engine #27, a Validation engine with FSED update previously used for 
AVCO in-house lab testing, was shipped to APG and arrived at 0130 Monday,
5 December. The engine was assembled to the transmission and ground 
hopped Monday night and installed in the vehicle and checked out Tuesday 
morning, 6 December. FV-1 was scheduled to run late Tuesday afternoon.
5. Engine #26 was shipped to AVCO and the failure is being analyzed. 
Preliminary inspection revealed compressor damage to several stages in­
cluding what appears to be FOD to the first stage low pressure compressor. 
AVCO is performing a detailed metallurgical analysis of the damaged parts 
to determine the cause of failure. Results should be available within a 
week.
6 . AVCO estimates that engine #26 should be repaired within ten days and 
can then be reinstalled in FV-1.
E. W. TRAPP
C, fiys Engr Div >
PROJECT MANAGER ACTIONi
NOTEDt 
SEE ME:
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DRCPtf-GCK-SM TACT S H O T  AatOMOtiws Itneb
MAJ Boot/31231 
27 April 1978
SUBJECT: dramstance* Surrounding ebs CoMroMat's Daisy InAecsptlag f W  
ProJact Hsasgsr, XM1 Tsnk Syataa
PURPOSEi To ehroolcls tbs svsats Issdlng to tbs PH's rsfussl to sccspt PV4 
prior to laspsetlon of tbs snglas #4 bsarlag forward ssal.
FACTSI
1. Ob 3 Jsauary 1978, testing of snglns #28, s rebuilt validation snglas, 
u s  temporarily saspsadsd dus to astsl chips found In tbs soglas oil. Chip 
datsetors rsvsalad ths problsa bsfors sscsadsry daaags occurred* Tha causa 
« u  ilsaegs to ths forward ell ssal of ths rsar coaprassor support bssrlag 
( t i  hssrlag) which hsd bssa prssssd too far lato its support bousing. Ths 
englas #4 hserlng pac^ags hsd bosa rsdsslgasd for TSKD aad saglas #28 hsd 
bosa Modified to iacorporsts ths ass design.
2. Ths propsr asseably of ths ssal is shows at TAB A* Ths ssal asssably 
should hs prssssd lato ths houslag natil it contacts ths sasp rlag. 
spseisl tool is suppossd to b« assd hshlad the sasp rlag to prsvsat ths 
ssal asssably fros bslag pnsbsd la too far* Ths fit batwssa ths sssl 
sssssbly sad its houslag is .003" latsrfsrsaes, so ones it is lastallsd, 
ths sssl should not m o ts *
3* If tits sssl asssably is lapropsrly lastsllsd (sss TAB B) sad is prssssd 
too fax lato its support houslag, high loads rssult bstwssa ths sssl carbon 
si—sat (#1) sad ths sssl rsaasr <#2). This is dus to ths fact that ths 
carbon sssl slsasnt is fully coaprssssd so its springs (#3). If ths sngias 
continues to run, ths sssl will hs daaagsd (hsst sad high vssr) sod hsTlng 
dsasgs vill svsntually rssult dus to astal chips froa thsssslgattlag lato 
ths bssrlag (sss TAB C). Bvsatually hsTlwi fsilurs will aecur^sad dus to 
ths thrust losd spplisd to ths high prsssurs eoaprasaor abaft which tsndi 
to displscs ths coaprassor shaft longitadlaslly, soctsnslvs sscondsry d— gs 
csa rssult to ths HP coaprsssor.
4. In ordar for this sltuatloa to occur, tha sssl asssably aust hs prsssed 
in past its locating sasp rlag, displacing ths snsp ring by forelag it out 
of its locating groove. This ladlcstss thst ths spseisl ssssably tool was
DBCPK-GCK-SM 27 April 1978
SUBJECT! Clrcnaotanrea Surrouadlag tbe Government's Delay la Aeeaptlag FV4
not H M d  during aaeeefely. Thar* 1* a vary email tolaraace where the aeal 
aaeaably caa be preaaed ia far oneugb to dlaplaee the snap ring tat w e  far 
enough to folly cpwprooa the seal alaaent apriata. Thia condition Indicates 
laprop«r aaeaably, tat ia thla caee, dot|» would probably not oecsr do* to 
tba fact that tfao aaal ep rings ara not folly compressed and tba reeultant 
loada between tba seal ruaaer and tba caxboo element aro not too high.
5. After thla problem appaoTod on engiae #28, all FSED engines subsequently 
nanufectured bad a apeclfle iaspaetioa for proper installation of this aeal 
assembly. Tive FSZZ) engines tad been aaanfaetnred and ahipped to Cbryaler 
prior to tbe incident on engine #28. They are #33t 34, 35, 37, aad 38.
6. On 4 April 1978, engine #34, laatailed la FV-4 at APO, aaffered a failure 
of the #4 aeal aeeeebly. Secondary damage to tbe high preaaura comproeaor 
also oecorred. Investigation revealed that the #4 forward aeel aaaobly had 
been preaaed la too far, dialocating tbe aaap ring aad eanalag daaege aa 
deacribed above. At that tiae, AVCO begea planning to cbeek the raaalnlng 
four engines for proper aaal installation. The engines were laatalled la PI, 
P2, P3, aad ?4.
7. On 11-12 April, Major Boot waa at AVCO for technical discaaeiooa laclud- 
lng dlacoaaloaa on tha #4 beaiing-seal aaatatily. Daring a talaphoaa call on 
12 April with Mr. Irrin Smith, It was reeliaed P4, with engine #38 installed, 
was due to be delivered to tbe flnrsr— snt without the #4 aaal asaamhly having 
been inspected for proper laatallatlon. Tha PHO refused delivery of tbe 
v e h ic le . Tbe frost module froa engine #43 (tbe aeel bed been laapected) wee 
substituted for the froot aodule of engine #38 end the vehicle waa accepted 
by tbe Covernaont one day late. At this tlae, two feiluree had occurred 
(#28 and 34) aad tbe other eagluea bad aot yet been inspected (#33, 35, 37, 
end 38).
8. On 17 April, Major loot visited AYCO to obaarve tbe dlaaaeambly «f tbe 
#4 eeal aaaaabllaa on engine #38 (froa F4) aad #37 (froa P3). Tha aaaaably 
froa #38 waa properly laatalled aa evidenced by flow aad vacuua cftecka of 
tbe aaaaably and by dlaeaalonal aaeauraaaata. Tbe aaa— ibly free #37 was 
improperly laatalled. Dimensional chocks ahowed It waa preaaed alightly Coo 
far lato ita housing aad tbe aaap rlag waa diaplaeed. It was aot puabed la 
eo far Chat tbe aeel aprlage were fully eoapraeeed as deacribed la para 4.
At thia paint, two engines had failed aad one of the two othera laapected 
had aa improperly laatalled aeal.
DRCm-GCM-SM 27 April 1978
SUBJECT: CircoMtaacM Surrounding tha Government'* Deity la Aeeeptlag T9k
9. Kngln— #33 (feat PI) mad 35 (fra P2) art still to be laspeetad.
3 Iael *• w * *****
aa C, SystsM Baglaeerlag Division
P10JECT HAHACE& ACTIOMl
HOTED:_________________
SEE HE:
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DRCPM-GCM-SM FACT SHEET
Automotive Branch 
MAJ Root/31231 
27 September 1979
SUBJECT: Turbine Engine Failures 
Program Manager, XMl Tank System
PURPOSE: To identify failure modes of field engines.
FACTS:
1. Since the 6 August 1979 update, four engines have been removed for 
repair.
2. The total number of engine replacements is now 39 failures and 14 
engines removed prior to failure.
3. Recapitulation of failure causes: 
a. Cause (attributable to):
(1) Dust erosion (air induction system design) 9(2)
(2) FOD (human error)
(3) LP turbine shroud (quality)
(4) #4 seal assembly (engine design)
(5) Combustor dome U p  (engine design)
(6) Compressor surge (engine design)
2(1)
2
1
1
2
(7) Overfuel/low voltage start (fuel control design) 4
(8) LP turbine wheel/blades (engine design)
(9) Burned combustor scroll (engine design)
2
2(2)
(10) Accessory gearbox bearings (three engine design, 5 
one quality, one under investigation)
DRCPM-GCM-SM 27 September 1979 
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(11) #6 bearing (secondary failure - fording kit) 1
(12) #7 bearing seal assembly/piston rings (engine, 
design)
(2)
(13) #3 bearing/seal (under investigation/quality) 1(1)
(14) Crew error, maintenance error, abuse 6(2)
(15) Burned nozzles (under investigation) (1)
(16) PTS linkage/recuperator cracking (quality) (1)
(17) HP turbine blade (under Investigation) 1
(18) #10 bearing seal (under investigation) (1)
(19) Power shaft piston rings or seal (under 
Investigation)
(1)
b. Summary:
(1) A1r Induction system design 9(2)
(2) Engine design 11(4)
(3) Fuel control design 4
(4) Quality 3(2)
(5) Crew error, maintenance error, abuse 6(2)
(6) Under investigation 3(3)
(7) Other 3(1)
( ) Denotes removal/replacement prior to failure.
4. Explanation of recent failures is at Inclosure 1.
5. Breakout of all failures by test type is at Inclosure 2.
y *  «‘/ v *
2 Jncl E. W. TRAPP
as Chief, Systems Engineering Division
PROGRAM MANAGER ACTION: 
N O T E D _____________ _—
ENGINE FAILURES SINCE 6 AUGUST 1979
1. On 13 August 1979, Engine #50 in P7 at Ft. Knox suffered a failed •
#3 bearing assembly. The cause of the failure was traced to oil con­
tamination by aluminum oxide, an abrasive material. The aluminum 
oxide came from the engine oil cooler. The cooler had been improperly 
cleaned by a vendor for Chrysler in May during the vehicle overhaul 
and aluminum oxide formed in the cooler due to a reaction between the 
cleaning solvent (trichiorethane), water, and the aluminum cooler.
Both engine and transmission oil coolers had this contamination and 
engine and transmission filters imnediately clogged when the power 
pack was operated. Filters were changed and the lube systems were 
flushed thoroughly when the vehicle reached Ft. Knox. Subsequently, the 
transmission failed because the aluminum oxide had scored the turbine 
driven control pump. Evidence shows that the engine oil filter was on 
bypass during part of the initial operation which allowed aluminum oxide 
to contaminate all bearings and seals. After the engine failure, 
aluminum oxide was found in the other bearings. The conclusion is that 
the aluminum oxide damaged the #3 bearing which eventually failed. This 
is classified as a maintenance error.
2. On 23 August 1979, Engine #33 was removed from P5 at Ft. Knox as a 
precaution. The engine oil cooler was leaking and replaced with one 
from stock. On the second start excessive smoke was seen coming from the 
engine. Inspection revealed that the oil filter and in line screens 
were clogged. It was determined that the oil cooler had been improperly 
cleaned and had aluminum oxide in it which clogged the filters (See above}
To prevent a future engine failure, the engine was shipped to AVCO for 
complete flushing of the lubrication system and replacement of all bearings 
and seals. This is classified as a maintenance error.
3. On 8 September 1979, Engine #33 suffered a failed #3 bearing at Ft. Knox 
after only a few hours of operation since bearing replacement (see above). 
Bearing quality or improper assembly are possible causes, but the inci­
dent is still under investigation.
4. On 25 September 1979, Engine #33 suffered a failure of the bevel 
gear shaft, which drives the accessory gearbox, in the vicinity of the 
#12 bearing. The #12 bearing was destroyed and the spline shaft below 
It was distorted. This occurred after only a few hours of Ft. Knox 
operation after the previous rebuild (see above). This incident is 
under Investigation.
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DRCPM-GCM-SM 2 May 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDt
SUBJECT: Trip Report to Ft. Blias to Investigate Engine Problems
1. On 25 April I went to Ft. Bliaa to investigate the engine problems on 
P5 end P4. The engine on P5 (#A36) would not stert end hed been down five 
days. P4 (#A43) shut down es it was pulling into the maintenance building 
and would not reatart.
2. Mr. John Petty (engine) and Mr. John Shacklock (nanuals) of Chrysler 
and Mr. Ed Pelligrino (test engineer) and Mr. Bill Egan (ILS) of AVCO 
arrived at approximately the sane time as I did. Mr. Pelligrino brought 
e modified ECU end a diagnostic box for the engine. The modified ECU 
will eventually be retrofitted on all engines.
3. P5 had become inoperative on 21 April. The problem appeared to be 
lack of fuel getting to the fuel nosxle. In the process of bleeding the 
system the starter was burned out. There was a delay of at least one day 
while a new starter was flown in. After the new starter was installed, the 
problem persisted. Bleeding the fuel system showed no fuel was getting to 
the fuel nossle. Start attempts aborted in epproxiaataly three seconds.
Ft. Bliaa personnel had done troubleshooting by the manuals with test sets 
and had reached e dead end. Although it waa not called for in the manuals, 
they then tried VESTS. Thla is not normally used in engine troubleshooting 
but did read "faulty ECU" and called for further tests with a multimeter.
At this time the new ECU was not yet available. It waa further determined 
that no fuel waa reaching the fuel nossle. Upon hla arrival, Mr. Pelligrino 
put on the new ECU and again bled the hydromechanical unit of the fuel con­
trol. The engine started on the next ettempt and sped up due to excess 
fuel left in the engine. It waa ahut down. It waa again atarted and ran
O.K. for 15 minutes. It waa ahut down, the old ECU relnatalled end again 
was started* The engine ren O.K. and was declared operetional. The vehicle 
ran until Saturday when it wouid not idle properly in neutral. The trouble 
was traced to a faulty 16V feedback cable. None was on hand so one was 
flown in from AVCO on Sunday. The engine ran satisfactorily, but when re­
installed in the vehicle, a good eeal could not be made at the air plenum- 
engine seal. The aeal would not properly fit on the bottom and tended to 
slip off. The band clanp had worked out of ita sleeve in the seal and 
must be recemented in there. Vehicle la not yet (1 May) operational.
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4. On 24 April P4 (engine #A43) had shut down while in the maintenance 
area. After the initial shutdown the engine was restarted, the vehicle 
moved forward 15-20 feet, made a alight left turn and after return of the 
"T" handle to the center position, the engine shut itself down and the 
master warning and caution lights came on. Other lights c u e  on after 
shutdown. Driver cranked engine using "atarter only" for 15 aaconds, let 
engine coast down and then tried normal start. The engine atarted, Npj 
rose to 850 RPM and then the engine shut down. Several warning and caution 
lights came on. The driver attempted to start again and when it waa apparent 
that the engine would not start, he shut it off. On the night of 25 April 
Mr. Pelligrino put the new ECU on P4 and attempted to start the engine. The 
engine cranked but it was obvious there was no fuel getting to the engine.
The hydromechanical unit was purged in several places and fuel then reached 
the nozzle. A start attempt was made and the engine started and ran. After 
normal shutdown, the old ECU waa reinstalled and the engine ran properly.
5. The cause of the problem is not exactly known. AVCO and Chrysler 
engineers were present during the attempts to start. An investigation 
ahould be made to determine the cause of the problem and its resolution. 
Removal of the "lightning" valve and installation of new ECU's may solve 
the problems*
6. On Wednesday, 26 April, I drove P4 and felt that the power might be 
low. The driver subaequently reported low power. It was decided to run 
a power check that evening ualng the Engine Organisational Test set to 
check out the system. AVCO waa given permission to Install a presaure 
guage In the fuel line at the hydromechanical fuel control. During install­
ation of the guag^ the in-line fuel filter was dropped and fell under the 
engine. Retrieval of this part necessitated pulling the power pack. After 
a delay in obtaining a wrecker, Chrysler personnel pulled the pack. There 
was some minor difficulties and two serious safety violations.
a. The pack was only partially removed from the hull and was held there 
while the mechanic reached between the front of the pack and the bulkhead
to retrieve the filter.
b. When reinstalling the final drive shafta, the Chrysler test engineer 
used a procedure different from that in the manuals. He had the driver put 
the vehicle in drive and slowly let off on the brake while he p u t h e  
shafts back into the transmission outputs with his hands. While doing this 
he was leaning into the sprocket and when the F.D. shaft seated, the vehicle 
lurched forward. When I asked him why ha hadn't used the procedures in the 
manuals he said that he had never read "your" (the Army'a) manuala and he 
had always done it the other way*
DRCFM-GCH-SM 2 May 1978
SUBJECT: Trip Report to Ft. Bllaa Texaa to Inveatlgate Engine Probleae
7. A power cheek waa subsequently performed, tha pack checked out O.K. 
and the teat aet performed aatiafactorlly. On Thuraday P4 waa taken for a 
confirmatory performance run. Top speed was 50 MPH and acceleration waa 
0-20 MPB in approximately 6 aeconda.
8. A Mating waa held Vedneaday with LTC Seehtaan and Chryaler representa­
tive*. LTC Sechtaen atreaaed the importance of eccurete aana.la for 0T II. 
1 mentioned that* froa what I bad seen, Chryaler had a long way to go In a 
abort time before tbeir aanuala would be aatiafactory. Examples are the 
leek of adequate fuel ayataa troubleahooting procedurea and the deed end 
that waa encountered In etteapting to get P5 running.
9. On Thuraday I had a dlacuaaion with Mr. Bob Vagner, Chryaler'a Teat 
Site Manager, on ay lapreaaiona of the contractor teat aupport. My 
coaaente were confined to tbe personnel I had obaerved working on the 
engine aad Includedi
«. Lack of poeltlva direction by tha aenior aan preaant at any tiae 
and consequent debate between tech repa aa to tha beat courae of action.
b. Apparent lack of profeaalonallaa of the contractor tach repa aa 
evidenced by dieragard of baaie eafaty procedurea.
e. Unfaalliarlty of tech repa with maintenance aanuala end procedurea 
given ia the menuele.
4, The neeeaalty for Chryaler peraonnel to Hcleen up their ect" alnce 
they ere viewed aa the experts on the ayataa, aanuala, and aaintenance by 
the ailltary peraonnel at Ft. Bllaa.
10. Several other cniienta aad plecee of information ware obtelned while 
et Ft. Bllae.
e. A euggeetion waa aade by Mr. Egan, AVCO, that on-elte aanual re- 
vialon taaae be conaldered to reduce the tiae between identification of a 
aanual problaa and the publication of the appropriate change.
b. The neeeeelty for the aanuala to be exhaustive in their trouble- 
ahootlng procedurea becaaa obvious and vaa aentloned aeveral tiaea.
c. Test aeta are not validated, that la, there haa been no ©n-vehicle 
check of the appropriate eoaponent to insure that the eet will properly 
diegnoae a particular fault. Conaequently confidence In the teat aeta la 
low. Chryelar-Huntavllla peraonnel were reprograming the fire control 
teet eet when I waa there.
DRCFM-GCM-SM 2 May 1978
SUBJECT: Trip Report to Ft. Bllaa Texas to Investigate Engine Problems
Cd. Hr. Egan, AVCO, stated that the Engine DS test set may not differ­
entiate between a good and bad engine. He stated that, given an engine 
that is bad aa determined by failure to pass the power check using the 
Engine Organisational Test set, the DS test set will tell you whether to 
replece the front or rear module, or both. Therefore, It cannot be uaed 
to check out e rebuilt engine.
e. The overflow return line from the rear to front tanks of P4 did 
not operete properly. During the power pack changeout, the front tanka 
were inadvertently pumped Into the rear ones. Insteed of returning the 
fuel to the front tanka, it seeped out eround the sponson filler cap 
gaakats and dripped Into the hull.
f. . LTC Sechtman stated that he wented to keep e resIdeal training 
teem at Ft. Bllas during OT II but that he could not get it funded. He 
may aak PMO to fund it.
PAUL M. ROOT 
MAJ, OrdC
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DRCPM-GCM-SM 5 July 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: 
SUBJECT: Trip Report to TPG
1. On 26-30 Job* I traveled to YPO to observe vehicle testing on FV1, 
Hydraulic system and fual lyatw taata vara scheduled.
2. On Monday, 26 June, tha hydraulic systam return lina filter elogged aad 
there were no aparea in tha MTSP. Sparaa were ordered froa Detroit and
Ft. Bllaa. Sparaa finally were located et Yuma Airport at 1700, 27 June.
They had apparently been there aince 0700 that day. Bendix installed a new 
circuit board in the ECU on 27 June.
3. 28 June hydraulic lyitaa teats vere conducted on the dynaeoeeter course. 
After one hour of running at 35-40 MFH and alaving the turret - 45°, the 
hydraulic fluid had reached 254° above the apeclfied 250° lieit. The teat 
waa terminated. The right cooling fan apparently never came on and, as a 
conaequence, there was little airflow over the hydraulie cooler. The teat 
ia scheduled to be repeated when the right fan can be locked on.
4. 29 and 30 June were spent In instrumenting the vehicle for fuel system 
tests. New fuel pumpa, Validation FtfS and new HNB were inetallad. Preaaure 
and tempereture eeneora were installed throughout the fuel system. Instru­
mentation is continuing.
5. Random obaervationa on the operation at TPG:
a. It la basically a one-ahlft operation, 0700-1530. They start eloaing 
up around 1500. I waa told that if they were running mileage, they would 
work later. In a hot weather teat center, they ahould regularly run until 
1800.
b. There appeared to be no senaa of urgency, although there were 
complelnts about being behind schedule.
c. There didn't appear to be much advance planning or work-around 
planning. When the vehicle waa awaiting a hydraulic filter, little elae waa 
planned. There didn't appear to be a lot of coordination with the instru­
mentation lab: On Thursday afternoon the teat engineer waa not sure If he 
could get the necesaary support to install telemetry on the vehicle on Friday.
d. There ia no aingle Individual dedicated to running the XMl tests.
Mr. Twomey hae other teats to conduct aa well end muat neceaaarlly divide 
hla time.
DRjCPM-GCM-SM 5 July 1978
SUBJECTt Trip Report to IPG
«. There vere unconfirmed reports that tha 61 creva and mechanica had 
not bean trained on tha vahiele.
f. Spare parts support ia bad. Tha MTSP ia inadequate and haa not been 
updated baaed on the Ft. Bllaa experience.
g. Aa NCO reported to ma that tech raps vere alibiing problena aa "being 
normal" rather than lnveatigatlng and solving than. Examplea vere roadvheel 
seal leaks, an oil leak at engine/tranaaiaaion Interface, and a reported 
engine aurga.
6. Racomaandatlonai
a. Tvo-ahlft operation ba laatituted if necessary to taka advantage of 
hot veather during the day.
b. Instruaontation and maintenance be conducted eecond ahlft to accelerate 
the teat program.
c. A single peraon be given authority to ran and direct the teat with 
no other dutlea or teat prograaa.
d. Spare part support be upgraded.
PAUL M. ROOT 
MAJ, OrdC
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDl
SUBJECT: Trip Report to AVCO Lyeonlng
1. On 6 July 1978 I rlaltad AVCO Lycoming to lnapaet damaged anginas #38 
and 42.
2. Knglna #38 vaa raturnad from Ft. Bllaa dua to eonpraaaor aurglng. 
Xnapactlon of tha dlaaaaanblad angina ravaalad aarere sand aroalon to tha 
lat ataga HP eonpraaaor and laaaar daaaga to tha remainder of tha LP & HP 
compraaaora. Tha lat ataga BP eonpraaaor bladaa vara alaalng tha outar 23Z 
and tha laadlng and trailing adgaa vara bant and torn. Tha raaalnlng HP 
eonpraaaora had rlppad and torn bladaa. All atator rova vara danagad.
3. Tha LP eonpraaaor ahowad alight aroalon to tha lat ataga bladaa. Tha 
3rd and 4th atagaa had allghtly dlahad laadlng adgaa and tha trailing adga 
of tha fifth ataga had FOD fron tha HP eonpraaaor. Tha trailing adgaa of 
laat ataga of LP atators vara badly daaagad fron tha HP eonpraaaor.
4. Band had paaaad through tha raeuparator and had baan aaltad In tha 
conbuator. It aolldlflaa aa "glaaa" (raally a eruably, poroua earaalc) 
on tha aplaah rings of tha eoabuator and tha acroll. Half of tha bladaa 
of tha HP turblna noxala had cracka In thalr laadlng adgaa and aoaa had 
glaaa on tha raar aurfacaa of tha bladaa. Tha trailing adga of a quartar 
of tha bladaa had burnad avay. Half of tha bladaa of tha HP turblna had 
cracka and burn-through aarka on tha laadlng adga. Tha LP nosala had aaall 
burn-through holaa at tha laadlng adga of naarly all tha bladaa vhara tha 
bladaa M a t  tha outar aupport ring.
3. Sand aroalon daaaga la apparantly vorat on tha flrat ataga HP com- 
praaaor for thla angina. Thla la probably dua to tha fact that tha HP 
eonpraaaor rotataa oppoalta to tha LP eonpraaaor and at dlffarant apaada.
Tha angina airflow dlaaatar alao narrova at thla point. Dua to eantrlfugal 
forca, tha aand la concantratad at tha outalda of tha alrflov path and tha 
larga dlffaranca In ralatlva valocltlaa batvaan tha aand and air laavlng 
the LP eonpraaaor and antarlng tha eountar-rotatlng HP eonpraaaor aaka for 
very rapid aroalon of tha lat ataga HP eonpraaaor.
6. Knglna #42 fallad to atart at tha Tank Plant vhlla Inatallad In P10 
prior to gorarnikant aceaptanca. Inapaetlon at AVCO ravaalad aztanalva 
daxaaga to tha HP & LP turblna atagaa. AVCO atatad that tha daaaga vaa
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caused by a portion of the lip of the combustor dome which surrounds the 
injector (see Inclosure 1) breaking off. This hit tha HP turbine, breaking 
off tha top half of one blade. The HP turbine had evidence of severe tip 
rulma caused by tha inner support ring and shroud cylinder breaking away 
from tha HP nozzle. Half tha blades of tha HP nozzle had evidence of over­
heating (or FOD from small particles) on their leading edges. Two blades 
ware mlaalng pieces from their trailing adgaa. Half the blades of the LP 
nozzle ware burned through on ftiair leading edge. The blades had broken 
loose from their inner mounting support on a braze line and tha lnnar aaal 
surface waa damaged. The LP turbine wheel had carbon deposits on its bolt 
circle end tip rubs on the trailing third of the blades. There was also 
considerable flaking of tha thermal barrier coating of tha combustor liner.
7. Tha angina has been rebuilt and la In teat at AVCO. It la due for 
delivery by 14 July.
8. Modifications ara being made to combustor domee to avoid recurrence of 
thla problem (it first occurred in angina #28).
9. Other information from AVCOt
*• Bill Boas, a fuel systems consultant from Chrysler waa at AVCO for 
fuel ayatema teat. Ha stated that DF2 fuel would vaporize at 11-12 PS1 
absolute (-3PSI G) and at Ft. Bliss, tha atmospharic preasure ia approximately 
12.7 P8I abaoluta. Therefore, with only alight nagatlva preasure in tha fuel 
system, vapor could form at tha high ambient tamperaturaa encountered.
b. Tha fuel aneountara a 30®T tmaparature rise paaaing through tha fual 
control at full throttla and 60°F at idle due to tha bypass and reclrculation 
of fuel.
c. AVCO haa poetponad poaalbla Incorporation of fixed IGV’s in tha angina 
due to aurga problems and the failure of angina #39. Thla will have a DTC 
Impact.
d. AVCO la pursuing their redealgn of tha 1st stage HP eompreaaor blade 
to glva it a greater surge margin.
a. AVCO la studying modification of tha IGV schedule to provida a greater 
aurga margin and avoid a rapaat of tha failure of angina #39.
1 Incl PAUL M. ROOT
aa MAJOR, ORD
r ,DRCPM-GCM-SM FACT SHEET m  /  Automotive Branch
7 August 1978
SUBJECT: Chrysler Attempts to Solve Air Cleaning Problems 
Project Manager, XM1 Tank System
PURPOSE: To detail the efforts Chrysler plans to take to eliminate air 
cleaning system problems.
FACTS:
1. On 2 August 1978 Chrysler conducted meetings concerned with solving 
the air cleaner system problems which have been causing engine failures 
due to dust ingestion. The problems can be categorized as:
a. Air plenum seal leaks and failures.
b. Failure to seal V-Pack/alr cleaner box interface.
c. Loss of efficiency of scavenge blower.
2. The morning meeting concerned the plenum and seal problem. Repre­
sentatives from several seal manufacturers were present (TAB A). Chrysler 
decided to extend the lip of the plenum box from 1" to 1.5" or 1.75" by 
moving the rear wall of the plenum forward. A bead has been added to the 
lip. A kit will be designed and the modification will be applied to the 
OT vehicle plenums during- the modification period.
3. Representatives of three different companies presented proposals to 
manufacture a more suitable, reliable plenum seal. Lead time on producing 
the required molds is the pacing item, and the earliest a new seal will be 
available from any of the companies is 4-6 weeks. Each of the separate 
designs will be evaluated. A band clamp was decided upon as the best means 
of fastening the seal to the plenum. Cables have been shown to loosen over 
a period of time. Because of the lead time involved in producing new seals, 
it appears that the modified plenum will be used with the present seal, at 
least for a short period. —
4. An afternoon meeting was held with Donaldson representatives concerning 
the air cleaner system. Donaldson stated that during Validation they had 
produced the V-Packs, seals and air cleaner hnx- in FSED they produce the 
V-Packs only, and bond a Chrysler supplied seal to the end of the V-Pack. 
Chrysler manufactures the air cleaner box. 4.
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5. Donaldson agreed to the following:^  f  [\f Q_x ^
a. Redesign the V-Packs withirftwo weeks to include 1/4" shorter 
length, new seals .^compressor limiters,\ and more rugged outer surfaces 
(expanded metal vs wire screen). Chrysler, will design a new clamp and 
inspect the squareness of the air boxes and the parallelism of the ends 
of the boxes.
' J r,) b. Supply a team to check the efficiency of the scavenge blower 
/ system and recommend possible improvements. It was generally agreed 
that a constant speed scavenge blower system such as the more expensive 
\ hydraulically driven blower used in Validation, was much better than a 
^.'variable speed scavenger blower as is now used (mechanically driven, 
blower speed depends on engine speed). Chrysler is investieating a 
higher speed, mechanically driven scavenger blower.
c. In return for this, Chrysler agreed to fund Donaldson to build 
two complete air cleaner systems (V-Pack, seals, air cleaner box) for 
delivery in four months. These would be fastened to a Chrysler supplied 
plenum and tested on FV2 and 3 at Ft. Bliss. Chrysler will then evaluate 
the system against the present one with Improvements and choose the 
better, considering cost. Chrysler is funding Donaldson for approximately 
$50,000.
6. These modifications, when incorporated, should greatly reduce or 
eliminate engine failures caused by dust ingestion.
1 I n d  * E. W. TRAPP
as Chief, Systems Engineering Division
INFORMATION PAPER
DRCPM-GCM-SM
7 September 1979
SUBJECT: Air Induction System
FACTS.
1. XM1 testing 1n the harsh environment of Ft. Bliss, Texas, revealed 
shortcomings in the air induction system. Problems occurred in the 
following areas:
a. The air cleaner box was not stiff enough and could deform under 
load. The dimensional tolerances were too large. These permitted the 
barrier filters (V-pacs) to be installed and the required airtight seal 
would not be made.
b. Seals on the barrier filters (V-pacs) were originally glued in 
place and exposed on the end of the filter. During V-pac installation 
and removal, they could be damaged, become unglued, and be rolled out 
of position. This allowed unfiltered air to enter the engine.
c. The plenum seal, which forms the airtight seal between the nose 
of the engine and the plenum ring was difficult to install and could 
work loose during operation.
2. The air induction system has been modified to overcome the above 
shortcomings.
a. The air cleaner box structure has been stiffened and dimensional 
control tightened. Combined with the modifications to the V-pac sealing 
method, described below, this results in a system where the V-pacs are 
positively sealed in place when installed. It is impossible to lock the 
V-pacs in position if they are installed improperly due to the locking 
handle.
b. The seals have been removed from the end of the V-pacs and re­
cessed in the end plate of the air cleaner box. In this position they 
are protected from damage during V-pac installation and removal. The 
V-pacs have a V-shaped ridge in the metal end plate which mates with 
this seal. The V-pacs cannot be locked in place if the ridge is not 
properly seated in the seal.
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c. The plenum ring has been lengthened to give a larger surface for 
clamping the plenum seal. A bead has been added around the edge of the 
plenum ring to prevent the plenum seal, once installed and clamped down, 
from sliding off. The material of the plenum seal has been improved and 
a redundant seal added which is effective even if the outer seal is not 
properly clamped.
3. These modifications have resulted in an extremely reliable and effective 
air induction system. Since these modifications have been made, there 
have been no failures of the system during an extensive and rigorous test 
program.
2
#
MAJ Root/31231
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Trip Report to WSMR and Ft. Bliss
1. On 14*17 August 1979, I traveled to WSMR to Inspect the test courses 
for the FV2 dust test and to Ft. Bliss to make Initial coordination for 
the FV2 suspension test.
2. The test courses for FV2 will be adequate for a dust test provided 
1t stops raining and the courses dry out. There were rain and floods 
the entire time I was there. People state that 1t will only take a week 
to dry out. However, this Is the beginning of the rainy season at WSMR/ 
Ft. Bliss, and rain can be expected from now on.
3. The two courses are both near the Small Missile Range (SMR) base 
camp.
a. A 4000 diameter circle near Parker Station. The tank may operate 
around the perimeter of the circle. The area 1s flat, with some scrub 
growth. A few passes with the tank will turn It over and If 1t dries out, 
there will be plenty of dust. This course can be closed 1n the event of 
missile firing.
b. A 4000-5000 meter course along trails from site Tracy to site Nan. 
This course Is slightly rougher than the circle but should produce plenty 
of dust once 1t Is broken out. This course 1s seldom closed for missile 
firings and will be used primarily when the circle 1s not available.
4. Chrysler has been provided office and storage space at SMR to use 
during the test. They have been provided a parts van (four wheel drive) 
which can proceed to either test site. They are procurrlng a four wheel 
drive vehicle for their own use. As of last Thursday, their office space 
was not set up although they were ready to begin vehicle testing.
5. Chrysler will operate one shift with three dr1ver-mechan1cs from 
approximately 0700-1700 hours. Arrangements have been made with WSMR 
personnel to get access to the area prior to the normal workday.
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6. The environmental problems with the previously proposed test areas 
are real. New Mexico Is very sticky concerning vehicle running 1n any 
area which has not undergone an archeological survey. I talked with
Mr. AI Johnson, the environmental specialist and COL Gelsel, the Facilities 
Engineer, and there Is agreement that the current test areas are alright to 
use.
7. Chrysler Is scheduled to run 250 miles per week on one shift. It 
will take aggressive leadership on the part of their site manager and 
FV2 test engineer to insure this schedule 1s met.
8. I made preliminary coordination with Ft. BUss concerning the 
suspension test to be run In Area 6D In early October. POC Is
HAJ Paul Piper, Directorate of Plans and Training, AV 978-3631/3918.
He foresees no problems with scheduling the test area or necessary 
support. He had not received an official copy of our coordinating 
TWX and will get it retransmitted this week.
PAUL M. ROOT 
Major OrdC 
Automotive Branch
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SUBJECT: Report on Trip to Ft. Biles and White Sands Missile Range
1. On 10 thru 13 September 1979, I traveled to White Sands, New Mexico, 
and Ft. BUss, Texas, for the purpose of observing FV2 air cleaner 
testing and doing preliminary planning for the track test.
2. The FV2 test 1s running well. On 10 September, 106 km were run; 
on 11 Septenber, 134 km. On Wednesday, 12 September, no mileage was 
accumulated because the range was closed where the test tracks are.
About half of the mileage 1s being accumulated on Parker Site which Is 
the 4000 ft circle. The dust Is very deep there and very fine. The 
remainder Is being accumulated on a tank trail that runs north from 
Small Missile Range approximately 13 km. The dust 1s not as heavy 
here but Is Adequate. The alternate road which goes up towards 
Rattlesnake Mountain 1s used but you cannot sustain as high a speed on 
1t. Parker Site 1s the preferred site.
3. Cooments on the test:
a. The mechanics for FV2 need a complete set of tools as soon as 
possible. They do not have such basic things as ratchets and the metric 
sockets which they need. There 1s only one set of tools available and 
It has to be shuttled back and forth between PV1 and FV2. This causes 
loss of time and some Inefficiencies. The Chrysler test engineer states 
that the equipment Is on order but 1s not there yet. The tools should 
be expedited. The support package should be reviewed to Insure Its 
adequacy for the air cleaner test and also the upcoming track test. 
V-packs, filter, both oil and fuel, and suspension parts are likely to 
be used at a high rate.
b. The Chrysler test plan calls for changing precleaner» scavenge 
blower and maybe cooling fans each 250 miles. This will result 1n 
excessive delays 1n the test program and should not be done. I propose 
that all changes be made after the track test 1s computed In October. 
Until that time we should accumulate mileage as quickly as possible.
This needs to be emphasized to Chrysler. (Chrysler - Bob Hall has 
agreed to this.)
c. The Chrysler organization 1s still a little ragged. The 
mechanics are good; willing to what 1s needed, but they need the 
guidance of a test engineer. Bob Benson, the latest test engineer 
arrived on Wednesday. He Is the third test engineer on site since the 
vehicle was rebuilt. I hope he'll last. Chrysler needs to plan for 
contingencies and look ahead which they don't seem to be doing very 
often. An example of this 1s the fact that they didn't have necessary 
filters 1n their shop van on site but had to return to White Sands main 
post to get one. The site manager states that he has not been there 
himself very long and is trying to get things together. This doesn't 
answer the question because the test has been scheduled for several 
months and previous site managers or test engineers should have taken 
care of this.
d. Chrysler must be asked to refine their test plan. Currently,
AVCO wishes to take engine measurements every 10 hours of operation and 
when the V-packs clog. This requires going over to the tank trail at 
SMR and running there. If the tank had been running at Parker Site, 
this results In the delay of returning to SMI, making the calibration 
run, changing V-packs and then returning to the tank trail. AVCO does 
not need these -.measurements each time the V~packs clog and the elimina­
tion of some of this testing should be discussed Immediately with Chrysler.
I don't think Chrysler knows exactly what's going on.
e. PMO needs an update on all mileage run on FV2 to date, where 1t 
was run and when, so we can determine what 1s really allowable against 
the dust test.
f. With the intensive usage that FV2 Is getting, frequent oil 
analysis should be performed on both the engine and transmission. This 
Is available In El Paso and was used during 0T II. This analysis was 
requested of Chrysler who checked with the home office and the home office 
did not seem particularly enthusiastic. We should follow up and Insist 
on this. The analysis needs a quick turn-around to detect any possible 
problems.
g. On Tuesday, 11 September, we had a safety problem with the 
vehicle. There are no hydraulics In the turret and the gun had been 
welded 1n an upward position. It was welded by welding an end connector 
to the gun shield and then to the turret. After operation on the 10th,
1t was found that this had cracked. Welders were called and the end 
connector was rewelded. The sides of the gun shield were welded to the 
turret and a track block was wedged Inside the turret between the top
of the gun and the turret roof. This track block 1s on end so the track 
pins r«st between the turret roof and the top of the gun. It 1s safety 
wired and tied 1n place with rope so that should all the welds break, the 
gun will still be held 1n an up position.
h. Replaceable pad track 1s losing Its pads during sustained opera­
tion at high speeds on the tank trail. In one case this posed a safety 
hazard where a pad was thrown forward of the vehicle bounced on the road 
and the tank drove underneath 1t and the pad nearly hit the tank conriander. 
This 1s perhaps another reason for staying away from replaceable pad track.
1. After operations on the 11th* when pulling Into the motor pool, 
the engine was Idling and then shut Itself down. It's not known why this 
happened. After a few minutes 1t was restarted. During the restart 
procedure, the engine gas overtemperature light and low oil pressure 
lights came on but the engine did not shut down and sttrted normally.
As soon as 1t came up to speed, the lights went out and the engine has 
been operating fine ever since. AVCO Is not concerned.
j. The clogged oil filter warning light came on both the 11th and 
again the 12th of September. The first time 1t was found to be a loose 
connection; the second time was unknown but probably was still a loose 
connection. This should be watched closely.
4. When this air cleaner test was set up, PMO was assured that the 
alternate site, which 1s the road which runs up towards Rattlesnake 
Mountain, would never be closed during missile firings. The day of
12 September was lost due to the entire range area north of Highway 70 
being closed three times for the same firing. Each time the firing 
was postponed and finally never occurred. As a result, no mileage was 
accumulated that day. When Chrysler finally got back on site, only 
maintenance could be performed. We need to find an additional site 
which will be open when these ranges are closed. LT Richardson should 
take that action Immediately. (Note: Subsequent checks reveal that 
the area 1s closed only for Patriot firings. Only two are scheduled 1n 
the next month and one naybe cancelled. We can live with this.)
5. A1r Cleaner System: On 11 September, the V-pack air cleaner warning 
light came on. The vehicle had been operating at Parker Site, was 
driven back to the tank trail and a calibration run was made. Two 
additional runs were made on tie tank trail for a total of 78 km after 
the light came on with little noticeable loss of power. Several Items 
on the air cleaner system are worthy of note:
t. The V»packs new weigh approximately 39 to 40 pounds. When 
removed, tha left and center V-packs weighed 58 pounds and the right 
V-pack weighed 67 pounds. After cleaning, the right V-pack weighed 
41 pounds.
b. The V-pack was cleaned with 100 ps1 air and the Chrysler cleaning 
wand. The wand Is a long metal tube with a disc about the size of a 
fifty cent piece on It with a single small hole 1n It. It took over 
1-1/4 hours to clean the V-pack and 1t Is a very dirty job. Suggest
we get Donaldson engineers there to observe and 1f possible to clean the 
V-packs themselves according to procedures. Maybe they can come up 
with a better Idea. A better cleaning wand 1s also required.
c. The difficulty 1n cleaning the V-packs comes fron the fact that 
the folds 1n the barrier material are tight. If the folds were more 
open, the dirt would be more exposed and be easier to get out.
d. I have dust samples from White Sands, from Area 6 at Ft. BUss 
and from the V-packs which are available if people want them.
e. There Is a stock of spare V-packs on hand at White Sands. Some 
were damaged 1n transit. George Psaros had inspected them and marked 
the bad ones. The bad ones are still on site. They should be removed 
from the stock so they aren't Inadvertently used. There 1s also a 
problem with Identification of good and bad ones and this should be 
double-checked Immediately with Chrysler.
f. When the V-packs were removed, Chrysler used a small portable 
115 volt vacuum cleaner to clean out the air cleaner box and plenum.
It worked fairly well. They have another version, a backpack 115 volt 
vacuum cleaner on site which has not yet been tested. We need to check
to see 1f a 24 volt version exists which could be plugged Into the vehicle 
electric system.
g. The metal blocks 1n the bottom of the air cleaner box at the 
rear which serve to locate the narrow end of the V-packs and line them 
up square with the front face seem.to be Improperly constructed. The 
slots Into which the narrow end of the V-packs rest are too wide and 
thus you cannot get perfect alignment of the V-pack on the front face.
When the V-packs were changed, there was approximately 1/2 Inch of extra 
space 1n the slot which could result 1n misalignment of the V-pack. The 
clamp has a roller only and has nothing to square up the V-pack to the 
front fact so a lateral movement Is possible. It is very difficult to 
judge when the V-packs are square and no way to tell If the seal Is 
properly made. The tolerances should be reduced to practically zero. 
Chrysler should be notified Immediately of this situation.
h. When the V-packs were removed, the seals on the air cleaner 
box looked good. There was very little dust 1n the plenum. The air 
cleaner system seems to be working satisfactorily at this point; 
however, the care required 1n cleaning the V-packs, as mentioned above 
and the time consumed, will probably result 1n some troops not doing 
it properly.
6. Driver's Instruments: The low fuel warning light came on during 
operation and when It does, 1t activates the master caution light.
The low fuel warning light flickers as the fuel level drops below the 
level of the Indicator but the master caution light latches on. When 
the driver looks from the master caution light to his instrument panel,
If the low fuel warning light has gone off, he doesn't know what caused 
his caution light to come on. This should be a latching light. The 
BITE lights are too dim when bright sunlight shines Into the driver's 
compartment. You cannot see which Indicators are on.
7. Chrysler 1s Indicating that PV1 will ttave a new TIS and GPS Installed 
in It and will run 500 miles of cross country testing 1n a "shake, rattle 
and rollM test to determine the ruggedness to the system. Additionally, 
approximately 100 rounds of main gun ammunition will be fired. I feel 
that PV1 1s not the best vehicle nor Is White Sands the best site to do 
this test. PV1 has a very old validation engine 1n it and 1t may not 
last the entire test. One of the Fort Knox vehicles, which 1s going to 
run additional mileage anyway, would seem to be logical choice for this 
particular test.
8. FV2 Track Test: On 12 September, I met with CPT Dyson and we discussed 
preliminary plans for the track test of FV2 with CPT Hamilton of DPT at 
Ft. BUss. CPT Dyson had done ouch coordination the previous day so there 
wasn't too much left to do. The following Items resulted from those 
discussions:
a. SGT Paul's driver Is a specialist Case. He 1s no longer at 
Ft. BUss.
b. The soil conditions at Ft. BUss now are quite dry. Will the 
test be valid if there has not been rain prior to the test and we don’t 
have the wet sandy conditions which caused so many problems?
c. We have reserved Area 6C for the full month of October. We will 
cancel further use of 1t when we have completed our tests.
d. We have cancelled the M60 requirement because no one wants to 
have one there to run with the test.
e. CPT Dyson needs funds citation at Ft. Bliss. He Is handling this.
f. A UH1 was requested to provide aerial photographic coverage of 
the testing on 10 October; also on 2-3 October, In case problems occur 
on the 10th.
g. If VIP's are to be transported out to Area 6C by helicopter, 
this should be handled through the Visitor's Bureau by CPT Shlflett. 
Anyone flying 1n a helicopter needs to carry dogtags and the name, 
rank, social service number of all passengers need to be provided to 
Ft. Bliss ahead of time.
h. If a UHI 1s used for VIP's, suggest that 1t leave Ft. BUss at 
1200 from the helipad 1n front of the old XMl field office. It must 
return prior to 1800, otherwise landing must occur at the air field.
1. Sedans should be layed on for VIP’s by CPT Shlflett with the 
Visitor's Bureau.
J. Fuel and an M88 will be on call from the 3d CAV which will be 
operating at Dona Ana.
k. A HET will be provided by White Sands and 1t 1s planned to 
transport FY2 to the test site and back each day reducing the driving 
time required.
PAUL M. ROOT 
Major, 0D 
Automotive Branch
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MEMORANDUM FOR: LTC FEENEY
SUBJECT: Turbine Overspeed Protection and T7 Temperature Indication for the 
Turbine Engine
1. The MFR on AGT-1500 overspeed protection, dated 25 January 1977 (Incl 1), 
raised the question of an indicator to show if the engine power turbine has ex­
ceeded 130% of rated speed. There 1s currently no such indicator, but the 
possibility of reaching 130% of rated speed (3900 RPM) 1s very remote. Two 
independent speed sensors on the reduction gearbox will provide input to two 
separate electronic logic circuits in the fuel control system. The first gov­
erns speed to 3150 RPM by reducing fuel flow to the engine. If this system 
should fall, a backup system is activated, when the power turbine reaches 3240 
RPM, which puts the engine on a deceleration fuel schedule. Therefore, both 
sensors and both protection circuits would have to be inoperative at the same 
time for engine overspeed to be a problem. Additionally, if electrical power 
is lost, the engine automatically shifts to a fuel schedule which gives an 
engine output power of 300 HP, corresponding to a power turbine speed well 
below 3000 RPM.
2. The power output turbine wheels are designed with a bursting strength of 
160% of rated speed (4800 RPM). This condition should never be reached because 
the overspeed protection circuitry reacts quickly enough to prevent the output 
from reaching even 130% of rated speed even if the engine should be completely 
unloaded at full speed and power (I.e., complete transmission failure which 
removed all load from the engine).
3. The transmission has built-in protection (an automatic upshift sequence)
to prevent it from back driving the engine to an overspeed condition. A trans­
mission failure (high speed downshift) would be necessary for this to occur.
4. If the tank accelerates while descending a hill, the transmission will not 
overspeed due to its automatic upshift sequence. The vehicle would have to 
reach 58.5 MPH in order for the power turbine to reach 130% of its rated speed.
5. The question of the meaning of the "T7" temperature as used in the attached 
MFR's (Incls 1 & 2) has arisen. T7 temperature is the temperature of the com­
bustion gases at the Inlet to the power turbine. The gases have already passed 
through the high and low pressure turbines, and have cooled considerably in 
the process. The critical temperature in the engine occurs at the inlet to the 
high pressure turbine. This temperature is defined as T5 (see accompanying 
drawing, Incl 3). The material properties of the turbine wheels dictate that 
the temperature T5 be kept below a given temperature (2180OF). 2180°F yields
a power output of 1500 HP on a 100° day. T5 is not measured directly.
Instead, T7 1s monitored, and a T7 temperature of 1450°F corresponds to a T5 
temperature of approximately 2180°F. When the T7 temperature exceeds 1450°F, 
the fuel control system automatically reduces the fuel flow to the engine. This 
reduces the T5 and T7 temperatures. This system automatically prevents "hot 
starts", by reducing the fuel flow to the engine if the turbine section is hot 
(see Incl 2). The T7 temperature sensor also indirectly limits the compressor 
speed as stated in Paragraph 5. of Incl 1.
3 Incl 
as
PAUL M. ROOT 
MAJ, GS
Automotive Branch
Recuperator
Pressure
Turbine
FUEL CONTROL FACT SHEET
1. Background:
a. Nomenclature: Electronic Fuel Management System or Electronic Fuel 
Control. Bendix Energy Controls Division is the subcontractor.
b. Requirement: The electronic fuel control must meter fuel flow to 
the engine according to driver's demands, within the limits of turbine inlet 
temperatures, as necessary to provide high engine durability. It must also 
govern normal and tactical Idle, maximum speed and provide engine overspeed 
and overtemperature protection.
2. Component Characteristics: The Electronic Fuel Management System con­
sists of three components provided by Bendix (Incl 1). The components and 
their functions are (Incl 2):
a. T1 Sensor: Senses the temperature of air into the engine.
b. Computer: An analog electronic computer mounted 1n the driver's 
compartment which takes Inputs from the driver, vehicle, engine, and flow 
handling modules 1n the form of electrical signals, processes them, and 
schedules the fuel appropriately. It does this by sending an electrical 
signal to the flow handling module. The computer also controls certain 
engine accessories and provides driver information in the form of a power 
turbine speed tachometer and warning lights.
c. Fuel flow handling module: (Incl 3) This unit, mounted on the 
engine accessory gearbox, contains the fuel metering valve which meters 
the fuel based on the signal from the computer. It also contains a fuel 
pump and filter and the servos which position the inlet guide vanes and 
power turbine stator vanes for part load operation. Feedback for the two 
servos and fuel metering valve feedback are also contained in the module.
3. Schedule: FSED Schedule is at Incl 4.
4. Present Status: Several engineering and FSED prototypes have been 
delivered to AVCO and are currently being tested on laboratory engines. 
Development work is continuing and fuel schedules are being optimized. An 
engineering prototype was installed in engine S/N 26 and accumulated over 
1900 miles on the ATR at Chelsea Proving Ground with excellent results. No 
major problems were encountered and there were no mechanical failures. Work 
is continuing and component Qualification Testing will begin at Bendix in 
September. A total of 40 fuel controls will be built during FSED. In June,
DRCPM-GCM
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Chrysler was tasked to investigate the feasibility of using current electronics 
technology for the computer. The computer currently is an analog type and con­
sists of discrete components soldered to printed circuit boards. They were 
asked to look at such developments as microprocessors, large scale integrated 
circuits, and analog-digital convertors from a standpoint of possible produc­
tion cost reduction, reliability effects, and modification of the maintenance 
concept to one of "throway" modules. This investigation is continuing.
5. Cost:
a. FSED Contract: $2.78 million
b. Production: Ten year design-to-cost for 3312 units is approximately 
$7500 (Bendix price to AVCO).
6. Personnel:
a. Man loading (average)
FY77 FY78 FY79
T O T  T “
b. Number of personnel at Bendix Energy Controls Division: 2376
7. Risk:
a. Technical: Technical risk 1s low. Bendix, 1n a very short time, 
has produced a fuel control that performs extremely well, and based on the 
limited test data so far, is reliable and durable. The technology used is 
well established.
b. Schedule: Schedule risk 1s low. Bendix has met all their milestones, 
1n spite of having a very short lead time to produce the first prototypes.
c. Cost: Cost risk is low. Due to the mature design, cost estimates 
should be valid.
8. Previous Guidance/Interest:
a. High echelon: None.
b. User: User Interest centers on the engine protection capabilities 
of the fuel control. Many users have had helicopter experience and are 
familiar with the problems of "hot starts" and having to wait for a period 
of time to attempt a restart 1f the initial attempt were unsuccessful. The 
electronic fuel control has built-in circuitry to prevent hot starts. A 
second attempt to start may be made as soon as the high speed compressor 
has coasted down to a low speed after a previous unsuccessful start attempt.
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Starting Procedure and Sequence for Turbine Engine
1. Normal Start Procedure and Sequence:
a. Momentarily, with the transmission range selector In neutral, depress 
the operator “push to start" button on driver's taster panel (Incl 1).
b. Start sequence 1s automatically controlled by the electronic fuel 
management system which energizes the starter and Ignltor and schedules fuel 
flow to bring the engine to a minimum Idle governed speed.
c. A start Is normally achieved within 20 to 40 seconds. When the high 
pressure compressor (Nu) speed reaches 55$, the green "started" light on the 
master panel comes on tor approximately 10 seconds Indicating a successful 
start. When the "started*1 light goes out, the hydraulic pump Is engaged.
d. If a start has not been achieved 1n 60 seconds, the sequence 1s auto­
matically terminated.
e. The vehicle can be put 1n gear before the "started" light comes on, 
and the vehicle will begin to move as soon as the engine develops enough power 
to overcome Internal losses, but the automatic fuel schedule cannot be over­
ridden, and the driver will not have full control until the "started” light 
comes on.
2. Normal Engine Shutdown Procedure: An engine shutdown Is achieved by 
moving the engine "shutoW" toggle switch on the master panel to the down posi­
tion.. This switch closes the main engine fuel shutoff valve (I.e., electrical 
power required to close valve). The toggle switch Is automatically (magneti­
cally) held In the down position until 10 seconds have elapsed from the time 
the engine high pressure compressor speed (N ) reaches 52 at which time the 
shutoff switch then snaps back to Its up (main fuel valve open) position. It 
normally takes from 20 to 25 seconds for the engine to coast down frora Idle 
with the hydraulic pump Installed.
3. Re-start Following a Normal Shutdown (Engine Hot): A restart following 
a normal shutdown wft ne~ngTne~ hot can be" accompl islied InnedUtely, using the 
"Normal Start Procedure," after the engine "shutoff" switch snaps back to the 
up position. Circuitry built into the electronic fuel control prevents "hot 
starts."
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4. Start Attempt Following in Automatic Abort:
a. If a successful start has not been achieved within 60 seconds or 
otherwise automatically aborted, the starter and Ignltor are automatically 
de-energized, the main fuel valve 1* closed, and the abort light on the 
master panel comes on. This abort light then stays on until 10 seconds after 
the time a SI high pressure compressor (N^) speed 1s achieved.
b. A subsequent start, using the Normal Start Procedure above, can be 
attempted Immediately after the high pressure compressor (Nh) reaches 5X 
speed, but practically speaking, this would not be until the abort light 
goes off, since there 1s no Indication when N}| reaches 53.
c. The maximum time available for an automatic start sequence can be 
extended by manually holding the “push to start" button 1n throughout the 
start cycle. If a total of 60.seconds has elapsed when the button Is released, 
the sequence will stop. If less than 60 seconds has elapsed when It Is re­
leased, the sequence will terminate at 60 seconds elapsed time.
d. There 1s not requirement currently to turn the engine over with the 
starter between start attempts 1n order to purge the fuel accumulated since 
the automatic drain valve should be of sufficient capacity to discharge any 
fuel accumulated during an abortive start attempt.
5. Starter Only:
a. The "Starter Only" button on the master panel 1s useful in trouble­
shooting to check such Items as:
- Starter
- Engine Coastdown
- 011 Line Leaks
- 011 Pressure
6. There Is no requirement to use It 1n any starting mode.
1 Incl PAUL M. ROOT
as MAJ, OrdC
Appendix B-ll
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Product Assurance and Tast Branch (DRCFM-GC51-3P) 
Chief, Systems Engineering Division (DItCPM-GCH-3) 
Assistant Project Manager for Logistics (DRCPM-GOi-A?M)
SUBJECT: Vehicle Los9 of Power
1. Vehicles in the field have repeatedly suffered temporary "loss of 
power" during operations. This has been identified as a "oajor" problea 
by the Advance Information Syaten. This neoo defines the problen and pro­
vides suggested actions for correction.
2. Tha Engine Electronic Fuel Management System (EFMS) has three fault 
(or protective) codes built in to protect ths engine fron damage in case 
of full or partial failure of engine sensors or accessories. If the fault 
is a transient one, the driver aay reset tha fuel control to full operation 
by a specific sequence of actions. The "fuel control faulty" lights on the 
driver’s panel is illuminated when the engine is in one of these fault modes 
and also for. certain other reasons. Hone of the above information or ex­
planations are in any of the manuals.
3. Some instances of "loss of power" are due to proper functioning of the 
EFMS to protect the engine, and some of ths others are due to hardware 
design problens which are being solved presently. The detail of information 
currently reported to P1I0, Chrysler, and AVCO either verbally or in writing 
(engineering logs, ITR's, etc.) is not adequate to allow diagnosia of the 
cause, after the fact, of a transient reported "loss of power" and it is 
very difficult for the contractor or subcontractor to lapleasnt corrective 
action baaed on this sketchy infotmetion.
4. Possible causes of ths "loss of power" due to design problens axer
a. Binding/bent/broken PTS or IGV feedback cables, or bending of the 
end brackets which support them*,
b. Intermittent shouts or open circuits in the RVDT (driver's throttle 
control) or electrical cables to the ECU, engine, or RVDT.
c. Air in fuel system which results in main metering valve being out 
of position.
d. Fuel starvation due to low or negative fuel pressures.
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5. Saveral actions must be taken to eliaiaate thia problea and/or ninioise 
its impact when it does occur.
a. Tank crewnen oust be aad a aware of tha functioning of the EFMS, that 
fault modes exist, what happens when they occur, and tha various conditions 
that can exist when the "fuel control faulty" light cones on (Inclosure 1).
b. A procedure oust be Inroad lately nada knovn to crewoen on action to 
take if a "loss of power" occurs in order to try to reset the EFMS to full 
operation (Inclasura 2).
c. Manuals oust be modified to inf ora crews of the existence of fault 
nodes, functioning of the "fuel control faulty" light and reset methods.
d. Tank creiwcn and tech reps Bust be instructed to report in great 
detail the circumstances, operating conditions, indications, remaining 
pover, etc., on each occurrence of loss of power in order to aid diagnosis 
of tha particular problem (Inclosure 3).
3 Incl PAUL H. ROOT
as MAJ, OrdC
1. The EFMS ha3 three fault (or protective) modes which function a3 follown
a. Fault Mode I - If the high pressure compressor speed is lass than 
55% of reaximm and conditions for Fault lloda I occur, tha engine will shut 
down.
b. Fault Mode II — If the vehicle i3 ia drive and Wg is above 55Z, 
if Fault Mode II occurs fuel flow is United between 70 and 300 lb/hr.
This corresponds to a maxima of approximately 600 HP.
c. Fault Mode III - If Mg 13 above 55%, and Fault Hode III occurs» fuel 
flow is fixed at 120 lb/hr (approximately 120-130 HP).
2. Tha identified faults end conditions for each fault mode are as follows t
a. Fault Mode I - To is occurs during tha start sequence and aborts the 
start 3ince IT^  is greater than 557 if a start is successfully completed. 
Conditions during the start sequence which can causa Fault Mode I to occur 
arc:
r (1). Kish speed compressor speed oensor 0?n sensor). If there Is no aignMi from^>ocn or tn* c\fl aenaora 7 1/2 seconds attar initiation or the
start sequence. It only one sensor la working the system will function
normally, but the "fuel control faulty" light will ccae on.
(2) Power turbine temperature sensors (T7 pickups). At 255 of Kg,
If tha T7 sensors read less than 225°F or more than 1000°F.
(3) I Lain fuel valve. At 7 1/2 seconds into the start sequence, If the 
main fuel valve is out of position by more than -4* or - 100 lb/hr of the 
deoaadad flow for more than 1/2 second.
(4) Power Lever Actuator (PLA). At 7 1/2 sec into the start sequence, 
If the PLA is set at less than 2° or more than 75° of rotation. These 
limits are outside the normal rotational llaits of the PLA.
(5) Vehicle power supply voltage below 8 volts.
b. Fault Mode II. This will occur whan the engine Is running and 
tha transmission is in gear. There is limited throttle response in thla 
fault mode. Conditions which can cause Fault Mode II to occur are:
(1) Ho power turbine speed signal (Hp^) from either Npj. sensor. If 
one sensor is working, the system will function normally, but ths "fuel 
control faulty" light will come on.
(2) The Inlet guide vane (ICV) or power turbine stator (PTS) cables 
are jacaaed, broken, or momentarily hung up.
(3) Ho pov*»r turbine temperature (Ty) signal. IJhen Fault '[ode II 
occurs, it is because the engine has lo3t one of the above si"nal3 which 
is normally U3«d to control fuel flow. Since there is no signal, fuel 
fic:v is reduced to a much lower naacimm rate (300 lb/hr naxiraua, corres­
ponding to aporoxlnately 600 HP) to protect the angina. The power turbine 
stators and the inlet guide vanes arc in fixed positions.
c. Fault Mode III. Thi3 will occur when the engine is running, whether 
or not the transmission is in gear. It is designed to avoid coopleta engine 
shutdown if certain required input signals are lost, and it gives a fixed 
fuel rata of 120 lb/hr (approximately 125 HP). There is no throttle response 
in this fault node. Conditions which give Fault Mode III ara:
(1) Main fuel valve. If it is out of position by nore than + or - 100 lb/hr 
for more than 1/2 second.
(2) System voltage less than 8 volt3.
(3) FLA. If it is get at less than 2° or nore than 75° of rotation.
These are some of the same faults which will cause Fault Mod a I to occur 
during the starting procedure.
d. All of the above conditions will activate the "fuel control faulty 
light" and "siastar caution light”.
e. It nu3t be noted that, for vehicle safety reasons, Fault Mode II 
occurs only with the transmission in gear. If the transmission is shifted 
to neutral, Fault Mode II automatically becones Fault Mode III.
3. The "fuel control faulty" and "master caution" lights will also coae on, 
but not affect power or cause a fault code under certain other circumstances.
In these cases, the lights serve as a signal that organizational maintenance 
should check the engine for loss of a backup sensor:
a. Loss of one of the two Ng sensors. The systaa functions normally 
with only one sensor. However, if the second one is lost, a fault node II 
results.
b. Loss of one of the two Npy sensors. Same as a above.
c. Loss of the ambient air (Tj) sensor. If this signal is lost, the 
control assuaes that the ambient temperature 1s 125°?. The fuel is scheduled 
to the engine as if that were the temperature, and in some cases thia results 
in a slight loss of power at tha high power end.
A. "Loss of power" nay also be sensed by the driver, if tha engine ia 
protecting itself against "ovsrspeed" or overtenperature" conditions. This 
is noraal operation of tha EFMS.
a. Overspeed: If an overspend condition occurs (Np<f greater than 
3240 RFM) the "overspeed" and'taaster warning" lights so on and fuel la
cut back until i!p-r is 2350 RPM. Then normal operation can automatically 
b>3 resuaed. Th9 rtovarspe«d" and "caster varaing" lij;ht3 can then be 
turned off by using the raset button. Procedures in the Operator'3 
Manual should be followed.
b. Overtenperature:
(1) Engine steady state operating conditions: If Tj reaches 1435°? 
under steady state speed conditions for the high speed compressor, fuel is 
cut back to maintain 1435°?. ifo warning light cooes on.
(2) Engine acceleration or transient conditions: If Ty reaches 1620°? 
during transient, the "ovarteaparature” and "master warning" lights cone on. 
Fuel flow is automatically cut back until Ty reaches 14200? when noroal 
operations can be reaunad. Pushing the reset button turns off the lights*
1. Did "fuel coutrol faulty” or "overspeed" or "ovarteaperatura" light3 
case on? I
2. Operating conditions when ''loss of power" was sensed:
a. Idle or noving.
b. Previous operating condition.
c. Speed.
d. Accelerating or decelerating.
e. Paver turbine speed.
f. Total or partial loss of throttle response.
g. Top speed attainable after "loss of power" occurred.
h. Was the fault rasetable?
1. The procedure used to attempt to reset the fault.
3. Thesa should be described In as such detail as possible to the 
organizational mechanic (or date recorder) to enable efficient trouble­
shooting of any problaa.
1. If the fault mode x/as due to a transient condition (I.e., nonentar7 
haagiag up of the IGV/PTS cable* or electrical intermittent In the R7DT or 
elactrlcal harnesses, etc.) tha B7MS may be reset to full operation provided 
tha cause of the fault nod* ha* disappeared.
2. Tha reset procedure* are as follow*j
a. If transmission Is in gear.
(1) Bring throttla to ldls position. The EFHS cannot be raset unless 
tba throttla is in idla position.
(2) Leave transaission In gsag.
(3) Push reset button on driver's alert panel and hold for 10 seconds*
(A) If'fuel control faulty" light goes out, the fault was transient and 
fuel control has been reset to normal operation.
b. If transmission Is in neutral.
(1) Put transmission in drive.
(2) Bring throttle to ldls position.
(3) Push reset button and hold for 10 seconds.
(A) If "fuel control faulty" light goes out, fault vas due to. a transient 
condition and fuel control has been restored to normal operation.
c. If the above fall, shut down tha eng in a, conduct a normal restart and 
see if normal operation has been restored.
d. If none of the abor* actions work, the fanlt vas probably not 
transient. Depending on cirewstancas, organisational maintenance should 
be called, or operation should be continued under reduced aobilicy.
Automotive Brench 
MAJ Root/31231
DRCPS-GCN-SH FACT SHEET 25 June 1979
SUBJECT: K60A1(RISE) and XMl Fuel Syste* 
Program Manager, XMl Tank System
PURPOSE: To compare the XMl and H50A1(RISE) fuel systems.
FACTS:
IT There have been recent occurrences of XMl FWS (Fuel Water Separator) 
filter elements clogging under conditions where M60(RISE) FWS filter 
elements do not. A change to greater capacity filter elements has not 
alleviated the problem.
2. In the XMl fuel system, the FWS 1s the primary fuel filter and there 
1s a final filter mounted on the engine. Pressure to the FWS 1s 26 ps1 
maxlmra (Incl 1). In the HGOAl(RISE) fuel system, there 1s a primary fuel
♦ filter ahead of the FWS and the fuel then goes through the engine fuel 
pump which raises the pressure to 70 ps1 before entering the FWS (Incl 2).
3. The higher pressure fuel entering the HSOAl(RISE) FWS allows a greater 
buildup of contaminants on tha filter elements prior to restricting fuel 
flow to a point which reduces engine power. However, M60A1(RISE) prlnary 
fuel filter clogs often.
4. Tha W60A1(RISE) Organizational Maintenance Manual (TH 9-2350-257-20-1) 
lists primary fuel filter replacement as a quarterly service, the two 
outer filter elements of the FWS semiannually, and the center FWS element 
annually. The M60 and M6CAl(Kanual (TM-2350-215-20) requires replace­
ment of the outside FWS elements quarterly and the center element annually. 
There 1s no advanced Indication that fuel filters are clogging. Checking 
for clogged fuel filters 1s a troubleshooting step 1f the engine won't 
start, doesn't run properly or runs rough and misfires.
5. According to the XK1 Organisational Maintenance Manual, the fuel 
water separator 1s serviced when the fuel filter clogged light comes on 
(tactical situation permitting) or at scheduled services. The outside 
oletrants are replaced semiannually and the center elcnent 1s replaced 
annually. "Lost of power( fuel control faulty not 11t” and "engine crank
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but will not start" are symptoms for which the FVS clogged light should 
be checked »s p,rt of the troubleshootl^n.cedure^ ^  ^ fL.
6. The lack of a primary fuel filter .-efceat!' of the FWS*1n the XM1 probably 
accounts for Its tendency to clog as oftn as It does. Without the primary 
filter, replacement of FWS filter elen«nts should be expected prior to 
S-services.
2 Incl 
as
PROGRAM MANAGER ACTIOH:
NOTED:_________________
SEE HE:________________
E. W. TRAPP
C, Systems Engineering Division
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Appendix C-l
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/
SUBJECT: Fuel Consumption
1. Estimating the fuel consumption for a tank Is like estimating the fuel 
consumption for an automobile; there is no single valid number.
2. Fuel consumption depends on many variables, including:
a. Engine and transmission condition.
b. Terrain (sand, mud, wet, dry, paved, etc.).
c. Track condition and tension (rolling resistance).
d. Slopes.
e. Driver technique (heavy foot, etc.).
3. Fuel consumption data is becoming available from several sources. Each 
source represents a significantly different condition and will be tabulated 
and discussed below. The data can be combined and manipulated in various 
ways to approximate an overall average (typical?) fuel consumption.
a. Development Test data is tabulated below. It Is taken from tests 
conducted on primary and secondary straight level roads using fuel burettes 
under controlled conditions. It 1s probably representative of the potential 
of the system and has as many variables removed as possible.
Paved 10 MPH 15 MPH 20 MPH 25 MPH 30 MPH 35 MPH 40 MPH
DT II Test .41 MPG .44 MPG .54 MPG .64 MPG .70 MPG .72 MPG .71 MPG 
PMO Prediction —  —  —  .67 MPG ...........-
Secondary
DT II Test 
PMO Prediction
33 MPG .42 MPG .45 MPG .56 MPG .65 MPG 
............  .49 MPG .55 MPG
63 MPG .68 MPG 
59 MPG ---
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b. Cross country fuel consumption data currently available states that 
XMl achieves .30 MPG cross country. Thts 1s actually DT I data supplied by 
TECOM. It 1s an average of all the miles run and fuel consumed during the 
DT I cross country endurance running on level and hilly cross country 
courses at APG. It Includes Idle time, does not account for fuel spillage, 
and was not run at any specific given speed. As such, It 1s gross data. 
Because TECOM publishes cross country fuel consumption data based on the 
above technique, this figure will not be updated until the end of DT II.
TECOM has been 2sked to conduct a specific cross country fuel consumption 
test over certain courses at discrete speeds 1n an attempt to get better 
cross country data for varying speeds. Because of the differences 1n 
"cross country" terrain, this data will only be completely valid for the 
given courses but should be a better estimate than the previous one.
4. Comparative data with M60 (RISE) has been run 1n DT II on the standard 
fuel course (hilly secondary road) at APG. This data 1s listed below and Is 
a valid comparison for that course only. The M60 1s seven tons lighter and 
has 3n engine with half the power of the XMl and consequently less mobility. 
The comparison ends at 24 MPH because that was the M60's top speed.
10 MPH 15 MPH 20 MPH 24 NPH 30 MPH
XMl .28 MPG .32 MPG .38 MPG .40 MPG .37 MPG 
M60 (RISE) .65 MPG .65 MPG .64 MPG .59MPG -----*
*M60 top speed was 24 MPH.
The ratio of fuel consumption for the XMl and M60 based on the comparative 
test course 1s as follows:
10 MPH 15 MPH 20 MPH 24 MPH
Ratio 2.32 2.03 1.68 1.47
5. Idle fuel consumption tests have been run during DT II. The idle fuel 
consumption has been 10.3 - 10.3 gal/hr at 1000 - 1020 RPM. This speed 1s : 
hinder than the specified engine idle speed of 870 - 950 RPM, and the test 
will be rerun at the lower speed. A reduction 1n idle fuel consumption 1s 
expected.
C. Operational Test fuel consumption data is becoming available from 
Ft. Bliss.
a. The figures listed helow represent data for the operational test 
profile and are taken from fuel tankers and vehicle logbook records. Ho
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allowance is made for spillage or leakage. The data represents overall 
fuel consumption for a variety of missions Including motor pool, gunnery, 
tactical exercises and road marches for five tanks. M60 (RISE) was run to 
approximately the same missions, so the comparative data (gallons per mile) 
should be a rough estimate. (M60 Is lighter and has half the power and less 
robinty). It should be noted that approximately 62% of the engine operating 
time for XMl Is at Idle, an Inefficient operating condition when compared to 
the tmiiiiwn.
OT II Fuel Consumption 17-13 Dec 78
Gal HUes Gal/Mile Mile/Gal
XMl 9391 2507 3.94 .25
M60 (RISE) 6166 2720 2.27 .44
Based on this, the XMl uses 74X more fuel than the M60 (RISE)
b. Several discrete fuel consumption tests were run at Ft. Bliss to 
gather fuel consumption data over specific courses and comparison with M60 
(RISE). The tests were conducted 1n late January 1979 with several XMl and 
H60 (RISE) tanks operating 1n each condition and the data was provided to the 
P.MO. Automotive Branch, PMO, reviewed the data, found some ccnor computational 
errors, and the corrected data 1s presented below: This data is valid for 
the conditions which existed at Ft. BUss at the times of test. Figures are 
averages for several tanks. Ratios are gallons/mile which is the valid method 
for comparing fuel consumption. Note that XMl speeds are greater than M60 
speeds.
(1) Paved road.
Speed (MPH) Gallons Miles Gal/Mile Mile/Gal
XMl 35 94.3 53.2 1.77 .56
F'60 25 50.0 60.3 1.21 .32
Under the above conditions, XMl uses 46% more fuel.
(2) Secondary road. A "secondary road" is widely variable from hard 
clay to gravel, to soft wet sand or mud.
{3) Course SI. Motor park to Coal Lake. Uphill (10% grade?). Muddy, 
slippery road.
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Speed (MPH) Gallons Miles Gal/Mile Miles/Gal
XMl 20 
M60 17.4
36.3
23.1
10.6
10.6
3.42
2.17
.29
.46
XMl uses 585 more fuel under this condition.
(b) Course S2. Tank trail 1n area MA5. 
secondary road.
Muddy,slippery loop of
Speed (MPH) Gallons Miles Gal/Mile Miles/Gal
XMl 24.9 
M60 17.0
20.9
19.6
11.7
11.7
1.78
1.67
.56
.60
XMl uses 112 more fuel under this condition.
(c) Course S3. A second circuit of the 
churned up by previous use of trail.
tank trail used in S2. Soil was
Speed (MPH) Gallons Miles Gal/Miles Hlles/Gal
XMl 24.6 
K60 19.4
39.1
26.3
14.0
14.0
2.80
1.88
.36
.53
XMl uses 495 more fuel under this condition.
(d) The wide differences 1n XMl fuel consumption between Courses S2 and 
S3 seem unreasonable.
(3) Cross country, 
terrain.
There 1s no definition of standard cross country
(a) Course Cl. Maneuver area 6 with high hills and 
was wet and heavy.
deep sand. Course
__ (SCeed (MPH) Gallons Miles Gal/Miles Miles/Gal
XMl 12.5 
M60 S.3
92.5
63.3
14.2
14.2
6.51
4.81
.15
.21
XMl uses 355 more fuel under this condition.
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(b) Course C2. Run In same area as Cl.
Speed (MPH) Gallons Miles Gal/Miles Hlles/Gal
XMl 11.2 88.2 22.8 3.87 .26
M60 9.3 59.6 22.8 2.61 .38
XMl uses 482 more fuel under this condition.
7. Mission profile fuel consumption has also been addressed.
a. A Mission profile usually consists of segments of Idle, secondary 
road and cross country travel. There 1s a lack of a universally accepted 
mission profile. Mission profile fuel consumption 1s affected by Idle time 
and the average speeds at which the vehicle operates. The data upon which 
the computations are based 1s usually the DT II data for the average speed 
for secondary road travel and the DT I value (.30 MPG) for cross country* 
regardless of speed.
b. A reasonably accepted mission profile (used 1n COEA) consists of
172.8 miles of operation 1n a 24 hour day. Distances, operating times and 
speeds are given, and the results are given below:
XMl Speed Time Consumption Rate Total Fuel
Idle
Cross Country 66.6 M1 
Secondary Rd 106.2
0
17 MPH 
25 MPH
5.17 Hrs
3.92
4.25
10.8 Gal/Hr 
.30 MPG 
.56 MPG
55.8 Gal 
222.
189.6
TOTAL 13.35 Hrs 467.4
M60 (RISE) Speed Time Consumption Rate Total Fuel
Idle
Cross Country 66.6 Mi 
Secondary Rd 106.2
0
14.4 MPH
>20 MPH
3.4 Hrs 
4.63 Hrs 
5.32 Hrs
5.3 Gal/Hr
.52 MPG .43 MPG
18.0 Gal 
127.3 
218.1
TOTAL 13.35 Hrs 363.4 Gal
c. Based on this profile, XMl uses 295 more fuel than M60 (RISE). This 
profile assumes equal engine operating time and equal distance covered. Due 
to the higher speeds possible 1n XMl, 1t arrives at Its destination 1n less 
time than M60. To achieve equal operating time, the XMl idles 1.77 hours 
more than M60. This does not seem to be reasonable, and an alternative 
mission profile could assume equal idle time and equal distance. Under this 
condition, using above mileages and speeds and 3.4 hours of idle time for both 
vehicles, XMl consumes 232 mors fuel than M6G (RISE).
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d» Many other profiles are possible resulting In widely varying battle­
field day fuel consumptions and comparisons between vehicles.
8. Fron the above, it can be seen that there 1s no single fuel consumption, 
or even an absolute average fuel consunption, and comparisons with M60 (RISE), 
vary widely depending on operating conditions. The following figures surmarl2 
the ranges of fuel consumption and comparisons with M60 (RISE) based on the
I1.n1 ted testing to date.
a. Fuel consumption figures for XMl. (The range of results Is shown).
(1) Paved (35 MPH) .55 - .71 MPG.
(2) Secondary (25 MPH) .36 - .56 MPG.
(3) . Cross country (12 - 18 MPH) .15 - .30 MPG.
(4) Idle 10.3 - 10.8 gallons per hour.
b. Comparison with M60 (RISE). (Comparisons are at different speeds for 
XMl and M60).
XiMl uses:
(1) Paved: 46X wore.
(2) Secondary: 11 - 58? more.
(3) Cross country: 35 - 45S more.
c. Mission profile fuel consumption depends on the selected profile.
9. Any of the above data should be viewed as very tentative and used 
judiciously.
10. Further fuel consumption testing should be performed 1n a variety of 
•climates find terrains to refine and gain more confidence 1n the figures.
E. W. TRAPP
C, Systems Engineering Division
Appendix C-2
WHITE PAPER
;ijBJECT: MG Lynch's Fuel Consumption Comments
1. MG Lynch is concerned that the XMl rnay have a range significantly below the 
MN requirement.
2. The MM requirement for vehicle operating range is 275-325 miles on dry, zero 
slope secondary road. Fuel consumption is tested at Aberdeen Proving Ground using 
calibrated fuel measuring equipment. The tank is run several times over a rela­
tively short course and the average fuel consumption rate is determined. This 
consumption rate and the fuel tank useable capacity are used to compute vehicle 
range. This test will provide a degree of repeatability and reduce the number 
and infli-ancs of uncontrolled variables which could affect the results. It 
should be noted that "operational" cruising range will always be significantly 
less than the range measured in this manner.
3. DT I testing resulted in a secondary road, 25 MPH, fuel consumption of
0.51 MPG. This was conducted using DF-1 fuel and when the results were corrected 
for the higher heating value of DF-2 fuel, the result was 0.53 MPG. A later test 
in DT I resulted in 0.53 MPG, which when corrected for DF-2, yielded 0.55 MPG.
4. LIT II testing in November 1978 resulted in a secondary road, 25 MPH, fuel 
consumption of 0.56 MPG using DF-2 fuel. The fuel capacity of the pilot vehicle 
used was 482 gallons resulting in a cruising range of 270 miles which is marginally 
below the MN requirement. Production tanks will have a capacity of approximately 
500 gallons.
5. There has been recent concern that the increased track tension now used will 
decrease cruising range. A fuel consumption test was run on PV3 at APG during 
12-18 December 1979 on both paved and secondary road and on the standard fuel 
consumption course. The test showed that the effect of tha increased track 
tension was to increase fuel consumption from 8.4£ to 11.1%, depending on the 
course. This is close to the 10* increase measured in an earlier test. Tha 
unexpected result of this test was that the absolute vehicle fuel consumption
on secondary road at the low track tension was much less than during the original 
test and, even at the high track tension, PV8, as tested, met the 275 mile 
cruisinn n n n e  reouira.nsn1: (.557 MPG >: 49.1 gallons available in PV? = 27-3 si las)
I iiv, i 1;. PV3 weighed 53.5 tons during &. I s ti-si.. r.-odu-c;.) . v-5 :; -.•? ' 
weigh 59.8 tons. Decreasing fuel consumption by tha increased weight yields 
0.554 MPG and a range of 272 miles which is marginally below the requirement.
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6. The exact cause for this improvement in fuel consumption is unknown, but is 
probably due to a combination of engine condition, secondary road condition, 
ambient temperature, driver skill, transmission performance, the use of integral 
pad track instead of replaceable pad track, and the fuel specific 'neat value.
Since the fuel consumption on paved road at the lower track tension was nearly 
the same in both the November 1978 and December 1979 tests, (2.7K better in the 
latter test), the secondary road condition probably had the greatest influence 
on the results (see Incl 1). The secondary road was probably in a "harder", 
drier condition for the second test.
7. The bare engine fuel consumption of the engine used for this test will be 
measured at AVCO and Chrysler is conducting an analysis of the engine, trans­
mission and suspension with, regards to fuel consumption.
8. The conclusion that the increased track tension increases fuel consumption 
by about 1 0 %  seems to be proven; however, further testing might be advisable.
The difference in results of tests on secondary road highlights th-r difficulty 
of repeating the secondary road conditions. Both the early and recent sets of 
results are valid, only the secondary road conditions varied. Repeatability 
would be enhanced by doing fuel consumption testing on paved road where con­
ditions vary less. DT III testing should provide the best answer as to the 
fuel consumption with higher track tension.
9. There will always be some variation in results of this type of test. Even 
the EPA cannot give fuel consumption figures for autorobiles which are repeat- 
able by consumers. The EPA provides a caution about the use of its figures and 
the same cautions would apply here. There are too many variables from tank to 
tank and test to test to expect complete repeatability and, in actual operations, 
the greatest factor influencing range will be how the driver handles his tank.
10. The MN cruising range should not be confused with an "operational" cruising 
range which might be defined as the range which a tank can be driven in a field 
environment without refueling, and which will always be less than the MM cruising 
range. Vehicle accelerations and decelerations, slopes, turns, the rolling r e ­
sistance of various terrains, periods of engine idle, driver skill, and other 
uncontrollable factors all contribute to an "operational" cruising range less 
than that measured for the Mfi requirement on a flat secondary road.
11. The "operational" cruising range quoted in the Phase I Ft. Knox test results 
3.8 GPM yielding a range of 140-150 miles, is based on total vehicle mileage 
(12,030 rnl->s) and total F•:e 1 consumed during the test. The dat?. v.!.3.s collected 
in a relatively uncontrol 1 ed mannar and includes unknown oarious of ir.ij 1 U .2 and 
does not account for fuel spillage or the accuracy of the fuel rcaterir.ci devices. 
Nonetheless, this data is comparable to the data taken in a similar manner from 
■OT If at Ft. Bliss clurinn 17 No ./saber*-13 December 197?. of 3.9 GPM and reore-
a r*?d-.*)nab1e olan*iinq ficiure.
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12. This "operational" range will vary from unit to unit and tank to tank and 
can be improved by training the driver to conserve fuel by such actions as re­
ducing engine idle time, eliminating maximum power accelerations, etc.
13. There are two future developments which will affect fuel consumption. The 
APil installation will result in a loss of 50 gallons of fuel in the left sponson 
fuel tank. The 120mm gun program will increase the vehicle weight to aporoxi- 
mately 61.5 tons, increasing fuel consumption. Part of the 120.™ program is to 
increase the capacity of the left front fuel tank by 35 gallons. The effect of 
the increased weight and increased fuel capacity practically cancel each other 
out and vehicle range is nearly unchanged. The fuel lost to the APU will reduce 
the MN range; however, the effect on the "operational" range will be minimal 
because the APU can substitute for periods of engine idle.
PAVED ROAD
A'ljusting Link Pressure
1800 psi 
2200 
2600 
3000
DT IT
Nov 78
.625 MPG
Track Tension Test Track Tension Test
Corrected' to 59.8 TDec 79
.642 MPG 
.626 
.592 
.583
.623 MPG 
.612 
.579 
.575
SECONDARY ROAD
Adjusting Link Pressure
1800 ps1 
2200 
2600 
3000
DT II Track Tension Test
Nov 78 Dec 79
.56 MPG .628 MPG
.599 
.592 
.567
Track Tension Test 
Corrected to "59.8 f
.614 MPG 
.536 
.579 
.554
Fu£;1 Capacity 482 Gal 491 Gal 491 Gal
Range at current 270 Miles 278 Miles 272 Miles
track tension
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MAJ Root/31231
8 March 1979
VSUBJECT: Comparative 1500 HP Engine Fuel Consumption in XMl
1. Fuel consumption for the 1500 HP AGT 1500 turbine and AVCR 1360 diesel 
engines was computed based on the mission profile defined in TSM Message 
131608Z Feb 79, Subject: XMl Fuel Consumption. The mission profile and 
resulting fuel consumptions are listed at Inclosure 1.
2. Based on this data, the turbine engine consumes from 9.4% more to 1 %  
less fuel than the diesel. The variation is based on the fact that on 
secondary road, 25 MPH was the shift point between 3d^  range converter and 
lockup and the vehicle could be in either condition at 25 MPH.
3. The AVCR 1360 diesel engine was tested in the General Motors prototype 
XMl in Validation at a weight of 58 tons. The diesel fuel consumption is 
based on DT I test results.
4. The AGT 1500 turbine engine fuel consumption 1s based on DT II test 
results at a vehicle weight of 59.8 tons with one exception. The cross 
country fuel consumption is based on DT I results. This is due to MTD's 
method of collecting cross country fuel consumption data, and comparable 
DT II data will not be available until the end of DT II.
5. The above comparison 1s for vehicles of different weights: 58 tons
for the diesel and 59.8 tons for the turbine. To provide a valid comparison 
based on the present XMl configuration, the diesel fuel consumption must be 
adjusted for the increased weight of the present XMl vehicle. To do this, 
the fuel consumption rates for the diesel in motion are increased (MPG are 
decreased) by the ratio of the upwelghted diesel XMl to the DT I data taken 
at 58 tons. There are two ways to approach this:
a. Equal vehicle weight of 59.8 tons. The mission profile fuel consump­
tion becomes 413-373 gallons, a difference for the diesel of 6.2% better to 
4.3% worse than the turbine. Because of the heavier weight of the diesel 
power pack, nearly 2000 lbs, this configuration would result in nearly a 
ton less armor and consequently less protection than the present turbine 
XMl
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b. Equal protection levels. This assumes that equal armor protection 
1s retained. The additional diesel power pack weight is added to the existing 
vehicle weight resulting 1n a 60.8 ton vehicle. This results 1n a diesel 
fuel consumption range from 417-378 gallons for the above mission profile, 
a difference for the diesel of 4.8% better to 4.9% worse than the turbine.
5. Conclusions:
a. Fuel consumption and the relative difference will vary with the 
mission profile chosen.
b. The Increased weight of the diesel engine installed in the present 
XMl has only a minor effect on the diesel fuel consumption.
1 Incl E. W. TRAPP
as C, Systems Engineering Division
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XMl
Q. Row does XMl Fuel Consumption compare vith the current fleet of tanks 
(MSO(RISE))? * •
A. I expect the XMl to consume on the average about 50% more fuel than the 
M60(RISE) tank. However, because the fuel consumption of the XMl's 
1500 HP turbine «ngine is more sensitive>te.idle and low speed1 operation 
than the M60(RISE)'s 750 HP diesel engine*-this value can range from 
extremes of 25 to 80 percent depending on how one defines the mission 
profile.
The Army is not satisfied with this and ha*; initiated a turbine engine 
fuel economy program to achieve a 10% reduction in fuel consumption.
If the Army approves a requirement for an Auxiliary Power Unit for each 
tank, an additional 3-4% cut in daily mission profile fuel consumption 
can be expected.
Basis for Expectations:
50% Estimate;
- OTEA: OT II subtest in Jan 79 (DCSXDA request) to determine compara­
tive consumption rates for XMl and K60(RIS^) when operated over varied 
terrain and conditions, i.e., roads, ctoss county and idle (E-Q. com­
pletes mission in 80% of time it takes M60).
Ttl Miles Hrs Gallons Ratio XM1/M60
XMl 126 8.24 398.3 1.5
M60(RISE) 126 10.18 265.8
- OTEA: OT II fuel subtest fitted to TRADOC time profile of 13.34 hrs 
(for XMl) and distance of 141.7 (XMl completes mission in 86% of time 
it takes M60).
Miles Hrs Gallons Ratio XM1/M60
XMl 141.7 13.34 569.7 1.57
M60(RISE) 141.7 15.56 361.8
25% Estimate:
- TSAD0C: Application of DT II fuel consumption data to CGEA ccrr-tsr.t 
mileage profile: 14 hr period of intense combat recognizing XMl's 
mobility advant^« (1-211 completes mission in 88% of time it takes M60).
Allies Hrs Gallons Ratio XM1/K60
XMl 172.9 13.34 467.3 1.24
M60(RISE) 172.9 15.11 377.0 •
80% Estimate:
- OTEA: Gross OT II fuel consumption data for period 17 November 
1978 to 23 January 1979.
4
Miles Gallons Gal/Ml Ratio XM1/M60
XMl 5059 17,092 3.38 1.82
M60(RISE) 4380 8,162 1.86
• < > *..
1/ Values based on odometer reading and,log book entries for period.
No controls on mode of operation, idle time, spillage, and fuel
metering.
(General Rogers testimony)
General Rogers' The following chart shows the speeds at which we 
conducted the fuel consumption tests at Aberdeen Proving Ground.
The fuel consumption value for each condition is also indicated.
The value for the secondary road condition at 25 mph, i.e. .56 mpg, 
is the basis for computing XMl range.
Condition Speed
Paved 10 MPH 15 MPH 20 MPH 25 MPH 30 MPH 35 MPH 40 MPH
DT II Test .41mpg .44mpg .54mpg .64mpg .70mpg .72mpg .71tnpg 
Secondary
DT II Test .38mpg .42mpg .45mpg .56mpg .65mpg .68mpg .68mpg
- Discrete tests
- Slightly better than predicted
- Best economy at higher speeds
Cross Country - Not yet computed
Based on all endurance running in DT II 
Uncontrolled test 
Available at end of DT II
Discrete Cross Country Test at APG • ’6
Fort Knox fuel consumption tests
XMl M60
Secondary Road .45mpg .62mpg
Cross Country .25mpg ,41mpg
Side by side tests 
Heavy cross country 
Hilly secondary road 
Steering
Early data was very inaccurate
- no controls
- inaccurate logbooks
- fuel meters on fuel trucks non-functional
- unknown amounts of idle time, speeds
Discrete tests were run which gave fuel consumption figures valid 
at Ft. Bliss in that terrain. Where several numbers are given, 
several different courses were run. Secondary and cross country 
roads were wet and heavy at that time.
XMl M60
Paved .56 mpg .82mpg
Secondary .29,.36,.56 .46,.53,.60
Ctoss Country .15-.26 .21-.38
Fuel Comsumption
Based on TRADOC mission profile.
Computed based on DT fuel consumption data for given conditions, i.e., 
secondary road @ 25 mph.
Probably optimistic due to lack of transients.
Used because it is easy to compute and provides a basis of comparison. 
XMl - VS - 1500 HP DIESEL
1. Fuel consumption for the 1500 horsepower AGT 1500 turbine and AVCR 1360 
diesel engines, together with the mission profile upon which the consumption 
is based, is shown below:
MISSION PROFILE
Secondary Road 
@ 25 Mffl
Cross Country @ 17 MPH
Idle for 5.17 Hrs
Distance
(Miles)
85
56.4
AVCR 1360 
(DT 1-58 Tbns)
.48-.61 MPG** 
.31 MPG 
7.9 Gal/Hr
AGT 1500 
(DT 11-59.8 Tbns)
.56 MPG 
.26 MPG*
10.8 Gal/Hr
141.4 400-362 Gal 425 Gal
*Based on preliminary DT II results. Final results pending completion of 
DT II. .26 MPG for AGT 1500 Is not directly comparable to .31 MPG for 
AVCR 1360. See below.
**25 MPH was shift point between 3d range converter and lockup. Values 
shown reflect consumption in lower and higher range.
2. Values shown above reflect turbine engine fuel consumption from 6.3 
to 17.4 percent more than that for the equivalent diesel engine over the 
same mission profile.
3. Data reflected for the diesel engine was determined during DT I on the 
GM prototype XMl tank weighing 58 tons. Assuming equal armor protection as 
the current XMl tank, the diesel engine would increase the weight of the 
tank to approximately 60.8 tons. With this increased weight, it is estimated 
that the fuel consumption of the turbine engine would then range between 1.9 
to 12.4 percent more than the equivalent diesel engine for the above mission 
profile.
4. Previous data used .30 MPG for the AGT 1500 fuel consumption. This 
figure compared directly to the .31 MPG for the AVCR 1360 diesel engine; 
both were average figures from DT I endurance running. XMl used 396 gal­
lons of fuel in this analysis.
Thia data, used for the sane mission profile, gave the following results 
for the different conditions.
58 Tbn Diesel 
(DT I as tested)
59.8 ton diesel 
(equal weight)
60.8 ton diesel 
(equal protection)
AGT 1500 AVCR 1360
396 gal 
396 gal 
396 gal
400-362 gal 
413-373 gal 
417-378 gal
Fuel Required 
For Turbine
9.4X more-12 less 
6.2% more-4.3Z less 
4.8% more-4.9% less
Comparison with M60 (Rise) Engine 
Secondary Road - 85 Miles 
Cross Country - 56.4 Miles 
Idle - 5.17 Hours
M60 Rise XMl
.48 MPG (20 MPH) .56 MPG (25 MPH) 
.52 MPG (14.4 MPH) .2&MPG* (17 MPH) 
5.3 gal/hr_______ 10.8 gal/hr______
313 gal 425 gal
♦Preliminary DT II data
XMl uses 36% more fuel than M60 under this profile.
Previous data, using .30 MPG for the cross-country turbine figure, yields 
396 gallons for the XMl and 27% more fuel required.
Rationale - (General Rogers testimony)
The XMl fuel consumption requirement is specified in terms of 
achieving a range of 275 miles when the tank is driven at 25 mph 
on dry, level, secondary roads. This criterion is based on a 
mission profile analysis by the Tank Special Study Group in 1975 
which indicated that, if the XMl could achieve 275 miles under the 
conditions 1 cited, then it was reasonable to expect that the tank 
would be capable of sustained operations between refueling every 
24 hours. As you can imagine, the actual distance traveled during 
a twenty-four hour period will vary depending on the operational 
scenari-o.
Conduct of Test -
a . 25 ° &^h, straight, level, dry secondary roads.
b. Short distance (1/4 mile) of steady - state operation using 
calibrated fuel flow meters. Get mile/gallon figure.
c. Use measured vehicle usable fuel capacity (gallons).
d. Compute cruising range - Miles/gallon x gallons * Miles. 
Realism of Test -
a. Artificial - doesn't reproduce any operational scenario.
b. Short test, extrapolated data.
c. No steering, which uses power and increases fuel consumption. 
Why Used -
a. Set up in MN & Specification.
b. Fairly reproducible.
c. Standard fuel consumption test.
Variable! -
a. Road condition (there it no standard secondary road).
b. Vehicle variations.
c. Driver variations.
(Question to General Rogers)
General Rogers Answer:
General Rogersf The figure you cite for the range of the XMl 
during OT II, 144 miles, was based on a gross estimate of fuel 
deliveries to XMls by fuel trucks lacking metering devices; the 
time period included the OT II training phase during which the tanks 
did not operate on a typical mission profile; and finally, during 
the period covered, one of the tanks experienced a major fuel leak.
This is correct.
The period covered included OT II training.
There was extensive idle during this period and all of OT II 
which contributes 0MPG.
ft
From all sources, a range of fuel consumption figures emerges.
For discrete tests, 
these ranges:
XMl fuel consumption will probably fall in
Paved .56 - .71 mpg
Comparison with 
M60 
48% more
Secondary Road .36 - .56 mpg 11-58% more
Cross Country .15 - .30 mpg 35-45% more
Idle 8.7 - 10.8 gal/hr
If pressed for a single planning figure based on overall fuel 
consumption seen to date under all circumstances, with no control, 
lots of idle, etc., .35 mpg (2.86 gal/mile) is probably a 
reasonable number. It is based on a subjective guess.
COMMENTS ON CHRYSLER'S LETTER 
"XMl TANK OPERATING RANGE" 
NTX-12408 dated 25 April 1980
1. In response to a PMO request to propose an equivalent range requirement 
for paved roads to replace the present 275 mile, 25 MPH secondary road re­
quirement, Chrysler has proposed a 300 mile range calculated at 30 MPH.
2. PMO proposed using paved roads to compute the range requirement because 
there is no "standard" secondary road and to reduce the variability of results 
achieved on the same secondary road due to moisture in the soil, etc. Chrysler 
proposed increasing the speed to 30 MPH to insure that the transmission is in 
4th gear lockup. This is reasonable and should improve repeatability of the 
tests.
3. However, when speed is increased from 25 to 30 MPH, the tank operates more 
efficiently and will go farther on the same amount of fuel. The DT II fuel con­
sumption test results are listed below:
4. The underlying fact is that the range, under any conditions, should not be 
decreased. Changing the speed at which the test is run and road surface merely 
improves repeatability.
5. Based on DT II data at 25 MPH, secondary roads, 492 gallons of fuel are 
necessary to meet the 275 mile cruising range requirement (275 mi/.55 MPG=492 gal).
6. Using 492 gallons, and based on DT II data, the cruising range on paved roads 
is: 25 MPH: 492 gallons x .64 MPG = 315 miles. 30 MPH: 492 gallons x .70 MPG = 
344 miles.
7. The fuel consumption data in para 3 is based on the lower track tension which 
is no longer used. Recent tests show a 10% increase in fuel consumption at the 
higher current track tension. This would decrease the 25 MPH secondary road range 
from 275 mi to 247.5 miles. Decreasing the paved road range by 10™ results in:
8. Recommend that PMO rewrite the System Specification cruising range requirement 
to be demonstrated on paved road at 30 MPH. The required minimum range should be 
increased to between 310 and 344 miles. 310 miles on paved roads at 30 MPH 
corresponds to 247 miles on secondary roads at 25 MPH (higher track tension) and 
344 miles on paved roads at 30 MPH corresponds to 275 miles on secondary roads 
at 25 MPH (lower track tensipn).
25 MPH 30 MPH
Paved Road 
Secondary Road
.64 MPG .70 MPG 
.56 MPG .65 MPG
25 MPH: 284 miles 
30 MPH: 310 miles
9. It is iny opinion that, since the higher track tension was a Chrysler decision 
and required for track retention, Chrysler should not be given any substantial 
relief from the range requirement and the cruising range should be specified on 340 miles.
PAUL M. ROOT 
Major, OrdC 
Automotive Branch
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INFORMATION PAPER
DRCPM-GCM-SM 
10 December 1979
SUBJECT: Engine #53 Test Incident
FACTS.
1. Engine #53, at approximately 672 hours of its 1000 hour test (272 hours 
into the 600 hour mission profile test) had a test incident 6 December 1979.
2. The engine was inadvertently shut down from full speed and full power 
by use of the lightning valve. This shut off the fuel flow to the fuel 
nozzle. At this point, the flame went out due to lack of fuel and the 
engine was still turning at high speed. Either the lightning valve failed, 
allowing more fuel into the engine, or the valve was opened by a test 
engineer who realized his earlier mistake.
3. Fuel was injected into the engine and was blown through the combustor 
and turbines. It did not ignite because air velocity was too high. When 
it reached the recuperator, the velocity slowed due to the larger area.
The hot recuperator core ignited the air-fuel mixture and may have acted as 
a flameholder. The rear half of the recuperator on the inside was burned. 
The recuperator now fails a pressure check, indicating burn-throughs in the 
plates.
4. This 1s a test cell incident. It is Impossible for a similar failure 
to occur 1n a tank due to the fact that once the engine shutdown cycle is 
started, there is no way to restart the engine or reintroduce fuel until 
the engine has stopped.
5. Damage appears to be confined to the recuperator core. A substitute 
recuperator core will be installed in Engine #53 and the test will continue.
MAJ ROOT/31231
EGLIN COLD ROOM TEST FOR P8
PROBLEM; Whether to go to Eglln Cold Room as scheduled or delay. Two 
possible delays: 7-12 days or next test cycle ( November ).
1. BACKGROUND:
P8 is scheduled for a systems test 1n Eglln Cold Room at temperatures to 
-65°F. This 1s retest due to poor performance of engine starting and fire 
control at temperatures to -25°F *t APG on two tests.
AVCO has been testing Engine #34 in their engine cold room. Tests Include 
alternate fuel nozzles (Excello and Parker-Hanlfen) for starting. Problems 
have been encountered starting at -25°F with vehicle batteries and at -65°F. 
The engine has excessive oil consumption.
2. ASSUMPTIONS:
a. Engine 34 will not be available (repaired) Friday at Chrysler for 
installation 1n P8.
b. No successful lab starts will have been made at -65°P prior to the 
Eglln test.
c. No suitable DFA fuel will have been obtained prior to the test.
d. Urgency of cold room test has diminished since Arctic test has been 
postponed one year.
e. Eglin can provide an extra five days.
3. FACTS:
a. Engine #34 currently has high oil consumption. Exact cause 1s not 
known. Replacement of reduction gearbox is likely candidate for fix, but not
certain fix.
b. Engine has not successfully started at -25°F using cold soaked 
batteries.
c. No successful starts have been made at -65°F.
d. DFA fuel 1s not to specification. Cloud point 1s 10°F too high 
(-50°F instead of -60°F).
e. Chrysler/AVCO don't know current requirements for starting at -65°F.
f. AVCO has not chosen and sufficiently tested a production configura­
tion nozzle. Two candidates exist, each with minimal testing.
f. Although current cold room test plan calls for using vehicle fuel 
system (tanks, vehicle pumps, etc) Chrysler had indicated they will not do 
so. They plan to pump from a drum of fuel, not testing the vehicle system. 
Problem is draining fuel tanks when fuels must be changed.
h. AVCO cold room currently being repaired. Will not be available for 
further cold starting until late Wednesday or Thursday.
1. C5A must be cancelled 72 hrs prior to flight time. (NLT COB 20 July.) 
j. Test plan has seven days of contingency 1n 1t.
4. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION;
a. HaIntattcurrent schedule - ship 24 July,
b. Slip one week - ship 31 July.
c. Slip until next available test cycle - Nov 79.
5. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES;
a. Maintain current schedule. This requires shipping P8 on 24 July.
It 1s no longer viable because AVCO has Indicated that the engine will not 
be shipped to Chrysler until 23 July.
b. Slip delivery one week - sKip P8 on 31 July.
(1) This allows time to deliver engine provided no further problems
occur.
(2) Impacts test schedule at Eg!in, but Eg!in states that a few 
days slip on tail end can be tolerated. Therefore, won't lose a full week.
(3) Minimal opportunity for further cold start testing at AVCO prior 
to shipping engine.
(4) Minimal time to resolve Chrysler/AVCO interface problems con­
cerning starting.
(5) Production nozzle decision won*t be validated with lab testing.
(6) No opportunity for getting good DFA prior to test.
(7) Will maintain schedule for test results with high risk.
(8) Will not upset AF or cause loss of funds due to failure to use 
cold cell
c. Slip until next available window - November 79.
(1) Requires rescheduling test cell.
(2) Provides time for AVCO lab testing of engine 1n cold cell.
(3) Time to resolve Interface problems.
(4) Time to choose and validate production fuel nozzle.
(5) Adequate time to repair engine.
(6) Slips schedule for test results three months. Program/political
Impact?
(7) Possible opportunity to obtain good DFA.
(8) Provides time to rework Chrysler test plan to provide true 
systems test.
(9) Lower risk of unsuccessful test.
6. CONCLUSION: The week slip does not provide any great assurance that 
the engine and Interface problems will be solved. The slip until November 
provides much needed time to prepare for cold room.
7. RECOWENDATIONS:
a. Postpone Eglin Cold Room Test until November.
b. Direct Chrysler to create Task Force to resolve engineering problems 
associated with Cold Room Test to assure success.
INFORMATION PAPER
T V  I st'f?rfeCPM-GCH-SM * •
30 Not ember 1979
SUBJECT: Penalty Runs ‘on 1000 Hour Engine Components
FACTS.
1. The question of "penalty runs" on the components of Engine #52 ’which did 
not complete the full 1000 hour test was raised by Mr. Jack Horan during 
Adairal Linder's visit to AVCO Lycoming on 28 November 1979* A "penalty run" 
consists of putting those components in another engine and running to the 
specified cycle until the full 1000 hours have been completed on those 
components.
2. It is not the intention of the PM, XMl Tank System, to conduct "penalty 
runs" on components from the 1000 hour tests for either the prototype or LRIP 
engines.
3* There are several reasons for not doing this:
a. The 1000 hour test corresponds to 171000-21,000 miles of vehicle 
operation. It is a severe overtest of the engine which has a requirement of 
10,000 Mean Miles Between Failure (MM3F). The knowledge to be gained from 
conducting a "penalty run" under these circumstances does not warrant the 
use of assets required to support the test.
b. The "qualification" test for the engine, per contract between Chzysler 
and AVCO Lycoming, is a UOO hour durability test (NATO type cycle). The 
engine has repeatedly successfully completed this test.
c. The 1000 hour tests were intended by the OSD Panel to be part of an 
"adequate engine improvement and verification test effort", and not a quali­
fication test. The Panel does not require no parts replacement or "penalty 
runs" on these tests for either the prototype or LRIP engine tests. In fact, 
the Panel states that the existing failure rate on engines (in April 79) was 
not unusually high for a turbine at that stage of development testing and 
"There will be more such failures and incidents".
d. There are no suitable FSED engine assets now available, or projected 
to be available, to conduct such "penalty runs". LRIP assets will not be 
available.
e. The cost of such a test aid the time to conduct it, versus the knowledge 
to be gained, is prohibitive* Est- cost $500-fcj0QK-» M months duration-! 
report available in May*
4» Conversation with Mr. Ralph Tyson, Propulsion and Power Branch, USAVRADCOM, 
reveals that there is no similar requirement on US Army Aviation engines 
(T 700, etc).
a. The aviation engine qualification test is a 150 hour qualification 
test. If a component fails during that test, (a typical engine has a 1500 
hour TBO and 5000 hour design life) a so-called "penalty run” would be con­
ducted. It would consist of an abbreviated test designed to stress the 
particular component which failed. '
b. The Array Aviation community does not have long duration qualification 
teste. 1000 and 1500 hour demonstration (or assurance) tests and 1000 hour 
shake tests (mission cycle vith flight vibrations) are typical of what is con­
ducted, but failures and parts replacements are expected on such tests and 
their izxtect is to identify those areas where future design effort should be 
concentrated. Successful completion of these tests with no parts replace­
ments are not required or expected and engine and aircraft programs are not 
contingent upon the results of these tests*
o. Overtest* beyond the expected time between overhauls (TBO), such as 
the AGT 1500 is currently undergoing, are seldonv if ever, conducted and are 
not factors in continuation of the engine/aircraft program.
MAJ Root/31231 
i £ - '
APPENDIX E
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DIVISION 
CHIEF, LOGISTICS DIVISION 
CHIEF, PROCUREMENT £ PRODUCTION DIVISION
SUBJECT: AGT 1500 Engine Depot Spares
1. Reference:
a. LSA List 09H, Provisioning List Category Codes.
b. LSA Record 10H, Support Items List.
c. AVCO Depot Spares List from Contract 3, CLIN 0001.
d. AVCO Depot Spares List from Contract 6, CLIN 0007.
e. AVCO Maint & Depot Spares List (with deletions) dtd 20 Nov 79, part 
of Chrysler's Dec 79 spare parts submittal.
f. AVCO Maint & Depot Spares List (with deletions) part of Chrysler 
7 Feb 80 letter JDW-0681.
g. Chrysler letter NTX-11868 dtd 22 Feb 80, subject:- BSP Quotation for 
110 Depot Maintenance Spares,
2. This branch has made an independent review of the AGT 1500 engine and has 
attempted to identify those parts which will be critical for rebuild of engines. 
These parts are generally fairly expensive and have long lead times for 
procurement.
3. Based on this review, there are many critical parts which are not currently 
under contract (references c, d, and e) or planned to be put under contract 
(reference f). Additionally, some parts previously planned to be procured have 
been deleted by action of Chrysler and PMO Logistics without review by Chrysler 
or PMO Engineering (reference g).
4. The result is that some required parts will probably not be available to 
rebuild failed engines. Using an engine failure rate between the durability 
rate and the all-inclusive rate reveals that engine/module rebuilds will be 
required during DT/OT III. Without adequate depot spare parts, there is a 
possibility that tanks will be without engines for extended periods of time.
5. Inclosure 1 is a list of parts not on order which were identified by this 
branch as being critical.
02 CP I'. - GCM-3M 17 March 1980
SU3jlCT: AGT 1500 Engine Depot Spares
6. Chrysler may have c plan to use production parts for depot rebuild and 
then replace the parts with those which are planned to be depot spares but
if it exists, this plan needs to be formalized and agreed to by AVCO and PMO.
7. it should be noted that AVCO submitted a Comprehensive Maintenance and 
Depot Spare Parts proposal to Chrysler in August 1979. PMO did not begin to 
receive increments of this proposal from Chrysler until December 1979 and the 
latest submittal is dated 7 February 1980.
8. The critical 'parts analysis (Inclosure 1) is an independent Automotive 
Branch assessment. To insure accuracy, the listing must be reviewed with 
AVCO and Chrysler engineers and logisticians for concurrence, additions and 
deletions.
9. Recommend the following actions be taken:
a. A PMO/Chrysler/AVCO task force be established to determine exactly 
which spare parts are critical. PMO Logistics should have the lead in this, 
but the task force should include engineers and logisticians from PMO, Chrysler 
and AVCO.
b. The engine depot rebuild plan should be definitized and agreed to by 
PMO, Chrysler and AVCO. This should include the source of those parts which 
won't be available from the depot spares.
c. A similar study should be conducted for the transmission.
1 Incl PAUL M. ROOT
as Major, OrdC
Automotive Branch
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APPENDIX F
DRCPM-GCM-SM FACT SHEET Automotive Branch
MAJ Root/mj/31231 
23 January 1978
SUBJECT: Diesel Engine Back-Up Program for XMl 
Project Manager, XMl Tank System
PURPOSE. To provide information on back-up diesel engine proposals 
for the XMl.
BACKGROUND.
1. In the Spring of 1977 the House Armed Services Committee recommended 
approximiately $10M funding for a "back-up diesel program". The Senate 
did not support such a measure, and no funds were included in the 
Appropriations Bill for this project.
2. In 1977 TCM submitted an unsolicited proposal to TARADCOM for continued 
development of the AVCR 1360 diesel engine. The program's objectives in­
cluded completion of the advanced diesel technology development of the 
engine (primarily Variable Area Turbochargers and Variable Speed Cooling 
Fans) and accomplishment of the configuration changes necessary for 
installation of the engine into the XMl Tank. No fund requirements were 
Included In the proposal. The proposal was reviewed by the Automotive 
Branch which concluded that the advanced technology aspect of the proposal 
was good, but there were many objections to considering it as a "back-up 
engine" for the XMl.
3. On 21 November 1977 Senator McClellan, Chairman of the Senate Ap­
propriations Committee sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense Brown 
stating that the Committee believed it necessary to consider a diesel 
back-up engine for the XMl Tank Program. Secretary Brown's reply stated 
that "While all Information leads us to believe that there Is no need 
for a diesel engine back-up program for the XMl Tank, the door is not 
closed."
FACTS.
1. The success to date of the turbine engine has been such that there 
is no need for a back-up diesel engine for the XMl. In addition to 
successfully meeting all performance requirements, the turbine engine 
completed back-to-back 400 hour NATO endurance tests. Last Fall a 
third 400 hour NATO endurance test was successfully completed with a 
Validation Phase engine updated to FSED configuration.. The turbine
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engine's durability Is above the predicted growth curve and is currently 
at 6400 MMBR. The only unresolved durability incident to date is the 
failure of a high pressure compressor stage resulting from a surge con­
dition believed to be caused by a faulty fuel system or bleed valve 
operation. During the total development program the engine will achieve 
over 29,700 hours and 120,800 miles of testing. The engine should fully 
meet all operational requirements at the conclusion of this program, and 
a back-up diesel program would have many more risks than the current 
turbine program.
2. Neither the $10 million funding level proposed in the HASC nor the 
scope of the November TCM proposal would result in "back-up diesel 
engines for the XMl". The low funding level and the proposed scope of 
work are both indicative of a relatively low-level advanced technology 
development program with limited objectives. A program of this nature 
could result in advanced technology which might be applied to improve 
the performance of other diesel engines, but would not result in a back­
up diesel engine which could be incorporated into the XMl without excessive 
program delays.
3. A true diesel back-up program, which would allow incorporation of the 
diesel engine into the XMl without undue program delay, should that become 
necessary, would be a massive and expensive undertaking« Such a program 
would include:
a. Procurement of engines, transmissions, and associated power train 
components. A one-year lead time on this procurement is expected.
b. Development and test of the advanced technology engine components 
mentioned above (Variable Area Turbochargers and Variable Speed Cooling 
Fans).
c. Extensive testing (engine) in the laboratory and in vehicles. 
Existing vehicles must be modified or new vehicles built to support the 
testing. Testing could not start until the hardware was procured.
d. Vehicle Integration planning to modify the XMl production vehicles 
for the diesel engine. Extensive engine compartment redesign can be 
anticipated.
e. Long lead procurement for production for certain engine components 
and certain of those other components of the vehicle which must be changed 
to incorporate the diesel engine. New fuel tanks, cooling systems, air 
intake and exhaust, and vehicle interface connections can be expected.
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f. Facilitization for production. This must be undertaken immediately 
to procure the machines, etc., necessary for diesel engine production.
g. Production Engineering planning.
h. Major logistics effort. Manuals must be revised for the diesel 
engine, spare parts procured, mechanics and operators must be trained, etc.
4. The cost of such a true back-up program would probably exceed the cost 
of the present turbine engine program. A TARADCOM estimate of the cost is 
$31.9 million excluding engine software and vehicle costs.
5. Even with a major effort, it is doubtful if the diesel engine could be 
ready for production in time to meet the XMl delivery schedule. A program 
slip must be anticipated if the diesel engine were to be incorporated.
6. This Fact Sheet does not require coordination.
E. W. TRAPP
Chief, Systems Engineering Division
PROJECT MANAGER ACTION:
NOTED:________________
SEE ME:_______________
DRCPM-GCM-SM INFORMATION PAPER Automotive Branch
MAJ Root/31231 
25 April 1979
SUBJECT: Backup Engine Program
PURPOSE: To provide the Implications of developing backup diesel and 
turbine engines for the XMl.
1. Diesel Engine.
a. Assumptions:
(1) AVCR 1360 1500 HP diesel engine 1s used.
(2) Additional development 1s limited to variable area turbochargers, 
variable speed cooling fans and necessary vehicle redesign.
(3) User accepts one ton weight penalty of diesel engine to preclude 
vehicle redesign.
b. Implications:
(1) Time:
- 5 year program from contract to beginning of LRIP.
- 3-1/2 years to LRIP DSARC decision.
- 3-1/2 years of facilitization.
- 1 year DT/OT.
(2) Resources:
- 17 new engines.
- Engine rebuilds.
- 12 new transmissions.
- 10 Pilot Vehicles for DT/OT.
- US Ariny troop unit for OT.
(3) Funding:
$144.8M - for engine design, build, vehicle build, testing and ILS. 
$ 85M for facilitization.
$229.8M - Total to start of LRIP.
2. Turbine Engine.
a. Assumptions:
(1) New turbine developed by a different contractor.
(2) Government accepts some risk in concurrency of development and 
testing.
b. Implications:
(1) Time:
- 9-1/2 year program from contract to start of LRIP.
- 4-1/2 years initial development and test.
- 5 years vehicle integration, testing and engine qualification.
- 8-1/2 years to LRIP DSARC decision.
- 3-1/2 years facilitization.
- 1-3/4 year DT/OT.
(2) Resources:
- 30 new engines.
- Engine rebuilds.
- 12 transmissions.
- 10 Pilot Vehicles for DT/OT.
- US Army troop unit for OT.
(3) Funding:
$255M - engine design, development, test, pilot vehicle build, 
vehicle test, ILS.
$ 80M - facilitization.
$335M - Total to start of LRIP.
3. There 1s no assurance that the engine developed under either of the 
above programs will M  be more reliable or durable at the end of Its 
development program than the AGT 1500 engine now 1s.
FACT SHEET
uacPM-Gc;i-sM
SUBJECT: Use of T700 Engine 1n XMl Tank 
Project Manager, XM1 Tank System
PURPOSE. To Inform the Project Manager of the Impractical1ty of using 
the T700 engine 1n the XMl Tank.
FACTS.T. The AGT 1500 turbine engine was designed as a tank engine, and as 
such, was configured to fit 1n a tank engine compartment to Interface 
with the rear mounted transmission and to operate 1n a ground vehicle 
environment. The T700 engine was designed as an aircraft engine with 
Its constraints and for Its particular environment.
2. Significant differences between the two engines are listed:
Characteristic AGT 1500 T700
Power (Continuous) 1500 "HP 1250 HP
Weight 2300 lbs. 415 lbs.
Compressor Materials Steel Titanium
Housings Steel Castings Fabricated Sheet Metal
A1r Cleaning System External Integral inlet particle 
separator
Recuperator Yes No
Lube System External Self-contained
Combustor Single can Annular
Fuels DF2, DF1, JP4 
JP5, DF-A
JP4, JP5
Reduction Gearbox Integral External
Alternator External Integral
Peculiar Accessories ■’lone Ant1-icinp valve 
History recorder 
Magnetic chip detector
Automotive Branch 
.‘1AJ Root/31231 
T August 1377
3. It would be theoretically possible to use the T7CQ engine in place 
of the AGT 1500 althounh a trer.endous amount cf development and redesign 
. ork would be required to ir-afce an engine daslqneJ for tn aircraft environ­
ment suitable 1n a ground vehicle environment. The major areas requiring 
development or redesign, and other major problea areas, are listed below:
a. The drive shaft for the T700 engine exits the front of the engine 
and no reduction gearbox 1s provided. A reduction nearLox would be re­
quired to reduce the engine output speed from 21,000 RPM to 3,000 RPM for 
Interface with the transmission. Also, 1t would probably be desirable to 
convert the engine to a rear drive, configuration and avoid the problem of 
having the exhaust In the vicinity of the bustle anso stowage.
b. The T700 does not Incorporate a recuperator to recover exhaust 
energy under part load conditions to Inprove fuel economy. A quick esti­
mate of the additional fuel required on an overall basis for a non-recupera- 
tlve turbine vs. a recuperative turbine 1s 1n the area of 30-40 percent.
If this penalty 1s not acceptable, a recuperator system would have to be 
developed for the T-700.
c. The T-700 1s designed to operate on the standard aircraft fuels, 
JP-4, and JP-5. In order to be compatible with the logistical systata for 
the other ground combat vehicles additional development would be required 
to allow for operation on DF-2 fuel.
d. The T700 engine has a continuous power rating of 1250 HP at sea 
level and 35°F while the AGT 1500 1s rated at 1500 HP. The 250 HP reduc­
tion would reduce vehicle performance accordingly.
e. The T700 engine Incorporates an Integral particle separator on the 
front of the engine. For ground operation 1t 1s felt that, as a nrfnisun, 
some form of additional filtration would be required. It 1s probable that 
the engine would have to be redesigned to eliminate the separator and 
utilize an air cleaner systeo very similar to that currently used with 
the AGT 1500. It should be noted that the Inlet restriction with clean 
barrier filters of the Chrysler XMl air induction systes (13 1n of N?0) 
exceeds the Units of the T700 engine specification.
f. The T700 engine does not incorporate accessory pads of the capacity 
necessary to drive the vehicle hydraulic pump. The hydraulic pusp would 
have to be relocated to the transmission, necessitating transmission re- dasijin.
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g. The currant starting system for the T7C0 1s an air turbine wiiich 
Is supplied with air by the helicopter auxiliary power unit. The starting
;v s o f  the 1700 would h3ve to be convertad to electric^
h. Combat vehicles are required to operate 1n up to 125°F anbfent 
temperatures. The temperature rise 1n the air Inlet system for th» Chrysler 
XMl 1s 7° to 10°F which results 1n an Inlet air tenperature to the turbine 
of 135°F. This temperature exceeds the specified ccorating envelope for 
the T700.
4. The 10 year average DTC of the AGT 15C0 1s estimated at $110,479. A 
comparable estimate (Source: AVSCCM) for the T7G0 1s $178,000.
CONCLUSIONS.o. The extent of redesign of the T700 required to sake 1t an effective 
tank engine 1s such that the engine would be, 1n effect, a totally new 
engine with very little coraraonallty, except the rotating parts, with the 
current T700. The cost would probably be higher than for the AGT 1500.
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APPENDIX
DRCPM-GCM-SM 3 November 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 
SUBJECT: Trip Report
1. On 5-13 Oct 77 the undersigned traveled to England and Germany to 
talk with PM, MBT 80, BNLO, and visit MaK to observe progress in installa­
tion of the AGT-1500/X-1100 power pack in a Leo 2 automotive test rig.
2. On 7 Oct 77 I paid a courtesy call to the US Standardization Group, 
London, and I discussed the purpose of my visit to MOD, UR. In the course 
of discussions, LTC Massey requested a copy of the "Deane Memorandum". He 
also requested information copies of the cover letters of all correspondence 
with the UK in order that they might know what has been transmitted should 
he be asked by MOD, UK.
3. I then visited COL Stopford, PM, MBT 80, at St. Christopher House, and 
MAJ Mike Barneby, and Mr. John Couzzens of his staff. Several items were 
discussed:
a. COL Stopford expressed the UK's interest in the turbine power 
package as one of the possibilities for the power pack for MBT 80. He 
stated that the gun decision might have a bearing on a power package choice.
b. He requested an organizational chart of DARCOM, the PMO, Chrysler, 
and AVCO, so that he could identify personnel and positions with whom he 
must deal.
c. He was pleased that the answers to the Rolls Royce questions would 
be delivered in the Immediate future and understood why the production 
questions could not be answered at this time.
d. Detailed discussions of the questions and answers were held with 
MAJ Barneby and Mr. Couzzens. Mr. Couzzens was about to travel to the PMO 
with the ROF group and the knowledge of the nature of the answers helped 
him prepare for his trip.
e. Clarification of the terminology in some questions was made.
f. In the Rolls Royce questions, there were no questions directed at 
Allison, only AVCO and Chrysler. COL Stopford stated that he felt RR was 
only interested in producing the engine and had visited Allison during 
their trip only because they had been asked to by the UK MOD.
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4. On 10 Oct 77, in Bonn, I visited LTC Mehrtens of the BNLO, Several 
topics were discussedi
a. The contents and nature of the weekly reports on the turbine power 
pack.
b. Contact between the Chrysler tech rep and BNLO.
c. LTC Mehrtens felt that it is important to invite the Germans to ob­
serve some specific tests of the turbine before the gun decision is made.
If the Germans are invited to observe specific tests (i.e. acceleration, 
fuel consumption, or braking during.EDT-C, and lab tests) and do not accept, 
he feels it would show lack of a true interest in the turbine. This invita­
tion could be presented at the Executive Group Meeting.
d. LTC Mehrtens requested some turbine fuel consumption data, which will 
be provided him while he Is at PMO.
5. On 11 and 12 Oct 77 I visited MaK, Kiel, accompanied by MAJ Benson and 
SSG Tocker from BNLO. The visit was highly successful and extremely worth­
while. Discussions of the test plan, schedule, and problems, and an inspec­
tion of the Installation were held 11 Oct 77. A plant tour and further 
discussions were held on 12 Oct 77 and minutes were signed. The following 
people were involved in addition to PMO personnel (Organization charts 
attached):
Herr Achlm Wilczek, Dir of Special Projects, MaK
Dr. Muller, Head of Tracked Vehicle Tests, MaK
Herr Schmitt, Dir of Vehicle Tests, MaK
Herr Olof Lenz, Assistant to Wilcyek, MaK
Herr Sombrowski, Dir of Research Group III, MaK (Installation Design)
Dr. Link, Dir of Power Trains, MaK
Mr. George Psaros, Chrysler Tech Rep
6. MaK appears to be a prosperous company with about 3000 workers. They 
manufacture large diesel engines for power stations, locomotive, and marine 
use. They manufacture locomotives, and have a considerable military vehicle 
business. They manufacture the FRG tracked recovery vehicle, LEO I, are 
modifying 7RG M113's for a diesel engine, and will produce 45% of the LEO II 
total quantity. They are doing some experimental development work on new 
tracked vehicles.
7. Mr. Psaros, Chrysler Tech Rep, had been at MaK since 6 Oct 77. He is a 
great help to MaK in the installation, and is able to answer many questions 
imnedlately. He is In daily contact with Chrysler and, so, is able to 
quickly obtain answers to questions that require expertise at Chrysler.
MaK cannot contact Chrysler directly, so he Is Invaluable in this respect.
He should be delegated authority by Chrysler, If he does not already have 
It, to allow minor Installation changes In the power pack, If In his 
opinion, they do not violate the loan agreement or harm the power pack.
8. The test schedule and tech rep schedule were discussed. MaK has to 
finalize the schedule with BWB, and a copy of schedules will be delivered 
to the US at the Executive Group meeting. The most significant feature is 
that MaK desires to run the test until the end of May and the power pack 
will not be ready for return until the end of June. (MaK states that the 
US was informed of this at the last Working Group meeting.) This extension 
should be acceptable to the US and'not affect the program. Currently, no 
immediate further use is planned for that power pack. This schedule does 
eliminate the option of rebuilding the FRG power pack for the Pll vulnera­
bility trials and the possible provision of an FSED power pack to Germany.
It must be insured that the technical support required for the revised 
schedule falls within the 19 man-months which were negotiated.
9. The draft test plan, dated 9 Jun 77 and already provided to PMO, was 
discussed in detail. A detailed test plan will be provided PMO through 
BWB when available (US should ask for it at the Executive Group Meeting.).
10. The power pack will be:
a. Ground hopped for check out.
b. Tested in the test rig in an environmental chamber equipped with 
dynamometers for each output.
c. Tested in the test rig at MaK and at a Bundeswehr test track 30 Km 
from Kiel.
11. Points discussed on the test plan include:
a. MaK desires to Install thermocouples I n B l d e  the transmission at the 
point of highest temperature of the oil for measurements during the braking 
tests. Since this may Involve opening the transmission, PMO permission 
must be obtained. Additionally, Allison should provide the location of the 
highest temperature.
b. Test results can be provided through BWB If requested by PMD (this 
should be done at the Executive Group Meeting and include periodic reports 
and interim results as well as the final report).
c. Some data, provided by PMO, has never reached MaK and is needed before 
tests can begin (details are later).
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d. Brake testing would be comparable to BWB tests.
e. Fire suppression system data was requested.
f. Certain tests will be deleted from the draft test plan:
(1) Electrical system tests
(2) Rolling resistance tests
(3) Tests of the shift Impulses to the final drive and suspension.
(4) Cross-country travel - due to the hull modifications
12. The following Information was requested by MaK. Some of It has pre­
viously been provided by PMO but apparently did not reach MaK (Suspicions 
are that It Is at BWB and has not been forwarded).
a. Engine #32 acceptance data.
b. Cooling fan maps.
c. Transmission loss diagram.
d. Accessory losses (power required).
e. Data on the fire extinguisher system to Include quantity of Halon and 
location of nozzles In the engine compartment.
f. Steering radii In each gear.
13. The turbine Installation was viewed. MaK has nearly finished the 
mechanical Installation of the power pack In the hull of Prototype #2 of 
LEO II. It Is a thoroughly professional Installation. The LEO II hull was 
modified by lengthening the rear (the rear grille does not open), moving the 
engine compartment bulkhead forward approximately 8", cutting out and lower­
ing the hull floor 1.5" to provide transmission clearance, cutting away a 
torsion bar cover, Insulating a fuel tank, and minor machining. (Drawings 
and photos will be provided the US at the Executive Group Meeting.) The 
modifications are relatively simple and are easily feasible for production 
or retrofit.
14. The power pack rests on the front engine mounting shoe and the LEO II 
transmission saddles. An adapter has been made to clamp around the trans­
mission to sit in the existing mounting saddle without modifications. MaK 
fabricated their own engine mounting shoe from Chrysler'drawings. This was
necessary to interface with the vehicle and allow for the different engine 
installation angle necessitated by the permanently closed rear grilles’.
MaK built their own engine mounting sling from Chrysler drawings.
15. Power pack Installation was demonstrated and took less than ten minutes 
(no electrical, etc., hookups were made). The pack is at a similar angle
to the US installation and is lowered almost straight down into the engine 
compartment. The front mount engages the shoe, and as the rear of the pack 
is lowered, the front cable is shortened with a hand ratchet on the cable, 
so that the angle of the power pack decreases, and the transmission mounting 
adapters seat directly on the saddle mounts. Bolts extend through the hull 
bottom into the transmission mounting adapters.
16. Clearances are tight around the coolers, but there is a great deal of 
room around the engine. Fuel tanks could be Installed on both sides of 
the recuperator, under the air cleaner, and in a space on the right side of 
the engine (looking forward) approximately 5'x 3’ x 1.5*.
17. Extremely few engine modifications were necessary:
a. A rib on the accessory gearbox was machined down (discussed at last 
Working Group Meeting).
b. Oil cooler seals and flanges on the outside edges were removed due 
to clearances.
c. The transmission mounting adapters were clamped around the transmis­
sion outputs.
d. Attachments to the turbine for thermocouples, fire wire, etc.
e. An adapter to connect the GE final drives to the transmission is 
required. MaK desires permission to remove the bolt in the transmission 
output shafts to connect the adapter. This installation offers possibili­
ties for harmonization. This will be checked with Chrysler.
18. MaK requested three meters exhaust duct seal for their installation 
as soon as possible (approximately 1 1/2" diameter).
19. Electrical boxes are installed in the hull. Certain connectors were 
not delivered, and while they are not halting the installation, they are 
needed very soon. Chrysler is attempting to obtain them.
20. MaK requested US agreement, in writing, for the following:
a. To remove the bolt in the transmission output shaft to install the 
final drive adapter.
b. To install a fail-safe fuel shut off between the fuel control and 
combustor so that fuel flow can be immediately terminated if there should 
be any problem.
c. The MaK fabricated engine mounting shoe, which has no alignment 
grooves but only has 0.5 MM of sldeplay, is satisfactory.
d. To conduct a single full speed braking run prior to the other 
driving tests to Insure adequate braking.
e. The extended test schedule.
f. Transmission oil thermocouples for the brake tests,
21. MaK appeared concerned with discrepancies found between the manuals 
provided and the power pack. It was explained that the manuals were cur­
rent as of early 1976 and same changes had been made in the power pack and 
not reflected in any manuals. MaK's concern centered around possible dam­
age to the power pack due to following outdated procedures in the manuals. 
Mr. Psaros is providing updating and clarification of the manuals and con­
tacting Chrysler if he does not have the information at hand.
22. During the plant tour, the LEO I hull machining line was visited. 
Capability is over 30/month on a 1/8/5 schedule. One machine can turn 
the hull on its side for turret ring machining. All are reprogrammable 
for various vehicles. Capacity is also over 30/month for the tracked 
recovery vehicle.
23. Herr Wllczek showed an experimental "Casemate" tank consisting of an 
FMBT 70 hull and suspension with two 105mm guns (another version has two 
120ran guns) mounted at the front edge of the vehicle. They are adjustable 
In elevation and have automatic loaders. Azimuth is controlled by the 
tracks. Crew Is three. The fire control system gives the capability of 
sighting on a target not on the vehicle axis and "swinging through" the 
target. The gun is stabilized and fires at the Instant of proper gun 
target positioning. This fire on the move capability is controlled either 
by the driver who swings through the target or the fire control system, 
which automatically lines up the vehicle with the target and then zig-zags 
along the axis, firing at the proper times. MaK claims excellent 1|it 
probabilities with a vehicle speed of 40 KPH 0 1500M for the 105mm ver­
sion. The 120mn version was viewed very briefly. I have a photo of the 
105mm version firing. Further Information should be obtained.
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24. MaK is using German final drives and will return the US final drives.
25. MaK has set up an office for conceptual studies of LEO III.
26. Minutes were signed at the end of the meeting. A copy will be 
available when translated.
27. I was highly Impressed by MaK and the people working on the power pack 
test. They are highly competent, excellent engineers, and seem dedicated 
to a successful test. They are somewhat limited in their actions by BWB 
and it appears that this will be the source of any problems.
28. I returned to the US 13 Oct 77.
/ W W .
1 Incl PAUL M. ROOT
as MAJ, OrdC,
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:
SUBJECT: Trip Report to UK 19-20 December 1978
1. On 19 and 20 December 1978 I participated in turbine power pack 
licensing discussions with the Project Manager MBT80 for the UK. The 
British are interested in the turbine power pack as a possible option 
for their MBT80. The other contender for the power pack is a British 
CV12 engine and a British transmission. The MBT80 will be a vehicle 
heavier than 60 US tons and longer than the XMl. The British are 
planning to decide on whether to use a British or American power pack
by July 1979. The Project Manager MBT80 must make his recommendation by 
31 March 1979.
2. In support of this decision, the British have asked for the loan of 
a turbine power pack in October 1979 under the terms of the ABCA agree­
ment. They have also indicated a desire to purchase an additional power 
pack at some later date. The British have accepted the fact that they 
will make a decision on which power pack will be used in their MBT80 
before they have any hardware to test. Because of this, complete answers 
to the questionnaire which they submitted in August are very important to 
'them.
3. The British are interested in the AGT-1500 engine and X1100 trans­
mission only. They are not interested in the accessories for the power 
pack such as cooling system, alternator, or hydraulic pump. They have 
stated their intentions as desiring the best power pack, either British
or US, for their MBT80. They are not completely committed to standardiza­
tion on either the engine or transmission. Their stated hope is that they 
would not have to change the engine configuration. They have stated that 
they would have to change the angle of the fan drive power takeoffs on the 
transmission to enable them to fit the cooling system into the narrower 
engine compartment of the MBT80. If the British were to make such a change 
internally to the transmission, this would destroy the commonality of 
transmission and therefore the British and US transmissions would not be 
interchangeable. If they could do it externally; for example, by a bevel 
gear set, the interface would not change and interchangeability would be 
maintained
4. The British stated that they do not wish to be limited in their 
ability to unilaterally make design changes on either the engine or 
transmission once their firms have licenses to produce them. The con­
clusion from this 1s that standardization 1s a secondary aim behind 
obtaining what they consider the best power pack. It is very important 
that future negotiations establish the interfaces which will be maintained 
as common between British and American versions of the engine and trans­
mission. Without this there 1s no assurance that the Items will be 
interchangeable and that there will be any standardization between American 
and British engines or transmissions.
5. The ABCA agreements provide for loans of equipment from one country 
to another in the furtherance of standardization. Without a committment 
on Britain's part to maintain common physical, mechanical, and electrical 
interfaces on the engine and transmission, the ABCA agreements may not be 
appropriate for the loan of a power pack. The British presented a draft 
test program for the loan power pack. The loan would extend for two to 
two and a half years and consist of basic engineering tests of the power 
pack, steering and brake performance tests to the heavier MBT80 require­
ment, separate engine and transmission tests, and power pack tests to the 
MBT80 specification. Additionally, there would be a nine to twelve month 
period of reliability and durability testing to a duty cycle which has 
been defined for MBT80. The length and scope of this test program will 
necessitate upward revision of previous estimates of the cost of the loan 
turbine power pack and associated technical support and spare parts.
6. The unofficial test plan which I saw provided for the purchase of 21 
more power packs 1n the 1980-1984 time frame. These would be tested by 
the British both In the laboratory and in various test vehicles.
7. On the second day I gave a brief report as to the status of the 
Automotive testing, the results, and a brief general description of 
turbine engine problems and solutions to those problems. Answers to the 
UK questionnaire were turned over to the British and they expressed 
general dissatisfaction with the scope of the answers. Chrysler and AVCO 
had provided some answers. Allison had refused, by letter, to answer any 
questions until a contractural relationship was established. The US 
position was explained which said that the scope of the British questions 
were such that they could not be fully answered by the contractors without 
additional funding and manpower. The British stated that the information 
requested 1n the questionnaire was the minimum essential which they needed 
to be able to make an evaluation and determination on the American power­
pack. They expressed concern that they would not be able to get the 
answers to the questions when they visit the US in January and stated that 
they needed the answers by January in order to prepare their recommendations.
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8. The British trip to the US at the end of January was discussed. A 
tentative schedule is for the British to proceed first to Aberdeen to see 
the vehicle. They hope to be able to get on a vehicle, see a power pack 
pulled, etc. The next two days, the delegation would split and go to AVCO 
and Allison for detailed discussions with the contractors and answers to 
the remainder of their questionnaire. Two days would then be spent at the 
PMO and Chrysler and, after that meeting, two days would be spent back at 
the contractor, either AVCO or Allison, to obtain the remaining data which 
they required. Plans must be made to insure fullest cooperation from AVCO, 
Allison, and Chrysler to insure access to the vehicle at Aberdeen.
9. In the afternoon, I had a meeting with several members of a Logistics 
Task Force headed by Colonel Glass. They were concerned with all areas of 
the support'*ability of the turbine power pack. I answered questions in a. 
general way, provided what data..I had, and stated that we would attempt to 
provide detailed answers to their specific questions as soon as possible. 
Members of the Logistics Task Force are scheduled to have a meeting with 
the PM and Chrysler at the same time as the technical people at the end of 
January.
10. The following possible problem areas exist in the provision of a power 
pack to the British in the time frame they require.
a. If the US decides to conduct DT/OT IIA,there is a strong possibility 
that power packs will not be available in the time frame required.
b. The scope of the British test program is such that it will be much 
more expensive than was forecast.
c. The British are not committed to standardization of engine and 
transmission. Therefore, the ABCA agreement may not be applicable for the 
loan of a power pack.
d. There is a competition for power pack and vehicle assets within the 
PMO. All vehicles are already committed to various uses after FSED. Some 
US requirements will not be met if a power pack is loaned to the UK.
11. The following recommendations are made:
a. That AVCO and Allison be informed of the intentions of the British 
. and the importance of full responses to the questionnaire by the end of
January when the UK delegation will visit them.
b. The US seek assurance from the UK that they will standardize on 
engine and transmission. Otherwise, the possibility should exist that the 
PMO be lfcss Involved 1n providing power packs to the UK.
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c. Provide a power pack to the UK 1n the October 79 time frame, 1f 
possible and desirable.
12. Based on Paragraphs 3 and 4, there appears to exist the strong 
possibility that the UK MBT80 will contain an engine and transmission 
similar to, but not Interchangeable with, the engine and transmission of 
the XM1.
PAUL M. ROOT 
Major, OrdC 
Automotive Branch
FACT SHEET
Automotive Branch 
MAJ Root/31231 
26 July 1977
URCPM-GCM-SH
SUBJECT; German Unique Requirements for a Turbine Power Pack 
Project Manager* XM1 Tank System
PURPOSE. To Inform the Project Manager of the Implications of the German 
Unique Requirements for the turbine power package.
BACKGROUND.Y. The PHO received a letter from Herr Jores dated 25 Jan 77, listing the 
German Unique Requirements for a Turbine Power Package. Jores stated that 
the requirements might have to be "supplemented or modified" as they found 
out more about the turbine. A reply was requested by the end of March 1977. 
The U. S. was prepared to discuss the Unique Requirements at the Working 
Group Meeting 1n early March. At that meeting, FKG had Its turbine experts 
present, but Herr Bruns refused to discuss the requirements.
2. The PNO response was sent to FRG In early April* and the Unique Require­
ments are scheduled to be discussed at the September Working Group Meeting. 
PilO has requested the current German position on their Unique Requirements, 
1n view of our response and the data they have received* prior to the Sep­
tember meeting so that 1t may be studied prior to the meeting. If a reply 
Is not forthcoming, the unique requirements discussion should be postponed.
3. the XM1 turbine power pack can meet maw of the unique German require­
ments. Theee are, however, a considerable number of requirements which are 
not currently met. They fall Into two categories: The first 1s tliose re­
quirements which the power pack will never meet due to Its Inherent design 
and performance characteristics, and the second 1s those which could be met 
with some modification to the existing power pack with associated cost Im­
pacts. Additionally, certain Items need clarification or must be negotiated 
with FRG representatives before their Impact can be determined.
4. The turbine power pack will not meet the following requirements;
FACTS.
Item Reason
Cruising range of 500 KM (300 ml) 
with no additional fuel than that 
carried on Leo 2.
The turbine engine Inherently has 
higher fuel consumption than tiie 
diesel. Using Leo 2 on board fuel
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Fuel consumption rate to be sane 
fur turbine in Lao 2 ti diesel.
Fuel consumption for 24 hours, 
uattlefleld day cannot exceed 
tut for Leo 2 with diesel power 
pack.
Engine output and condition*. 1500 
HP output when Installed In vehicle.
Growth potential to 1950 HP (302).
Specific fuel consumption at various 
loads.
HTBO of 600 hours when leaded gaso­
line is frequently used.
Lubricants. Turbine oust operate 
on laotor oil or Jet power plant oil.
26 July 1977 
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Reason
range is estimated at less than 
240 mile*. SMaller turbine 
volune could allow for additional 
fuel. (Leo 2 did not meet this 
requirement during DT I testing.)
Fuel consumption is inherently 
higher than diesel. This will 
never be met with the current en­
gine.
Turbine engine is rated at 1500 HP 
gross. Effects of air cleaners, 
etc. will lower this when Installed 
in vehicle. Magnitude of effect 
depends on particular systea. US 
systea rated at 1400 HP with air 
cleaners installed.
1800 HP gross is the currently 
forecast growth potential without 
an extensive redesign of the engine 
and power pack.
Turbine engine will not neet German 
requirements. Best turbine SFC is 
.475 1b/HP/hr at BOS load and the 
FRG worst specified Is .477/lb/HR/hr.
Will not be net. Extensive opera­
tion on leaded gasoline nas detri­
mental effects on hot end components 
of engine, although rate of dosage 
is not quantified.
Turbine is designed to operate 
on systhetlc oil HIL-L-23699.
Other oils are not suitable with­
out redesign of the lubrication 
system.
URCPH-6CH-5M 26 July 1977
SUBJECT: Geraan Unique Requirements for a Turbina Power Pack
Itm
urake System Requirements.
Power Pack Installation without 
null modification.
Reason
The turbine power pack does not 
nave a Hydraulic retarderjnd, 
therefore, probably wl Unmeet 
the requirements of the beroan 
Hlgnway Traffic Licensing Code.
Power pack does not fit In Leo i 
hull. It Is too long, the coolers 
Interfere with the hull sides, and 
the transmission 1s too deep.
S. The turbine power pack could meet the following requirements with 
redesign and nodlflcatlons to the existing configuration:
Itea
APu required if idle fuel consuap- 
tlon higher than diesel. APU to be 
developed and funded by US.
Installation conditions: Turbine 
oust be capable of being Installed 
without modifying existing Inter­
faces, Including final drives.
M r  inlet port as an Integral part 
of power pack.
Monitoring and governing equipment 
for tiie power pack.
Lubrication: Emergency lubrica­
tion for one minute.
l«P«ct
Turbine idle fuel consumption 1s 
hiyher. APU could be developed.
It would occupy volume currently 
taken by fuel, reducing cruising 
ranye. Development funding re­
quired.
Conaon final drive interfaces 
could be designed to be compatible 
with both XM1 and Leo 2. FRG has 
designed final drive adapter for 
turbine test rig.
This 1s a vehicle configuration 
problem, bue to the size of the 
air cleaners, this 1s not recom­
mended, althougn feasible.
These are basically vehicle-related 
Instrumentation Items tnat FRG 
could add 1f necessary.
This could be designed using cut­
off valves or a redundant emergency 
oil system.
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Chip detectors In lubricating system.
Impact
These are Installed In proto­
types and could be Included In 
production engines.
These are vehicle design require- 
cents.
US alternator (65QA) yields 1&.2 
KU. If 20KU were required, FRG 
could Install their own generator 
1n place of current one.
Engine currently has one PTO which 
drives accessories. Transolsslon 
has 3 PTO's: one drives alterna­
tor and two drive cooling fans. 
Additional ones could be designed 
In on transsisslon and output 
speed could be as required.
6. The following Items need clarification before their Impact can be determined;
Fuel systeu requirements
Electrical generator with 20KU 
output.
Power takeoff: Two required with 
output sp«ed of 4000 RPH.
Item
ttRD oust certify power pack ready 
for production
FRG reproduction rights.
Official verification by various FRG 
tests.
Reason
MOU states that the US will 
certify the power pack for pro­
duction and provide it to FRG. 
Certification occurs at ASARC/
USARC III.
FRG requires condensation If 
complete reproduction rights should 
not be possible. Statenent 1s 
very vague.
These types of tests are planned to 
be conducted by US and results will 
be provided to FRG. MOU states 
that US will conduct these tests.
for a Turbine Power Pack
Item Reason
Product1ona11zat1on proof by FRG 
by test.
FRG requires five complete power 
packs on loan to test. Packs
are not planned for or funded.
Earliest delivery 1n 1979. MOU 
states that US will certify that 
power pack 1s ready for produc­
tion (ASARC/OSARC III). US could 
run additional tests If necessary 
to satisfy FRG.
DISCUSSION.
7. The Unique Requirements Indicate that the Germans desire a turbine 
with all the^performanee and interface characteristics of their diesel—  
an Impossible requirement. Depending on their true interest In the tur­
bine* many of the unique requirements could disappear. If, on the other 
hand, t h e y Insist on the necessity of their requirements, thoy will never 
accept the AGT 1500 turbine power package.
6. Their most serious objections will probably be:
a. Fuel consumption and Its ramifications.
b. Lack of a hydraulic retarder (an Independent braking systea) In 
the transmission.
c. Installation problems.
Automotive branch 
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FACT ShEET 26 July 1977
DRCPri-GGM-SM
SubJECT; Installation of Turbine Engine In Leo 2 
Project Manager, XMl Tank Systea
FUkPuiL. To infona the Project Manager of the problem FRG faces In 1n- 
s u T TTn y  Its Alii turbine power package in Leo 2.
FACTS.
1. Tha AGT 1500 turbine power pack will not fit in Leo 2 without hull Modi­
fications.
a. Tne power pack is too long for tne hull. The air Inlet extends 
through the bulkhead between the crew and engine coopartaents. Movement of 
the components located on the crew side of tha bulkhead and other Modifica­
tions would be necessary to accooaodate the Inlet and air plenun. It Is 
not thought that the engine will Interfere with the turret basket.
l . Tne lower outside comers of the oil coolers, which are Mounted on 
the transulssion, Interfere with the hull. Thqy are slightly too wide.
c. The transalssion Is too deep to fit In the Leo 2 hull. Modifications 
to tne floor of the hull are required.
2. Herr Bruns asked, at a Working Group Meeting in Hay, if the U. S.
would Modify the turbine to fit 1n Leo 2. It 1s not known if he was serious.
UteUJSSlOH.
X  Tno modifications required on the Leo 2 hull, while requiring soue re- 
uesi^n, are not Major and should be relatively easy If FRS 1s so Inclined.
4. Other Implications of the installation In Leo 2 include possible oovesent 
forward of the vehicle center of gravity due to the lighter turbine power 
pack and reduced vehicle cruising range, without the addition of More fuel, 
aue to the turbine's higher fuel consumption.
CWCLuSIOti.
Tne 0. S. position should be that we will assist the FRfi 1n their efforts 
to Install the turbine power pack 1n Leo 2, but will not and cannot Modify 
tiie turoine power pack configuration to accfiMSodate their vehicle.
MINUTES OF 
US-FRG DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE 
120MM TANK MAIN ARMAMENT PROGRAM
8, 9 AUGUST 1978, BONN
In furtherance of the spirit of cooperation, representatives of 
the US Government as represented by the Department of the Army (USDA.) 
and the FRG Government, as represented by the Ministry of Defense 
(FMOD) held joint discussions on 8-9 August 1978 to clarify certain 
areas of mutual interest which would enhance joint efforts to 
achieve harmonization of the XMl and Leopard 2 tank programs. 
Accordingly, the following discussions were held and the following 
agreements reached:
a. Consistent with the best interests and needs of the US Army 
and the implicit intent of the Harmonization Memorandum of 
Understanding, the USDA made a conscious decision to expedite the 
development and incorporation of the 120mm tank gun system into the 
XMl. It was agreed that the FMOD has met or is in the process of 
attempting to meet most of the US unique requirements. Some other 
US requirements may be classified as satisfied following further 
technical clarification which is on-going now. The USDA and FMOD 
further agreed that a limited number of the US unique requirements 
would be more appropriately and expeditiously addressed by the USDA. 
The US unique requirements in each category are listed at Inclosure.
b. The next item discussed was the FRG unique requirements for 
a turbine power pack. The USDA noted that since delivery of the FRG 
unique requirements, the USDA has taken cognizance of the FMOD concern 
that the turbine engine meet the FMOD performance and configuration 
requirements. The USDA and FMOD agreed that should the FRG adopt the 
turbine power pack, integration into the Leopard 2 tank system would 
be the responsibility of the FMOD just as responsibility for integra­
tion of the 120mm gun system into the XMl has been accepted by the 
USDA as their responsibility. The FMOD is very interested to be 
precisely informed of the level of USDA fulfillment of Germany's 
unique requirements for the turbine power pack.
In the matter of turbine power pack performance requirements, 
the USDA updated previous correspondence and addressed the following 
items of FMOD concern:
(1) FUEL ECONOMY. The USDA has contracted for development of an 
auxiliary power unit which will significantly improve battlefield day 
fuel economy results. Additionally, the USDA is pursuing a fuel 
economy improvement program with a goal of reducing overall fuel 
consumption by at least 10%. However, the XMl turbine is not 
expected by either country to equal the fuel economy required by the 
FRG requirements nor-can it be so modified. The FMOD agreed to 
reconsider t l ir—tii r i rrrity nf t h r i r  fu rl rrnnrny requirement after 
receipt of the data requested at paragraph b (4). The turbine power 
pack will use DF-2 (NATO F-54) as its primary fuel.
(2) GROWTH POTENTIAL. The USDA and FMOD currently have no 
requirement for ah engine larger than 1500 HP for the Leopard 2 and
p" £> £> ^  O o  &  —^ C--C-l 1‘ r
the,XMl^_ Thus-growth ]3Qt<intial-be>uml 1500 HP lS'HUt ail FRG
d f L  fTO  -Z.
rrqiiirrmrTiT un tho I.anpiril ? Use of a turbine engine for other than 
main battle tanks can be a subject for follow-on discussions.
(3) BRAKE SYSTEM. As previously stated the US power pack has no 
redundant service brake system and cannot be so modified. However
it is expected to meet all other FRG unique brake performance 
requirements. This fulfillment of braking performance will be 
proven by the USDA. As the redundant brake system is not possible 
in the current power pack, FMOD will seek a waiver as an exception 
to traffic law requirements as soon as FMOD can verify the braking 
performance demonstrated with an up-weighted FSED XMl taking into 
consideration the main Leopard 2 aspects which are weight, center 
of gravity and sustained braking. FMOD noted that there is a 
precedent for waiver. FMOD agreed that, if a waiver is granted, 
the lack of a redundant brake system would not of itself block the 
introduction of a turbine power pack into production of Leopard 2.
(4) In the light of these agreements the target date of a German 
decision to adopt the turbine power pack for its Leopard 2 tank is 
the end of calendar year 1979. In order to meet this target date both 
parties agree to the following:
(a) The USDA agreed to provide expeditiously all background 
information and data relating to the FSED tests of the turbine power 
pick.
(b) The USDA agreed to provide expeditiously the detailed FSED 
test plans to facilitate possible incorporation of FMOD test require* 
ments. Further, the USDA agreed that FMOD has the right to request minor
changes to the tests, as they night occur, in order to satisfy 
FMOD test requirements. To the extent permitted by the XMl test '• 
schedule, the USDA will attempt to incorporate thoae jointly agreed 
to changes.
(c) The USDA agreed to provide to the FMOD observer all test 
data on the turbine power pack as it becomes available.
(d) The FMOD stated that there will be no substantial redesign of 
the turbine power pack required to integrate the engine into the 
Leopard 2 tank. However, the USDA agrees to jointly explore means 
with the FMOD to minimize the impact of changes required to the 
Leopard 2 hull by incorporation of the turbine power pack. Possible
cost questions for changes of mutual advantage will be addressed separately.
c. The USDA reported that US research and development efforts 
indicate that its planned advanced technology 120mm kinetic energy 
round can be made with interchangeable tungsten and depleted 
uranium penetrators. The FMOD expressed interest in the tungsten 
efforts for possible German application if the ammunition offers a 
substantial performance gain over the German 32mm penetrator and the 
ammunition can complete development "by the 1982/1983 time frame.
The FMOD and USDA agreed to form a Joint Working Group, under the 
GE-US Memorandum of Understanding of 15 December 1977 on Conduct of 
Joint Firing Tests, to review the US data base, consider joint and 
national activities on-going or planned, and recommend to national 
authorities by 1 November 1978 a proposed program which will permit
the FMOD to decide whether or not to join the USDA in a cooperative 
development program. As a condition to a favorable decision, the- 
US must initiate its 120mm XMl program.
FOR THE FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE US DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE: OF THE ARMY:
RUNGE DONALD R. KEITH
MinDirig Lieutenant General, USA
UAL Rue VII Deputy Chief of Staff for
FMOD Research, Development
and Acquisition
Bonn, 9 August 1978 Bonn, 9 August 1978
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ME OR RECORD V
V .  S o .SUBJECT: Report on Trip to APG for OSD Engine Review PaneT"~---- ^
1. On 28 February 1979 I participated in a demonstration of the XMl tank 
for the OSD Engine Review Panel. The demonstration was held at H field, 
lasted from 0845-1200 and consisted of:
a. Firing demonstration of the XMl and M60A1 RISE (passive) over the 
bump course.
b. Firing of the XMl smoke grenades and demonstration of the smoke 
generator.
c. Riding 1n and driving the XMl and M60.
d. Display of the pqpM^ack removed from the vehicle, the engine 
compartment and ground hop of the power pack.
2. The demonstration went extremely well and was well received by the 
panel members. They were impressed with the firing demonstration and 
comparative mobility of the XMl.
3. The display of the power pack went very well also. There was great 
interest 1n the pack, Its Installation, the plenum seal and air cleaners 
and other interfSCes. The engine fuel control system was expT&lfied and
re were many other questions. The most significant are:
a. Tracking of modules by serial number (a recurring question).
With the modular maintenance concept, the Army may have to track modules 
during production and identify them separately in the logbook.
b. Inlet/air Induction system 1c1ng tests. Messrs. Neumann and Horan 
firmly believe that the air cleaner V-packs and FOD screen will 1ce under 
certain circumstances. PMO should probably conduct 1c1ng tests on an 
engine during the fall of 1979 to answer this question. Mr. Neumann 
unofficially offered g l r r t n V f  amrlHrnmrntiil facilities tor this
4. I believe the demonstration had a very positive benefit and was 
Invaluable 1n helping the panel to understand the program, the tank and 
the power pack.
5. The RAM assessment group of the panel 1s tentatively scheduled to 
meet at Anaheim, California, on 2 March and again on 8 March. They will 
have no new data to analyze at these meetings, only that which was provided 
at previous meetings, and consequently may not contribute much new to the 
program.
6. The engine design group 1s scheduled to go to AVCO 14-16 March. Dr. 
Petrick is scheduled to go to Allison 7 March.
7* There 1s a panel meeting scheduled 1n Los Angeles 19-20 March* pre­
sumably to draw up conclusions.
A/.
PAUL M. ROOT 
Major* OrdC 
Automotive Branch
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OPM XMl COMMENTS 
GAO REPORT 951482
Page 5 - Comment 12
Allegation: Inadequate design of internal engine components, such as the LP 
turbine wheel and (LP) turbine nozzle caused an engine failure and caused 
other engines to stop functioning properly.
PM Status Comment: The statement is misleading, inaccurate and should be 
deleted. The engine design has' never proven to be faulty. Some design 
changes were made as required due to problems revealed by testing, but this 
is normal in an engine development program. One component (low pressure 
turbine wheel) was made of a material used in other turbine engines by a 
standard process but proved to be inadequate for the type of duty cycle to 
which the engine was subjected. A tank-type mission is new for a turbine, 
and the properties of this material (C101) were not known by anyone to be 
sensitive to the particular cycle prior to the testing. Only one engine was 
damaged by this. A redesign of the low pressure turbine wheel has been in­
corporated and completely successful in extensive vehicle and laboratory 
testing.
A quality - not design - defect in the LP turbine nozzle caused problems in 
two engines. The cause was determined, all engines were checked for the 
problem and all nozzles now have an inspection to prevent recurrence of the 
problem.
Page 6 - Comment 13
Allegation: Range dropped from 270 to 246 miles with increased track tension 
a 10% increase in fuel consumption.
PM Status Comment: It is premature to conclude that the range has decreased. 
Based on testing, the increased, track tension does increase fuel consumption 
by about 10%. An additional test was conducted in December 1979 with the in­
creased track tension which yielded a range of 270 miles; i.e., no decrease 
in range. This scatter in the data is due to a number of variables and fuel 
consumption and cruising range tests will be repeated in DT III to verify the 
range of production tanks.
0PM XMl COMMENTS 
GAO REPORT 951482
Page 6 - Comment 14
Allegation: No successful cold starts at -25°F. Procedures differed from 
TECOM's.
PM Status Comment: Problem was due to low battery voltage during initial 
"inrush at starter tripping the ECU protective circuitry. It had nothing to 
do with the engine's inherent ability to start at cold temperatures.
Chrysler is correcting this problem by providing a separate ECU battery which 
will provide power to the ECU during starts. A conceptual version of this was 
used at the Eglin Cold Room and resulted in repeated successful starts. The 
Eglin test was a contractor test and not a TECOM test.
TECOM has been asked to develop reasonable Test Operating Procedures (TOP) for 
a ground turbine engine and to clarify its interpretation of its TOP.
0PM XMl COMMENTS 
GAO REPORT 951482
Pans 11 - 2d Paragraph Up
Allegation: Extraordinary maintenance actions were taken to keep test on 
schedule. Fuel nozzle cleaning at 25 hr intervals is cited as example.
PM Status Comment: Maintenance was in accordance with manuals and Army pro­
cedures and performed on a third shift basis to expedite completion of the 
test. Details should come from SP.
During Ft. Knox Phase I testing, production configuration fuel nozzles were 
not yet available. Recognizing that the nozzle did not meet the requirements, 
a 25 hour inspection and clean-as-necessary program was instituted to avoid 
needless combat mission failures.
At the end of Phase I and during Phase II, production fuel nozzles were used. 
Since they were so new and no information was known of their coking rate, they 
were inspected every 25 hours, but cleaned only if there was a failure to 
start. One nozzle failed to start at 133 hours (due to the driver not allowing 
the start sequence to be fully completed), was cleaned and then ran over 150 
hours the requirement. Another went 178 hours, and the third has over 340 
hours (in several engines) without requiring cleaning. This is a good demonstra­
tion of the 150 hour semi-annual cleaning requirement.
0PM XMl COMMENT 
GAO REPORT 951482
Page 13- Paragraph 2
Allegation: Engine has not met its required reliability and durability goals.
PM Status Comment: Engine has no required reliability and durability goals, 
its re‘1 i'abilfty is evaluated as part of the XMl Tank System and its durability 
is evaluated as part of the power train.
Based on Ft. Knox testing, the XMl exceeds its requirements.
Requirement 
Combat Mission Reliability 272 MMBF 
Power Train Durability .5/4000
299 MMBF (Phase I) 
.54/4000 (Phase I & II)
Demonstrated
OPM XMl COMMENT 
GAO REPORT 951482
Page 14 - Paragraph 3
Allegation: As of April 1979, engine's demonstrated reliability and durability 
ware so low that they could be doubled and still fall short of its goals.
Recent testing tends to confirm this assessment.
PM Status Comment: Based on Ft. Knox testing, the vehicle reliability and power 
train durability requirements have been exceeded.
Chrysler has apportioned reliability to components based on a design objective 
of 356 MMBF for Combat Missions as a goal and has included an engine durability 
number in the Chrysler contract with AVCO, but these are not government require­
ments. The engine is close to meeting those levels of reliability and durability.
There were optimistic goals between the contractor and its subcontractor and are 
not government requirements.
The demonstrated improvement in these areas can be seen by comparing the results 
of the OSD Panel's assessments in April 1979 and January 1980 and the Pi 10's 
evaluation of Phase I and II Ft. Knox testing.
Powertrain
Demonstrated Combat Mission Reliability Assessment
Panel 
Evaluation 
April 1979 
__(MMBF)
Panel 
Evaluation 
January 1980 
___ (MMBF)
TOTAL POWER TRAIN
- Engine
- Transmission
- Final Drive
- Other Power Train
360
470
2,090
5,230
2,591
2,975
20,082
-1/
- 1/
1/ No failures in Phase I testing.
Demonstrated Power Train Durability
Panel Panel
Evaluation Evaluation
DT/OT II Phase I-Ft. Knox
April 1979 January 1980
PMO
Evaluation
Phase I & II - Ft. Knox 
January 1980
_____ (M B DF)___________
' 6,400
a ,  ooo
32,000
- 2 /
POWER TRAIN
- Enqine.- transmission
- Final Drive
(MMBDF)______ (liMBDFl
2,460 4,820
1/ No failures in Phase I testing.
77 Nn failures in Phase I cr II testing.
Page 14 - Last Paragraph
Allegation: GAO states the OSD Panel compared engines demonstrated durability 
and reliability against established requirements.
PM Status Comment: They compared the engine against contractor established 
goals, not government requirements.
See previous comment.
OPM XMl COMMENT 
GAO REPORT 951482
Page 15 - Charts
Allegation: Chart showed only April 1979 OSD Panel results.
PM Status Comment: Results of recent OSD Panel study for engine durability 
and reliability are provided.
ENGINE
Durability 
Reliability: 
System 
Mission
Design 
Objective 
(Note a) 
(MMBF)
10,000
2,825
5,000
UPPER CHART
Panel 
Assessment 
(Note b) 
(MMBF)
3,160
420
470
January 1980 
Panel 
Assessment 
(Note c) 
(MMBF)
4,820
2.975
2.975
January 1980 
PMO 
Assessment 
(Note d) 
(MMBF)___
6,400
3.168
3.168
a/ Design objectives as set forth in the engine manufacturer's coi Lract.
b[_ Assessment based on available test data with testing about 60 percent completed
c/_ Phase I Ft.IKnox test iresults.
d/ Based on Phase I and II Ft. Knox test results. There were no additional 
power train durability failures during Phase II.
LOWER CHART
Design April 1979 April 1979 January 1980 January IS
Objective Demonstrated Panel's Demonstrated Panel'?
(MMBF) Performance Projected Performance Projected
ENGINE (Note a) (MMBF) 
(Note a)
Performance 
(MMBF) 
(Note a)
(MMBF) 
(Note b)
Performanc
(MMBF)
System Rel. 2,825 420 860 2,975 15,061
Mission Rel. 5,000 470 1,050 -2,975 15,061
a/ Mean miles between failure, 
b/ Phase I Ft. Knox test results
Page 16 - Comment 33
Allegation: One engine completed the 1000 hr test. Parts were replaced to 
avoid possibility of engine damage. The second test is underway.
PM Status Comment: Update: Both tests have been completed. PMO considers 
the tests as extended durability tests and that they were successfully 
completed. The purpose of such testing is to identify those components which 
might limit engine durability at high engine operating times. The tests did 
this, some parts were replaced. A PIP program is being structured to increase 
the life of the durability-limiting parts.
OPM XMl COMMENT 
GAO REPORT 951482
Page 16 - Comment 34
Allegation: Six engines were replaced during 12,000 miles of test for all 
reasons, yielding 2,000 MMBF (all failure causes).
There were two inherent design failures for a 6000 MMBF for durability failures.
PM Status Comment: Update: During Phase II of the Ft. Knox testing, there were 
no more engine removals so the numbers become:
2,666 MMBF (all failure causes)
8,000 MMBF (durability failures)
The two durability failures were from errors during assembly, not design problems. 
Inspection procedures have been incorporated into the engine build procedures 
to avoid these problems in the future.
DRCPM-SCM-SM • POINT PAPER Automotive Branch 
MAJ Root/31231 
3 March ldSO
TOPIC
Why should Congress believe 
030/3RP instead of 6A0?
0 Membership/qualifications,
0 Scops of review.
0 Yardstick.
0 Recommendations
DISCUSSION POINTS
0 OSD Panel consisted of high ranking 
turbine engine and RAM-D engineers 
from government and industry.
0 Engines were inspected by engineers 
from Navy Air Propulsion Canter for 
OSD Panel. \
0 GAO Panel contained no turbine engineers 
(or any type of engineers?).
0 GAO conducted-.no engine inspection with 
with qualified engineers.
0 OSD panel conducted .comprehensive reviews 
in Feb-Apr 79 and Dec 79-Feb 80.
0 OSD panel used results of recent Ft. Knox 
and engine lab testing.
0 GAO did not use recent lab test results.
0 OSD Panel evaluated against government 
vehicle and power train reliability and 
durability requirements.
0 GAO evaluated against^engine design goals 
(not government requirements).
0 OSD Panel made specific recommendations 
to further improve engine.
0 GAO recommendations concerned only 
limitation of production and altarnate 
engines.
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Paul Michael Root
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Barbara, California. He is the son of Paul and Marylou 
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Mr. Root graduated from Punahou School in Honolulu, 
Hawaii, in 1962. He received a Bachelor of Science degree 
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